prove helpful in dealing with such questions, we would be in his debt. And in Thomas Hueglin’s as well.

PHILIP HANSEN  University of Regina

Thomas Hobbes and the Political Philosophy of Glory
Gabriella Slomp
New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2000, pp. xii, 194

In this brief but adventurous work, Gabriella Slomp brings together two perspectives—glory and game theory—that more commonly are opposed in readings of Hobbes. She argues that glory has an important place in all of Hobbes’s writings on human nature and political conflict. On this basis she insists that glory be incorporated in game-theoretic constructions of the logic of Hobbes’s account, and she uses this to show the inadequacy of “rational actor” versions of this logic. In their place, she proposes an alternative reading of Hobbes as “the political geometer of glory.”

This is not, however, an exercise in game theory. It is primarily an exploration of the role of glory in Hobbes’s theory, based in a comprehensive analysis of the texts—including the Anti-White and Hobbes’s Correspondence. The two chapters on game theory are non-technical, written for general readers who, as she wryly notes, “may have an instinctive distaste for the often spurious precision of game-theoretic analyses” (122).

Slomp argues (against F. S. McNeilly) that glory has a constant meaning and role in human conflict throughout Hobbes’s works. She develops this through comprehensive textual analysis and illustrates it by engaging comparisons with Thucydides. However, she notes a shift in the extent to which glory explains human behaviour. In Hobbes’s earlier works (the Elements, De Cive, and Anti-White) glory has a central role as the primary source of human behaviour, whereas in later works (Leviathan, De Homine and Behemoth) glory is just one passion among others, and the passions as a whole have a reduced role in determining behaviour. With this development, Slomp detects a correspondingly greater attention to social institutions (relative to human nature) in Hobbes’s account of the causes and cures of political instability.

Slomp then develops a game-theoretic model, distinctively stressing the role of glory. Readers of this JOURNAL may recall Slomp’s technical articles in this area with Manfredi La Manna in 1996 and 1997. But Slomp’s account in the book is written for non-technical readers and, with one exception (the formal notation in stating rankings), she succeeds admirably. I strongly recommend chapters 10-11 to readers who might like to know more about this approach. Chapter 10 provides an accessible survey of the game-theoretic readings of Hobbes in a style that is light, incisive and playful. Then, following the lead of Pat Neal, Slomp shows why the rational actor perspective should be abandoned.

This is the core of the work as I understand it, but there is a great deal more at the margin—including speculations about Hobbes’s ideology and his views on self-identity. These seem to have been abbreviated (and wrenched) from a more detailed work.

One virtue of a work of this quality is that it puts the reader into a position to assess its limitations. This is particularly true of the account of glory. Slomp’s discussion is comprehensive, but too summarily so for my taste. Too many quotes are assembled from too many texts, where a slower and context-based analysis of the passage in the particular text would be more effective.
Let me illustrate this with reference to one of Slomp’s basic claims: that throughout all of Hobbes’s works glory is used in the same way, as a desire for prestige and a desire to acquire power over others (33). This is oversimplified. In De Cive, Hobbes treats glory as the desire “to have a good opinion of ones selfe” [sic]: this is not necessarily comparative and it absolutely does not entail a desire for power over others. In Leviathan, Hobbes defines “glory” the “imagination of a mans [sic] own power and ability”: this again is not necessarily comparative and clearly not dominative. Slomp dismisses this in a single sentence and without quoting the definition (it is relegated to a footnote). To be sure, glory is often used in these works with comparative and dominative connotations. The point is that these are not the only usages and so there is no basis for treating them as definitional. What is needed is not an assertion-by-definition but an analysis that links these different connotations together, showing how Hobbes moves from one to the other. This is important especially because there are several different such connotations, ranging from the basic definition (imagination of one’s own power) through competitiveness (wanting to win because the prize is food and one wants food), private honour (wanting to win as a sign to oneself of superiority), public honour (wanting to win as a sign of superiority to others), deference (wanting others to acknowledge one’s superiority) and natural authority (claiming to rule others in respect of one’s natural superiority). Hobbes uses “glory” at different times with all of these connotations and so a full analysis, I think, would explicate them all on the basis of Hobbes’s stated definition.

However this point criticizes only Slomp’s claim about the meaning of glory for Hobbes, not her larger claim about its importance in explaining conflict. Indeed, a fuller analysis of its differing usages would almost certainly support this larger claim and open the door to a more nuanced version of the “political geometry of glory” that she proposes.

DON CARMICHAEL  University of Alberta

Instilling Ethics
Norma Thompson, ed.
Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 2000, pp. v, 239

This is a book that is well worth reading. Its essays are generally lively and thoughtful pieces that collectively engage with significant questions about the present state of ethics. It covers a lot of ground in the space of 239 pages. Some of the contributions suffer from attempting too much in the relatively constrained space available. For instance, the interesting essay by Cary Nederman on Cicero signals an intention of relating Cicero’s ethics to contemporary republicanism without fully redeeming the promise. Likewise, Jeffrey Macy’s essay on medieval Jewish and Islamic standpoints on ethics and religion inevitably covers its broad area by making indicative remarks rather than offering sustained argument. A number of the essays, however, such as those by Stephen Salkever on Aristotle, Clifford Orwin on Rousseau and Stephen White on Charles Taylor, manage to convey significant, convincing arguments in succinct, engaging prose.

The volume as a whole possesses coherence in raising and answering questions about the contemporary state of ethics. Its success in this regard turns upon the high quality of the crucial second part of the book. The book is divided into three parts. The first part, “Sources of Ethical Reflection” deals with premodern and early modern ethics. The third part, “Instilling Ethics Today,” reviews the ways in which ethics are invoked in contemporary pro-