Primary and Secondary Qualities

Reading

[Reid, 1895a], V.II. [Mackie, 1976], ch. 1.
[Bennett, 1971], ch. 4. [Williams, 1978], pp. 327–47.
[Robinson, 1994], pp 59–74

Essay

What is the basis of Locke’s distinction between primary and secondary qualities? Is his distinction satisfactory?

Is it right to say that the colours of physical objects do not exist independently of perceivers, while the shapes of physical objects do exist independently of perceivers? Would saying this imply that objects do not really have colours?

Perception

Reading

[Locke, 1964], bk. II, chs. 1–8, 23. [Reid, 1895a], VI 20,21.
[Hume, 1966], sec. xii, part 1. [Mackie, 1976], ch. 2.
[Ayer, 1956], ch. 3. [Russell, 1959], chs. 1–3.
[Robinson, 1994], ch. 1. [Audi, 1998], ch. 1.

Essay

Is it true that we perceive physical objects (if at all) only indirectly, via perceiving sense data? What is the argument from illusion, and does it provide a good reason for believing in sense data?

What role should the concept of cause play in an account of perception? Does the causal theory of perception require the existence of sense data?

Causation

Reading

[Sosa and Tooley, 1993], Introduction. [Lewis, 1975].
[Hume, 1966], sec. VII. [Skyrms, 1975], pp. 85–89, 121-129.
[Mackie, 1974], ch. 2. [Blackburn, 1984], ch. 5, § 1,6; ch. 6, § 5,6.
Essay
What is the counterfactual conditional analysis of causal statements? Is such an analysis necessary for science or is a regularity or constant conjunction view adequate?

Innate Ideas

Reading

[Harris, 1974]. [Chomsky et al., 1971].

Essay
Examine and assess Locke’s arguments against innate ideas. Does he succeed in showing that the theory that we have innate ideas is less satisfactory than his alternative theory that we get all our ideas from experience?

Abstract Ideas

Reading

[Locke, 1964], II.xi(9-11) and III.i-iii. [Berkeley, 1970], introduction.
[Hume, 1978], I.i.7. [Kant, 1965], B180-1 and B741-2.

Essay
What is Locke’s view on how we come to have abstract ideas? What problem is it meant to solve? Does it solve this problem? Does Berkeley fairly represent Lock’s view?

Personal Identity

Reading

[Shoemaker, 1995]
[Locke, 1964], II.xxvii.. [Hume, 1978], I.iv.§ 6, appendix.
[Reid, 1941], III.6. [Mackie, 1976], ch. 6.
[Dennett, 1978a] [Strawson, 1959], ch. 3.

Essay
What is the difference between a ‘psychological criterion of personal identity’ and a ‘physical criterion of personal identity’? Which kind of criterion, if either, is more satisfactory?

Why does Parfit hold that it is survival, not personal identity that matters? Is he right about this?
Berkeley’s Immaterialism

Reading

[Ayers, 1975], editor’s introduction. [Berkeley, 1979], editor’s introduction.
[Dancy, 1987], ch. 5. [Ayers, 1970].
[Warnock, 1982], chs 5 & 6. [Bennett, 1971], ch. 6 §§33–35; ch. 8 §42.

Essay

Examine and assess Berkeley’s arguments for the non-existence of matter and for his view that ‘to be is to be perceived’. Be sure to consider whether he gives a satisfactory account of the difference between ‘real’ and ‘imaginary’ and the possibility of illusions.

Kant: Transcendental Idealism

Reading

[Kant, 1950], sect. 13 notes II and III; sect. 49; appendix.
[Wilkerson, 1976], ch. 9. [Strawson, 1966], part I sects 1,4,5;
part IV sect 8.
[Allison, 1983], ch. 2. [Bird, 1962], ch. 2.
[Walker, 1985].
[Kant, 1965], A26/B42 – A30/B45;
A32/B49 to end of Transcendental Aesthetic;
Refutation of Idealism;
A490/B518 – A497/B525.

Essay

How does Kant’s transcendental idealism differ from the idealism of Berkeley? Is it more defensible? Is Strawson’s dismissal of transcendental idealism justified?

Kant: Synthetic A Priori Truth

Reading

[Bennett, 1966], ch. 1. [O’Connor and Carr, 1982], ch. 6, up to p. 161.
[Hospers, 1990], ch. 3. [Strawson, 1966], pp. 43 f.

Essay

What did Kant mean by ‘synthetic a priori’? Was he right to think that there is such a thing as synthetic a priori knowledge? And was he right to think there is a special problem about how it is possible?
Leibniz: The Identity of Indiscernibles

Reading
[Leibniz, 1969a], sects. 8, 9, 12. [Leibniz, 1981], II xxvii.
[Leibniz, 1969b].
[Armstrong, 1978], ch. 9.
[Feldman, 1970].
[Curley, 1971].

Essay
What is the principle of the identity of indiscernibles? To what use does Leibniz put it? Should we accept it?

Leibniz: Necessary and Contingent Truths

Reading
[Leibniz, 1969a], sections 6, 8, 9, 13–16. [Leibniz, 1969c].
[Leibniz, 1969d].
[Cottingham, 1988], pp. 64–74.
[Fried, 1978].
[Broad, 1949].
[Hacking, 1982].

Essay
Did Leibniz succeed in drawing a satisfactory distinction between necessary and contingent truths?

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