

Does Turnout Matter?
Black Mobilization and Substantive Representation in Congress

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A great deal of scholarly attention has been given to whether patterns of voter turnout in the United States produce a representative electorate (Piven and Cloward 2000; Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995; Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980). This research is motivated by the belief that voting matters, that elected officials “are more likely to be aware of, and to pay attention to, the needs and preferences of those who are active” (Verba, Schlozman, and Brady, 163). Despite such assertions, surprisingly little research has demonstrated political or policy consequences resulting from group disparities in voter turnout. The current study seeks to add to the debate over whether voter mobilization matters by probing the effects of group turnout on a variety of measures of substantive representation – and also to ask how a group’s turnout rate might influence the system.

Our specific focus in this paper is to ask whether voting among African Americans improves black substantive representation in Congress. Previous studies have examined the representation of black interests. However, this work does not overlap much with research that has studied the political influence of participation, despite their common interest in the quality of representation. The first of these literatures focuses on the influence of the racial composition of congressional districts on representation of blacks’ interests in Congress, as well as how this relationship may be dependent on the race of the representative (Canon 1999; Hutchings, McClerking, and Charles 2004; Lublin 1997; Lublin and Voss 2000; Swain 1993, Therstrom 1987; Whitby 2000; Whitby and Gilliam 1991; Tate 2003). The second literature examines the influence of political participation on representation for distinct political groups, such as low-income individuals, seeking to understand whether turnout produces greater representation of their interests in policy outputs (Avery and Peffley 2005; Hill and Leighley 1992; Hill, Leighley, and Hinton-Andersson 1995; Martin 2003; Radcliff and Saiz 1995).

While both of these literatures have provided important insights, they also have limitations. Research examining the linkage between black constituencies and substantive representation in Congress has focused on the racial makeup of the geographic constituency, ignoring the potential impact of racial characteristics of the voting public. It does not answer directly the question of whether different levels of mobilization result in different levels of policy responsiveness. Further, indicators of substantive

representation of black interests in Congress have almost exclusively been limited to scores provided by interest groups (e.g., the Leadership Council on Civil Rights), votes for which the demands of black representation are relatively obvious, rather than considering the preferences of black citizens on issues that do not receive so much attention. Likewise, studies investigating the impact of participation are largely limited to state-level analysis and focus on the policy outputs resulting from disparities in voter turnout, leaving important intermediary steps (e.g., legislative voting) in a black box.

The current study builds on and seeks to link these two research programs by investigating the impact of various characteristics of the black population in congressional districts on substantive representation in Congress. Specifically, we examine simultaneously the influence of black population (both total and voting age) and black turnout on various indicators of substantive representation, including a new measure based on national black public opinion rather than interest group scores. We begin with a discussion of the two literatures outlined above. We then turn to a model predicting black substantive representation that uses different policy indicators and that includes a key explanatory variable: the (estimated) black proportion of the voting electorate. Although we intend to improve our estimation of turnout by race through the use of the Federal Election Project (Lublin and Voss 2003), such that the findings reported in this paper are preliminary, we do find support for the claim that turnout matters. When blacks make up a larger portion of the voting electorate substantive representation is enhanced. However, the relationship between black voting and representation is not direct, but works primarily through the electoral outcomes produced – that is, votes on behalf of the Democratic Party with whom most African Americans identify.

LINKING TWO LITERATURES

Studies examining representation of blacks' interests in Congress are primarily interested in how the racial composition of congressional districts and the characteristics of representatives influence the quality of black representation. One line of inquiry focuses on the consequences of racial gerrymandering on representation of blacks' interests in Congress as a whole. Along these lines, scholars have debated whether the creation of majority-minority districts leads to greater representation of blacks' interests

through the election of more African Americans to Congress, or whether the concentration of blacks into fewer districts leads to poorer substantive representation in Congress as more conservatives are elected in the now white-concentrated neighboring districts (Canon 1999; Lublin 1997; Lublin and Voss 2000; Swain 1995; Thernstrom 1987; Whitby 2000). The focus is primarily on aggregate outcomes, though, rather than on how individual legislators respond to demographic shifts in their electorate over time.

A second, related question does look at the quality of representation at the district level rather than in Congress as a whole. For example, scholars have examined whether congressmen in districts with larger black populations are more likely to support the interests of blacks and how this relationship may be conditioned by the race or partisanship of the member (Cobb and Jenkins 2001; Canon 1999; Hutchings, McClerking and Charles 2004; Lublin 1997; Mansbridge 1999; Pinney and Serra 1999; Whitby 2000; Whitby and Gilliam 1991). However, the treatment rarely incorporates district behavioral characteristics such as voter turnout that might change from election to election within the same legislative districts.

That is, this research is limited in that it has focused exclusively on the racial characteristics of districts' *geographic* constituencies, ignoring other conceptualizations of constituencies. In his book *Home Style*, Richard Fenno (1978) identifies several levels of constituencies that members of Congress (henceforth referred to as MCs) may consider when making voting decisions. Fenno's concern is with distinguishing the strength of one's supporters, but the larger point is that we do not know precisely to whom a representative typically feels responsible and whose policy needs and preferences are likely to be reflected in the individual's voting behavior. Representatives may act to protect the interests of what Fenno calls a geographic constituency, his term for all citizens within a district. But representatives instead might be driven by the election connection and therefore respond most attentively to constituents of voting age (who have the potential to cost them reelection) or to constituents who already participate in the electorate. Likewise, Whitby (2000) posits MCs may pay greater attention to the preferences of white conservative financial supporters in districts where blacks make up a large share of the geographic constituency but only make up a small share of the reelection constituency (i.e., where black voter turnout is low).

Some empirical evidence does suggest a link between the composition of the reelection constituency and the representation of their interests. Informed by survey research showing greater support for welfare among low-income citizens, studies have found that higher levels of turnout among the lower class are associated with more generous state welfare policy (Avery and Peffley 2005; Fellowes and Rowe 2004; Hill and Leighley 1992; Hill, Leighley, and Hinton-Andersson 1995). For example, Avery and Peffley (2005) find that in states where the lower class turned out to vote at a rate closer to that of the upper class, lawmakers were less likely to pass more restrictive welfare eligibility measures. While this finding (and others like it) suggests congruence between turnout among groups and representation of their interests in policy outputs, it tells us little of the legislative process that supposedly facilitates this linkage.

One study at the national level does demonstrate the role that MCs play in providing wanted outcomes to the reelection constituency. Paul Martin (2003) found that members of Congress attempt to allocate resources (i.e., federal expenditures) strategically to the counties within their congressional district that vote at higher rates. Thus, Martin's findings coincide with those examining lower class turnout in that representatives motivated by reelection are likely to reward groups that turnout at higher rates with favorable policy decisions.

Finally, some studies provide indirect evidence of the importance of turnout among blacks for representation in Congress (Black 1978; Bullock 1981; Whitby and Gilliam 1991). For example, Whitby and Gilliam (1991), examining the 91st through the 100th Congresses, find that Southern Democratic MCs became more liberal after the passage of the Voting Rights Act of 1965. One reason Southern Democrats have become more liberal is because conservative Democrats were replaced by liberal ones (i.e., generational replacement). However, they also find that incumbent Democrats have become more liberal in their voting also. Both findings, the authors conclude, suggests that the political mobilization of blacks in the 1960's has lead Democratic MCs to give greater consideration to their black constituents' policy needs. While their study provide indirect evidence of a link between voter turnout among blacks and legislative behavior, they do not examine this linkage directly – nor, given the context of disenfranchisement

in which their work operated, can one conclude that less-dramatic variation in turnout would produce comparable responsiveness.

While a positive relationship between black turnout and representation of blacks' interests is consistent with both Fenno's work and the previously cited empirical evidence, some studies have posited a "backlash" hypothesis, which suggests that minority participation may actually *decrease* substantive representation in Congress. The backlash hypothesis argues that as blacks make up a larger portion of a geographic constituency or participate at higher levels, whites, threatened by racial competition for power, support more racially conservative candidates and public policy (Giles and Buckner 1993; Huckfeldt and Kohfeldt 1989; Key 1949; Radcliff and Saiz 1995). Hence, a potential backlash by conservative whites may lead to policies less congruent with blacks' interests as blacks participate at higher rates. Recent studies have not found support for the racial backlash hypothesis (Lublin 1997; Lublin and Voss 2000; Voss 1996), but they lacked any direct way to distinguish the political impact of black voting. Our study therefore is the first to consider directly the implications of black turnout, at the district level, on representation of blacks' interests in Congress, so we cannot rule out the possibility that higher levels of turnout among blacks may lead to poorer representation of their interests.

In summary, the bulk of research examining representation of black interests in Congress has focused on the impact of the racial characteristics of the geographic constituency. However, studies examining welfare policy in the states, allocation of resources within congressional districts, and legislative behavior after the enfranchisement of blacks in the 1960s suggest black voter turnout may also play an important role in garnering representation of blacks in Congress. Such a result would have important practical implications because, unlike the demographic makeup of congressional districts, mobilization is something that activists and politicians can influence directly. The current study tests empirically whether a relationship does in fact exist between black mobilization and representation in Congress – and, if so, whether the relationship is positive or negative.

MEASURES AND METHODS

Dependent Variables: Representation of Blacks' Interests in Congress

We focus on representation in the House of Representatives rather than in the Senate for two reasons. First, the shorter length of terms in the House should facilitate greater responsiveness (Whitby 1997). Additionally, examining these research questions at the congressional-district level, rather than at the state level, allows for much greater variation in each of our measures of black constituency and black mobilization.

Theoretically, one could expect variation in the size of the black geographic and reelection constituencies to affect several different aspects of MCs' voting behavior. Consequently, in estimating the influence of racial characteristics of constituencies on congressional voting we employ four dependent variables. These four measures allow us to examine the effect of the black constituencies on a wide array of variables from liberalism in general, to voting consistent with black interest groups, to voting with the expressed interests and preferences of blacks on various issues that have not been politicized as racial ones.

First, we make use of Poole and Rosenthal's DW-Nominate scores, a general measure of MCs' ideology. As blacks comprise a larger percentage of a member's district and of the voting electorate, we may expect MCs to vote more liberally in general, as blacks are overwhelmingly liberal (e.g., Lublin 1997). Second, following previous scholarship (Huchings, McClerking, and Charles 2004; Whitby 2000; Whitby and Gilliam 1991), we include MCs' ratings by interest groups associated with promoting the interests of African Americans. In addition to commonly used ratings from the Leadership Conference on Civil Rights (LCCR), however, we add the legislative positions taken by the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP). The LCCR and NAACP scores measure the proportion of roll call votes in which MCs have supported positions endorsed by the two groups, and are generally those votes in which black interests are clearly at stake. The LCCR and NAACP scores, however, are limited in that they are based on only a few votes that have been identified as "black issues." The NAACP and the LCCR took positions on only eighteen and twelve votes during the 107th Congress, respectively. Because it seems inappropriate to reduce the desire for representation to a handful of issues seen as defining blacks' interests, we

computed a final index based on the policy preferences expressed by African Americans on issues such as abortion, crime, defense spending, the environment, and social security, to name just a few.

This new measure of substantive representation of blacks' interests utilizes 47 votes during the 107th Congress and is based on whether the MC voted in a fashion consistent with national black public opinion as reported in surveys. In constructing our measure, we first identified black public opinion on all available policy issues by searching the 1996 National Black Election Study, the 2000 American National Election Study, and the 2000 General Social Survey, determining the percentage of blacks supporting each side on each issue. Issues incorporated into our measure include preferences regarding the military, the environment, national healthcare, childcare, welfare, mass transportation, funding for national parks, education, social security, funding for the sciences, abortion, foreign aid, campaign finance reform, and support for stricter crime policy. After identifying black public opinion on these issues (i.e., percent supporting or opposing an issue or policy), we then identified 47 final passage votes for the 107th Congress that were directly related to one of the survey questions identified and where a "yea" and "nay" vote were clearly consistent or inconsistent with black public opinion. Votes that were not clearly consistent or inconsistent with black opinion were excluded, but we did not censor votes according to how lopsided or evenly balanced black opinion happened to be. Instead, we weighted each vote – consistent or inconsistent with the majority of blacks – by the percent of the black population siding with the policy choice made by the member of Congress. Importantly, there are significant racial differences in opinion on the majority of issues we include in our measure. (A description of the construction of our measure, the racial differences in preferences on each issue, and the associated votes in the 107th Congress are included in Appendix A.)

Independent Variables

In predicting representation in Congress we are most interested in the effect of racial characteristics of congressional districts. We therefore computed three separate measures of the proportional size of the black constituency in each congressional district. Two measures come from the Census redistricting files, aggregated from block-level data into values for each congressional district. The first reports the proportion of the district

population that is black.¹ The second reports the proportion of the district voting-age population that is black.² A third constituency measure reports the estimated proportion of 2000 presidential election voters who were black.³ We choose presidential turnout both because that campaign offered two viable candidates in every district, including those where the congressional election was uncompetitive, and because it represents voters who are potentially mobilized rather than those who happened to show up for a single contest.

Other variables were pulled into the analysis as controls. For example, we included a dummy variable to capture whether the representative is himself or herself black, presuming that such representatives might favor black interests more than required by the demands of their constituencies (1 = yes, 0 = no). We included a dummy variable to distinguish the South, in case southern representatives are particularly likely to disfavor the interests of African Americans (again, 1 = yes, 0 = no). We included a dummy variable for whether the representative was a Democrat, given that black voters generally favor the Democratic party and therefore can expect greater policy congruence with candidates elected from that party (1 = yes, 0 = no). Finally, a continuous variable captures the general partisanship of the district. It contains the proportion of the overall general election vote received by Al Gore, the 2000 Democratic presidential candidate.⁴ We also used interaction terms computed among these variables for some models.

For the current paper, we use Ordinary Least Squares regression to predict the four indicators of substantive representation. Our eventual goal is to identify methods of

¹ The measure counts as black everyone who reported a primary identification as African American, including not only those who reported being black as their only racial category, but also those who reported that they were black as one of two racial identifications. Note that Hispanic blacks were counted as well. People who reported three or more racial categories were not counted as black, regardless of the categories they chose.

² Needless to say, the black voting-age population is not the same thing as the pool of eligible black voters. However, the Census does not keep track of whether some proportion of adults in a district are ineligible to vote because of felony convictions or citizenship status. These barriers to voting only show up in the turnout measure.

³ The present paper derives the estimates from ecological inference using Gary King's EI software. The current estimates came from an analysis conducted at the congressional district level, but our intention is to improve individual district estimates using precinct-level data from the Federal Election Project where possible. The district-level analysis allowed black turnout rates to vary based on the proportion of the voting-age population that was black. White turnout rates were allowed to vary based on that same variable as well as the proportion of voting-age population that was Hispanic.

⁴ Because state political parties can vary significantly in their ideological makeup, presidential voting seems a better measure of identification with the national Democratic party than registration data would.

weighting that can take into account multiple sources of noise at once: that coming from estimation of one dependent variable using polls, estimation of one explanatory variable using ecological inference, etc. We also intend to bring additional control variables into the analysis, variables that can be aggregated at the level of congressional districts from other Census extracts. However, we do not have any strong suspicions that results will change as a result of these additional safeguards. We therefore consider the preliminary findings from this project to indicate where our final analysis is likely to point. We hope that readers of this draft will give us feedback about what changes would be necessary to increase their confidence in the results, which we report in the next section.

RESULTS

Different Constituencies

At the most basic level, congressional districts with more African Americans in the electorate are especially likely to send to Congress representatives who vote in a fashion consistent with perceived black interests. Table 1 shows results from four bivariate regressions, one for each measure of substantive representation. Districts with more black voters are more likely to be liberal on the Nominat scale (where low values are associated with liberal scores), more likely to side with the LCCR and the NAACP, and more likely to side with national black preferences on issues that do not attract the attention of race-based interest groups.

[Table 1 about here]

The real question, though, is whether there are mobilization effects distinct from the simple presence of black citizens or black constituents within the district. Table 2 therefore adds the two constituency controls: proportion black of the population and of the voting-age population. For all four dependent variables, there is a large amount of overlap between the control variables and the racial characteristics of the voting electorate, making it difficult to distinguish their effects. However, it is clear that the important constituency is the electorate, not simply the demographic characteristics of the district or even of the voting-age population. The black share of the electorate exhibits a strong and independent relationship with the quality of substantive representation, leading a representative to be more liberal, more favorable toward the positions held by

relevant interest groups, and more likely to side with the preferences of African Americans on low-profile issues.

The importance of mobilizing black voters appears clearly when one compares the results for the turnout variable with those for the voting-age population (VAP). The latter variable consistently returns coefficients in the opposite direction from those of the turnout variable, and all of them at least approach statistical significance (one has a p-value of 0.07). What does it mean to have a high value on that variable? Given that we are controlling for the racial makeup of the electorate, a high value essentially represents a demobilized black voting pool. African Americans receive poor substantive representation in places where they do not vote. Of course, we cannot say from these results whether poor representation demobilizes the voters or whether their absence from the polls encourages poor representation. But we can say with certainty that the relationship between turnout and representation did not result automatically from the demographic makeup of the district.

[Table 2 about here]

Table 3 adds the relevant control variables. It is important to note, however, that these variables are not controls in the traditional sense: variables added to prevent omitted variable bias. We can imagine certain control variables that scholars might want to see, things that would be causally prior to the race of the electorate because they would have been determined before the 2000 election (e.g., details about the candidate choices or about previous election results) – and would appreciate feedback about which ones seem necessary. The additional variables we have added serve a different purpose. They are intended to capture possible mechanisms through which black turnout might influence substantive representation indirectly. Having African Americans vote at a high rate might influence their representation directly by communicating engagement to elected officials, or it might work through its influence on electoral outcomes.

Addition of the controls eliminates the significant coefficients for black turnout in all four models. The turnout variable returns a minuscule coefficient and a large standard error for every dependent variable. Notable, the effects of the other constituency variables are diminished, but they are not wiped out as completely. Black turnout matters, but only insofar as it is effective. It works in tandem with the election of black

representatives, both by increasing in reaction to their candidacies and by improving the chance of their candidacies being successful. It works through the successful election of Democrats to Congress. It helps increase the strength of support for the national Democratic party in the district. In short, the effect of turnout works through the mechanisms of descriptive representation and partisan representation.

[Table 3 about here]

We also tried several models in which the turnout variable was allowed to have an interactive effect with other variables in the model. For the most part, the results from this exploration were uninteresting (as were the results of models that controlled for the proportion of the voting-age population that was Hispanic). Table 4 reports the one notable exception. We allowed the effect of turnout to depend on whether the congressional district contained a black representative, supposing that mobilization might have a disproportionate effect on white representatives who otherwise might have no personal identification with the black community. A suggestive result appears, but not the one we expected. Black mobilization made no difference on the commonly studied indicators of substantive representation: Nominat scores, LCCR scores, NAACP scores. However, rather to our surprise, black mobilization corresponds better with representation on primarily non-racial issues among African-American MCs. When blacks make up a larger proportion of the electorate, controlling for their general numbers among the constituencies in question, representatives of the same race are notably more likely to vote in a manner consistent with national black opinion. Again, we cannot say whether successful representation mobilizes the voters or whether the mobilization of the voters promotes the representation – but the two do appear in tandem.

[Table 4 about here]

Different Mobilization Measures

Until now, we have looked at the influence of black turnout relative to turnout of others. However, there is another way to think about mobilization that we also explored, which was in terms of the mobilization rate. It is possible that even a relatively small black electorate could demand the attention of elected officials if they were highly mobilized. Table 5 therefore offers an alternate version of the full Table 3 model, this

time using the proportion of African Americans who voted (rather than the proportion of voters who were African American).

The results for this measure of turnout are not appreciably different from those identified for the other turnout measure, however. Black turnout exhibits no independent effect on substantive representation. Indeed, the variable does not help predict our dependent variables even in the underspecified model reported in tables 2. This result increases our confidence that we have identified the electoral mechanisms through which black mobilization operates to make the political system more responsive.

[Table 5 about here]

CONCLUSION

Activists and scholars often promote turning out to vote as an important way for groups to ensure adequate representation. They imply that elected officials will not listen to citizens unless they form part of some politically important constituency. An alternate story would be that politicians do not wait until voters mobilize; they simply anticipate the needs of their geographic constituency and provide good representation regardless of who actually bothers to vote in a given election. Our results do not accommodate this sensible hypothesis, however. If anything, when districts contain a large but demobilized group of black voters, elected officials provide particularly poor substantive representation. One can question which way the causal arrow runs in that relationship, but either way the result falsifies any expectation that candidates are serving the demobilized voters.

Having said that turnout matters, however, we cannot support the implication that elected officials somehow automatically listen to people just because they vote. Voting and losing probably does not improve one's representation and may even worsen it (a possibility we will explore in future research by considering the racial demographics of an MC's winning coalition). Rather, the relationship between representation and turnout that we have observed is mostly subsumed within the party system. Highly mobilized black voters can ensure the election of Democrats and to increase the power of the overall Democratic electorate within a congressional district. Representing that partisan base allows members of Congress to vote more liberally, to accommodate the desires of race-oriented interest groups, and to otherwise accommodate black public opinion on non-

racial issues. A large black electorate also can result in the election of a black representative, who is even more likely than other Democrats to provide that roll-call substantive representation. One tongue-in-cheek way to summarize our findings, therefore, is that turnout matters only when it really matters.

APPENDIX A: MEASURE OF SUBSTANTIVE REPRESENTATION

In constructing our measure, one of the authors identified and coded votes for the second session, while his research assistant coded votes for the first session. After this initial step, each reviewed all votes in the other's session with those chosen as relevant and suggested new votes to include. Each also reviewed the others' direction of coding (consistent or inconsistent with black opinion). There were two votes that produced disagreement, one regarding whether it was relevant to black opinion, the other regarding the direction of coding. Both were excluded from the final measure.

Table A1 includes the issues identified from the surveys, the percent support among blacks and whites, and the associated votes in the 107th Congress.

Table A1: Issues, Percent Support, and Associated Votes for Measure of Substantive Representation.

Issue	Percent Support (Blacks & Whites)	Associated Votes in 107 th Congress
National Assistance for Military	20%; 33%	RC 458 1st session. RCs 158, 455 2nd session.
National Assistance for the Environment	69%; 58%	RCs 81, 134, 206, 389 1 st session. RCs 82, 237, 284 2 nd session.
National Assistance for Healthcare	84%; 73%	RCs 64, 332 1 st session. RCs 282, 351, 466 2 nd session.
National Assistance for Welfare	39%; 18%	RC 170 2 nd Session.
National Assistance for Mass Transit	34%; 36%	RC 348 1 st Session. RCs 159, 243, 327, 375 2 nd Session.
National Assistance for Social Security	75%; 58%	RC 160 2 nd Session.
National Assistance for Science	32%, 37%	RCs 13, 212 2 nd Session.
Abortion	36%; 44%	RCs 97, 343 2 nd Session.
National Assistance for Foreign Aid	18%; 8%	RCs 182, 443, 2 nd Session.
Campaign Finance Reform	75%; 75%	RC 34 2 nd Session.
Stricter Crime Policy	33%; 39%	RCs 89, 386, 396, 398, 491, 501 1 st Session. RCs 64, 175, 255, 296, 465 2 nd Session.
National Assistance for Crime	70%; 55%	RCs 333, 493 1 st Session.
National Assistance for Education	82%, 73%	RC 145, 166, 375 1 st Session.
National Assistance for Childcare	73%; 57%	RC 124 1 st Session.

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Table 1: Bivariate Relationship Between Black Turnout and Representation

	Model 1A (Nominate)	Model 1B (LCCR)	Model 1C (NAACP)	Model 1D (Pub Opinion)
Prop. Black in Electorate	-1.054*** (0.137)	0.850*** (0.126)	0.739*** (0.100)	0.026*** (0.008)
Constant	0.147***	0.411***	0.469***	0.551***
Obs.	441	440	441	441
R-squared	0.119	0.094	0.111	0.026
Root MSE	0.438	0.404	0.320	0.025

*** p < .01, **, p < .05; * p < .1
Standard errors in parentheses

Table 2: The Influence of Black Constituencies on Representation

	Model 2A (Nominate)	Model 2B (LCCR)	Model 2C (NAACP)	Model 2D (Pub Opinion)
Prop. Black in Electorate	-4.639*** (1.067)	4.367*** (0.981)	3.336*** (0.778)	0.211*** (0.060)
Prop. Black in VAP	9.032** (4.385)	-8.819** (4.029)	-5.811* (3.196)	-0.787*** (0.246)
Prop. Black in Pop	-5.150 (3.484)	5.011 (3.201)	3.031 (2.540)	0.573*** (0.195)
Constant	0.082**	0.475***	0.519***	0.553***
Obs.	441	440	441	441
R-squared	0.143	0.122	0.136	0.051
Root MSE	0.434	0.398	0.316	0.024

*** p < .01, **; p < .05; * p < .1
Standard errors in parentheses

Table 3: Full Model Predicting Representation

	Model 3A (Nominate)	Model 3B (LCCR)	Model 3C (NAACP)	Model 3D (Pub Opinion)
Prop. Black in Electorate	0.218 (0.413)	0.104 (0.351)	0.123 (0.259)	0.092 (0.066)
Prop. Black in VAP	1.751 (1.527)	-2.329* (1.296)	-0.772 (0.957)	-0.703*** (0.245)
Prop. Black in Pop	-1.580 (1.206)	1.782* (1.023)	0.434 (0.755)	0.570*** (0.193)
South	0.027 (0.020)	-0.028* (0.017)	-0.010 (0.012)	-0.003 (0.003)
Black MC	-0.105** (0.047)	0.118*** (0.040)	0.069** (0.029)	0.018** (0.008)
Democrat	-0.724*** (0.018)	0.708*** (0.016)	0.572*** (0.012)	0.005* (0.003)
Dem. Share of Presidential Vote	-0.874*** (0.089)	0.577*** (0.076)	0.444*** (0.056)	0.016 (0.014)
Constant	0.801***	-0.098***	0.067***	0.544
Obs.	441	440	441	441
R-squared	0.900	0.913	0.925	0.093
Root MSE	0.149	0.126	0.093	0.024

*** p < .01, **, p < .05; * p < .1
Standard errors in parentheses

Table 4: Conditional Influence of Race of Representative

	Model 4D (Pub Opinion)
Prop. Black in Electorate	0.018 (0.079)
Prop. Black in VAP	-0.552** (0.260)
Prop. Black in Pop	0.483** (0.200)
South	-0.003 (0.003)
Black MC	-0.016 (0.021)
Democrat	0.005* (0.003)
Dem. Share of Presidential Vote	0.019 (0.014)
Black MC * Prop. Black in Electorate	0.095* (0.057)
Constant	0.542***
Obs.	441
R-squared	0.099
Root MSE	0.024

*** p < .01, **; p < .05; * p < .1
Standard errors in parentheses

Table 5: The Influence of an Alternative Measure of Black Mobilization

	Model 5A (Nominate)	Model 5B (LCCR)	Model 5C (NAACP)	Model 5D (Pub Opinion)
Black Turnout Rate	-0.231 (0.252)	-0.008 (0.196)	0.169 (0.158)	0.037 (0.040)
Prop. Black in VAP	2.249** (1.101)	-2.305*** (0.855)	-0.412 (0.690)	-0.456** (0.177)
Prop. Black in Pop	-1.784* (1.032)	1.835** (0.801)	0.146 (0.646)	0.406** (0.166)
South	0.022 (0.020)	-0.029* (0.015)	-0.008 (0.012)	-0.004 (0.003)
Black MC	-0.108** (0.047)	0.128*** (0.036)	0.079*** (0.029)	0.022*** (0.008)
Democrat	-0.725*** (0.018)	0.722*** (0.014)	0.572*** (0.012)	0.005 (0.003)
Dem. Share of Presidential Vote	-0.863*** (0.087)	0.624*** (0.068)	0.447*** (0.055)	0.019 (0.014)
Constant	0.861***	-0.115*	0.016	0.531***
Obs.	441	440	441	441
R-squared	0.900	0.929	0.926	0.091
Root MSE	0.149	0.116	0.093	0.024

*** p < .01, **; p < .05; * p < .1

Standard errors in parentheses

What exactly do we mean? Studies regularly demonstrate the importance of resources in movement emergence, development, strategies, and outcomes, though often without explicitly mentioning the resource mobilization approach. When resource mobilization is explicitly referenced, it is often used as one of many theoretical explanations being examined, rather than a systematic examination of resource mobilization theory itself, or it is used as a series of control variables in studies interested in alternative theoretical explanations. When turnout does increase, the increase appears to be temporary. We conclude that while representation of minorities has increased in Congress, these candidates appear less effective at inspiring continued African American involvement in the electoral process. 1 Minority Turnout and Minority Candidates. Following the increase in minority representation produced by Section 2 of the VRA, a literature developed trying to answer the question of whether minority candidates generally increase minority turnout (?). Early work using precinct level data found little evidence of increased turnout (?). Grassroots mobilization and voter turnout in 2004. *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 69 (5), 760-777. Article Google Scholar. Congress in black and white: Race and representation in Washington and at home. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press. Google Scholar. Race and turnout: Does descriptive representation in state legislatures increase minority voting? *Political Research Quarterly*, 63 (4), 890-907. Article Google Scholar. The recent Black Lives Matter protests peaked on June 6, when half a million people turned out in nearly 550 places across the United States. That was a single day in more than a month of protests that still continue to today. The Women's March of 2017 had a turnout of about three million to five million people on a single day, but that was a highly organized event. Collectively, the recent Black Lives Matter protests are more organic in nature appear to have far surpassed those numbers, according to polls. "Really, it's hard to overstate the scale of this movement," said Deva Woodly, an associate professor of politics at the New School. Professor Woodly said that the civil rights marches in the 1960s were considerably smaller in number. Under representative democracy, substantive representation (in contrast to descriptive representation) is the tendency of elected legislators to advocate on behalf of certain groups. Conflicting theories and beliefs exist regarding why constituents vote for representatives. "Should Blacks Represent Blacks and Women Represent Women? A Contingent 'Yes'". *The Journal of Politics*. (2011) "Toward a Mobilization Conception of Democratic Representation" *American Political Science Review*, vol. 105(1): 100-114. Erikson, Robert S., Michael B. MacKuen, and James A. Stimson. (2002) *The Macro Polity* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Huber, John D. and G. Bingham Powell, Jr.