THE IMPACT OF ETHNIC ISSUES
ON THE SECURITY OF SOUTH EASTERN EUROPE

Ivanka Nedeva Atanassova, Ph. D.

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1. INTRODUCTION

Ethnic issues have paramount impact on the security of South Eastern Europe. The latest proof of this have been NATO air strikes against Serbia because of its treatment of ethnic Albanians in Kosovo. The expulsion of over a million of the Albanian population residing in Kosovo by the Serb army and paramilitary forces has already destabilized the whole area of the Balkans. This report is based on the understanding that ethnic issues compounded by the processes of transition and by the economic backwardness of the area are the major threat to the security of South Eastern Europe. Here the notion of security is used in its broad meaning that embraces political, military, economic, as well as societal factors such as psychological stereotypes, historical border disputes, religious divisions, demographic indicators, etc.

The change in the Balkans after 1989 has a system-wide character. On one hand, we see the potential power of ethnic conflicts to shift the regional balance and to revise the old status quo. On the other, the change is systemic because the transformation of Southeastern Europe into a relatively self-defining and self-driving region has been taking place in a situation defined until fairly recently by power vacuum and anarchy.¹

The object of this report are the states of Bulgaria, Romania, The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia – further in the text it will be referred as the Republic of Macedonia or just Macedonia – and Serbia. The study will focus on Turks in Bulgaria, Hungarians in Romania, Albanians in Macedonia and in Serbia, more particularly in the region of Kosovo. A main characteristic that defines these countries is that they all have emerged from some 45 years of communist domination and have set off on the uneven and thorny road of transition to democracy, civil society and market economy. Another common trait is that their transition has been strongly influenced by the specific relations between dominant national majorities and sizable ethnic minorities that reside in border areas with neighboring kin-states.

Serbia is burdened by its highly complicated national question. Apart from being in a federation with the Republic of Montenegro, with which it is in a state of a deepening political conflict, Serbia contains areas with quite diverse ethnic composition. In Vojvodina according to the 1991 census 54 percent of the population was Serb by nationality and 22 percent was Hungarian. During the war years (1991-1995) however some 50,000 Hungarians and between 30,000 to 40,000 Croats fled the province to escape harassment, economic privation, and military conscription. At the same time more than 300,000 Serbs from Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina moved into it. Compact Hungarian and Croat settlements have been broken up to make room for Serbs, and some Hungarians have been evicted from their homes. In this way, a situation of escalating confrontation between ethnic groups has been created which puts at stake the very survival of the Hungarians.² The region of Sandjak that lies mostly in Serbia but partly in Montenegro has a clear Muslim majority – 67 percent in 1991 of a population of 200,000-250,000 inhabitants. Sandjak politicians favor the idea that the province should enjoy a large degree of autonomy.
For the purposes of this report only one aspect of the complicated ethnic problem of Serbia is an object of analysis - that of Kosovo. The reason is that it is important to evaluate and compare the present day situation of the two main components of the unresolved “Albanian question” in Southeast Europe – in Kosovo and in western Macedonia. However, the “Albanian question” has broader scope encompassing ethnic Albanians in central and southern Serbia, eastern Montenegro and in Greek areas bordering the state of Albania (called southern Epirus or Shameria).

The geographical scope of this study may be called “the Balkans Proper” since according to the view of the inhabitants of the defined area this is the heart of the region called “the Balkans”. It is not a mere coincidence that the Bulgarian airlines bear the name “Balkan Air” and that the mountain that runs across Bulgaria from west to east like its spinal cord is called the Balkan mountain. Thus, at variance with the famous report “Unfinished Peace” published by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in 1996 that focuses mainly on the wars in Croatia and Bosnia, this study will move the attention further to the east of the region of the Balkans.

The area defined above can be characterized in political terms as a region witnessing an explosion of ethnic conflict in Kosovo whose waves of violence and instability might put at stake the very existence of the Republic of Macedonia. Although not of the same scope and intensity ethnic tensions exist also in Romania and Bulgaria. In 1989, the mass exodus of Turks from Bulgaria because of Zhivkov’s assimilation campaign created grave international concern. A few years ago U.S. Defense Secretary William Perry admitted that the state of Romanian-Hungarian relations had led him to consider the possibility of “military conflict”. Thus addressing the possibilities of Hungary or Romania joining NATO, Perry specified that NATO was not willing to “import security problems”.

The changing political, international and economic landscape of the “Balkans Proper” shows that ethnic issues play a pivotal role in the security of the region. However, the term “ethnic issues” is too broad to define the peculiar security situation in the region. Rather, the complex phenomenon can better be described as relations between dominant national majorities and sizable ethnic minorities living within each of the four countries that are an object of analysis in this report. While the smaller ethnic groups are significant in terms of human and minority rights protection and equal access to social and economic benefits, the relations between dominant ethnic majorities and the most sizable ethnic minorities living under the roof of one and the same state has much wider importance. These relations define not only the political, social and economic developments of such states as well as the essence of the international relations with their neighbors but in certain cases put at stake the very existence of the state itself. The intensity of the conflict within these relations is so high that the end result as is the case of Kosovo has been violence despite the fact that it has been predicted by most analysts for years already that there might be violence.

Thus, the main security problem is how can one bridge the gap between a majority and a minority when there is a government of one ethnicity and a population of another ethnicity. The vicious circle of “ethnoparanoia” that is created can be defined in the following way: Minorities tend to consider the civic concept of the state granting equal rights for all citizens to be a cover for the supremacy by the dominant national group. In their view, legal guarantees are reliable only if accompanied by collective rights and territorial autonomy. On the other hand the major national groups tend to see sizable ethnic minorities as a potential “fifth column” of neighboring states and refuse to grant territorial autonomy because they fear irredentism and in the final end possible disintegration of their state.
A core ingredient of this security problem is the international dimension of the domestic conflict described above. Recently there has been a growing awareness of trans-border ethnic groups as independent foreign policy actors and their substantial role both in domestic politics and in interstate relations. A close analysis of the four countries clearly highlights the connection between trans-border ethnic groups, foreign policy, and regional security concerns. The study of trans-border ethnic groups is of particular importance for the understanding of such issues as the nature of the nation-state, the limits of national sovereignty and the challenges posed by such transnational issues as immigration, crime, and the arms trade. The role played by these groups gives enough evidence that the problems of stability and regional cooperation as well as human rights cannot be treated as an internal matter of any country. However, as Charles King correctly points out “despite the clear importance of these forms of ‘internationalized ethnicity’ understanding the web of relations among kin-states, host-states, and trans-border ethnic groups has remained elusive”.

The tasks of this report can be summarized in the following way:
1. To analyze in depth the nature of ethnic relations within the four countries chosen as case studies on the bases of a number of variables and by introducing a comparative approach. Recent scholarly research on ethnicity in the region has underlined the need for ethnic issues to be assessed and explained on the basis of comparative analysis. It is our hope that such approach can contribute to the clearer understanding of the security challenges facing the region.
2. To explore the increasingly porous boundary between domestic politics and foreign policy by focusing on the role of trans-border ethnic populations on bilateral relations between neighboring states.
3. To examine and compare the motives and behavior of ‘host-states’ (the states in which minorities reside) and of ‘kin-states’ (the neighboring ‘homelands’ of trans-border ethnic groups).

In order to be able to meet these challenging tasks a large variety of problems have to be examined and assessed. Among these are the basic variables of ethnicity in the region; the most recent theoretical concepts on ethnic conflict and their applicability for the situation in the “Balkans Proper”; the domestic dimensions of ethnic security; the development of interstate relations.

The necessity to analyze all these aspects of the ethnic conflict in the Balkans has determined the structure of this report. However the preparation of this report has been an extremely difficult task because of one almost insuperable obstacle - in most cases, there does not exist reliable statistical data based on ethnicity. Even today, there is no practice in the region to gather statistic information about the demographic, social and economic indicators based on ethnicity. The only exception to the best knowledge of the author is a program for the development of a socio-demographic database in Romania managed by the Soros Foundation.

2. BASIC PARAMETERS OF ETHNICITY IN THE “BALKANS PROPER”

2.1. Geographical Distribution and Territorial Concentration of the Most Sizable Ethnic Minorities
The main characteristic of all the countries included in the study is that they are host-states of sizable ethnic minorities concentrated in border regions with neighboring kin-states.

Bulgarian Turks are concentrated mainly in two districts – in the southeastern part of the country, where in the area around Kurdjali they constitute the majority of the population. A peculiarity of the geographical distribution of ethnic Turks in Bulgaria is that they are also a majority in the northeastern area around Razgrad. Apart from these two main concentrations, groups of Turks live in the districts of Varna, Bourgas and Haskovo.

Hungarians in Romania live mainly in Transylvania – a region that is bordering Hungary and is well defined both in geographic and historic terms. Hungarians comprise 23.9 percent of the population of Transylvania where they are intermingled with Romanians and to some extent with Germans (Saxons and Swabians) whose numbers are decreasing. In Transylvania lived traditionally some Jews too. Hungarians constitute absolute majority in two counties – Harghita and Covasna. The two counties are situated in the eastern part of Transylvania that geographically can be seen as the heart of present day Romania (see map 1). This peculiarity of the geographic distribution of Hungarians in Transylvania is one of the reasons of the high sensitivity of Romanians in the ethno-territorial dispute with Hungary. Hungarians also comprise 21.1 percent of the population of the Crisana Maramures region in northern Romania and 6.6 percent of the Banat region.

Macedonia’s ethnic Albanians reside in seven western municipalities forming a crescent-shaped region that begins in Kumanovo in the northeast, stretches through Skopje and Tetovo in the northwest, then continues south along the Albanian border to the towns of Debar, Gostivar, and Struga. In certain municipalities, principally around Tetovo and Gostivar, Albanians represent the majority population. Nearly 100,000 Albanians live in the capital, Skopje, whose total population is 600,000. This is a situation similar to Bosnia’s capital Sarajevo.

The region of Kosovo is the most specific case study in this report since 90 percent of its population consists of ethnic Albanians. Serbs from Kosovo argue that less than 90 percent of Kosovo inhabitants are ethnic Albanians, because many Turks, Roma and Muslims may have described themselves as Albanians in hopes of advancing their social status.

The problem about the actual composition of the population in ethnically mixed regions in the “Balkans Proper” is a politically charged issue and all figures are contested. Ethnic Bulgarians and Slav Macedonians have arguments that are similar to those of the Serbs mentioned above. In the case of Bulgaria it is argued that some Roma and Pomaks – Bulgarian speaking Muslims - are identifying themselves as Turks. In Macedonia the number of ethnic Albanians can be swollen by adding to them some Muslim groups of the population like Turks, Roma and Torbesi – Macedonian speaking Muslims.

2.2. The History of the Ethnically Based Territorial Disputes
The core of the problem about ethnically based territorial disputes in Southeastern Europe is the idea of the nation-state according to which there should be a correspondence between a territory and people. This idea is a by-product of Western modernity exported to East Europe since the time of the French Revolution. However the process of creating this correspondence has been slow and quite gradual in Western Europe, while in the eastern part of the continent it came with a time lag and was more violent. The peculiarities of the history of Balkan peoples have been the reason for their delayed ethnic self-identification. Balkan peoples can be called “belated nations” because they were able to establish their nation-states in the 19th century or even the early 20th century.

The process of transformation that is taking place after 1989 revealed certain fragility of the existing borders in Eastern Europe which can be explained partly by the fact that there still exists non-correspondence (in some areas) between ethnic and political borders. The great ethnic diversity, making the drawing of state boundaries so difficult is mainly a legacy of the Austro-Hungarian and the Ottoman empires. In the era of empires the settlement patterns and the geographic distribution of various ethnic groups differed substantially from the patterns established in the era of modernization. The present day borders of the Balkans Proper are quite new. They were created at a number of international conferences at the end of 19th century and the beginning of the 20th century: the Congress of Berlin (1878), the London Conference of Ambassadors (1912), the Treaty of Bucharest (1913), the Versailles system of 1919 and the Paris Peace Treaties after 1945. A certain liability of this border delimitation is the fact that the overwhelming majority of the borders has been established at postwar international conferences rather by bilateral agreements and thus were often perceived as having been imposed by the Great Powers.

The new states that were created as a result of these conferences had all the defects of the alleged prison-houses of nations (i.e. the old empires) which they replaced. These states were not free from minority problems, while the combination of smaller size, inexperienced political leadership, and minorities that previously were dominant cultural groups, unused to subordination and well-placed to resist it made the problems even more complicated. To the greatest extent this is true for the Hungarians who for centuries dominated Transylvania politically and administratively. But it is also true for Turks in Bulgaria and for Albanians in Kosovo and western Macedonia. The Albanians resisted fiercely the Ottoman conquest. Their continuous struggle for independence is personalized in the legendary medieval hero Skenderbeg but afterwards they converted on a mass scale into Islam and as a consequence of this later on occupied a prominent niche in the military and administrative system of the Ottomans.

The territorial approach used by the victorious powers after World War II for the creation of the new entities was also burdened with a supposition that might be called “peasant-military thinking” according to which wealth and international status depend on the control of land. This kind of thinking lies at the heart of the desire of all Balkan peoples to create territorially large states. The dreams for “Greater Bulgaria”, “Greater Romania”, the Greek “Megali idea” and most recently the crimes committed in the name of the creation of “Greater Serbia” are all manifestations of this kind of thinking. In 1919 the drive of the victorious powers and their client states in Eastern Europe was to create larger state formations which will form a belt of friendly alliances.

The substantial presence of ethnic minorities in the newly created nation states required however some juridical approach that could impose supervision and protection of human and minority
rights. In this respect the failure is quite obvious. Neither the League of Nations with its main focus on minority protection nor the United Nations with its stress on individual rights were able credibly to address ethnic conflict in terms of proposals for the protection of human rights or constitutional guarantees. The root cause for this failure was clear enough at least to scholars even in the years immediately after World War I. The British historian Macartney wrote in 1934: “The real root of the trouble lies in the philosophy of the national state. So long as the majority persists in its endeavour to make those states the exclusive instruments of their own national ideals and aspirations, so long will the minorities be placed in a position which no system of international protection can render tolerable… The whole conception of the national states implies a violation of the principle of equality to the detriment of the minorities”. xi

The situation in this respect has not changed substantially to the present day. Despite different opinions about the balance of authority between governments and transnational institutions, most experts still consider the nation-state to be fundamental to the modern international system. xii Similarly, the states that are object of analysis in this report have remained to be the national states of Bulgarians, Romanians, Serbs and Slav Macedonians. As will be seen further in the report this concept has been the main reason for political polarization between majorities and minorities. It revolves around such basic problems as the contents of the newly written constitutions and the status of the sizable ethnic minorities within the nation-states in the “Balkans Proper”.

Even the shortest historical survey can quite clearly reveal the main components of the ethnically based territorial disputes in the region: the newness of borders and their fragility, the attempts of national governments to “solve” the minority question by ethnic cleansing and forced assimilation, the historic credibility of assertions that the minority communities harbor irredentist agendas.

In the case of Transylvania the unique thing is that it has been for centuries a country of two nations – each with its own history and culture. Neither Romanians nor Hungarians can rightly be called “minorities”. Despite the fact that Romanians claim that they were the original inhabitants of Transylvania, while the Magyars insist that the area was depopulated when their ancestors arrived in the 10-th century, Transylvania is historically both a Romanian land and a Hungarian land. Its identity cannot be reduced to one single national state tradition. The German as well as the Jewish minorities made also a great contribution to the history of Transylvania. However during much of the time since the 10-th century the Hungarians have dominated politically and economically the region. The happiest solution for Transylvania in the age of nationalism would have been that it should be an independent state with equal rights for all its inhabitants. History however took another route. Between 1867 and the end of World War II Transylvania moved four times from Hungarian rule to Romanian and back. Among these moves the most “prominent” was the Treaty of Trianon of 1919 when Hungary was forced to cede two thirds of its territory to Romania, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia and some 5 million Hungarians found themselves outside of Hungary’s borders. The treaty was revised in 1940 by the Second Vienna Arbitration when two-fifths of Transylvania were returned back to Hungary. After 1919 the land of Hungarian landowners was expropriated and redistributed to Romanian peasants. Romanians assumed administrative and political positions and Romanian became the official language of the region. Nevertheless Hungarians were able to keep their schools, churches and newspapers.

After World War II - in the early fifties - broad minority rights were granted to the Hungarian minority in Romania. These policies of Romanian communists in power were in tune with the
Stalinist model for national self-determination. A Hungarian Autonomous District was established in Transylvania, a system of schools and universities, financed by the Romanian state was created, a network of Hungarian cultural institutions was functioning, and the Hungarian language was put on a par with the official Romanian language in the district. Ceausescu’s national communism changed these policies. In 1960 the District was renamed the Mures Autonomous Region, its autonomy was confined within quite narrow limits and through territorial reorganization the Hungarian ethnic presence was reduced. In 1968 the Mures Autonomous Region ceased to exist, Hungarian rights to use their mother tongue in the school system, in courts, and administration were severely curtailed, representatives of minorities were removed from leading positions on all levels. The state-organized process of increasing the number of ethnic Romanians in areas where the Hungarian ethnic element prevailed intensified. A major step in this direction was the “rural resettlement project” of 1988, the goal of which was to reduce the number of villages, and ultimately effect an assimilation of minority populations, in the first place Hungarians. In Bulgaria, during the five centuries of the Ottoman rule, there were several large colonizations of Muslim settlers from Anatolia while many Bulgarians were massacred, or fled to the mountains and the neighboring countries. A class of Turkish landowners developed who held privileged positions. A reversion of this process started after 1878 when the modern state of Bulgaria was established. A large number of Bulgaria’s Turkish-speaking inhabitants who were the former dominant element emigrated. The principal cause for the emigration was their unwillingness to adapt to the new Christian state. In 1881 they represented almost a quarter of the population of Bulgaria, yet by 1892 the proportion was 17.21 percent and in 1910 - 11.63. In the same years, the Bulgarian-speaking population constituted 67.84 percent, 75.67 percent and 81.63 percent of the total. The most important social consequence of this emigration was that large areas of land became available for purchase by Christians, and possibly, as much as a quarter of the arable land in Bulgaria changed hands in the decade after 1878. The border between Bulgaria and the Ottoman Empire and later Turkey was delimited several times: first by the treaty of San Stefano that created for a very short period “Greater Bulgaria”, then by the Congress of Berlin that divided the country into two parts – Bulgaria and Rumelia. The treaty of Constantinople ended the second Balkan war in 1913 for the two countries. Bulgaria received the Kurdjali district and a part of Thrace that included the coastline around Dedeagach. Thrace and Dedeagach were lost by Bulgaria according to the treaty of Neuilly of 1919 when about a million Bulgarians were left outside the borders of the nation state. Since then however the border has not been changed and this made it more stable than the borders between Hungary and Romania and between Albania and Kosovo and western Macedonia that were changed also during World War II. In Bulgarian historiography there has been a substantial effort to prove that not all of Bulgaria’s Turkish-speaking inhabitants were ethnic Turks that settled just as a result of the Ottoman conquest. This aspect of the problem however is irrelevant for our study and we will refer to them as Turks. The new Bulgarian state was reluctant to allocate sufficient funds for the development of the regions inhabited by Turks and Pomaks which was the cause for the increasing backwardness of these regions. In the same vein although there were Turkish schools financed by the Muslim community and partly by the state, their number was gradually reduced and the quality of education was lower. The end result of such policies was mass illiteracy among Turk
and Pomaks. Such policies had also the effect of marginalizing and alienating these ethnic groups from the Bulgarian state and contributed to the preservation of their feeling of belonging to Turkey. Successive Bulgarian governments sought for solution of the ‘Turkish problem’ mainly by encouraging, sometimes through bilateral agreements with Turkey, the emigration of Turks, Pomaks, and even Muslim Roma to Turkey. There were several emigrant waves. The last one before the events in 1989 was a result of an agreement between Bulgaria and Turkey in 1968 when some 130,000 Turks migrated to Turkey in the period of ten years.\textsuperscript{xvi}

During the first years of the communist rule and well until the sixties the policy toward the Turks, as in the case with Romania, was strongly influenced by the directions coming from Moscow. The Turks were granted substantial political and cultural rights in order to be enlisted for the cause of the regime. Between 1944 and 1969 the state subsidized 25 central and local newspapers and magazines in Turkish.\textsuperscript{xvii} The quality of the education in Turkish was improved and illiteracy was substantially reduced. Private Turkish schools began gradually to receive funding from the state budget and four high schools with education in Turkish were opened.

This political line was reversed by the early seventies and was substituted by consistent attempts for cultural assimilation of all the largest ethnic communities. The process of the forced assimilation of Roma and Pomaks preceded chronologically the campaign against the Turks. The main target of assimilation however became the Turks who in 1984 were forced to change their names and adopt Bulgarian ones. Brutal measures were introduced against Islam and the Turkish language. Over 1,000 Turks were detained in prison and over one hundred were killed.\textsuperscript{xviii} During the mass demonstrations of Turks in 1989 the communist authorities resorted to violence and provoked mass emigration of Turks mainly to Turkey. Some 370,000 Turks left the country in 1989 but about 152,000 later returned back to Bulgaria.

What is interesting in the case of Bulgaria is that Zhivkov’s successors at least partially reversed the effects of this ‘ethnic cleansing’ – “in the only move by a Balkan country to reverse such a policy”.\textsuperscript{xix} A law on the restoration of Turkish names was passed in March 1990. In 1991 some 600,000 Turks, Pomaks, Roma, and Tatars restored their previous names. Another law amnestied all persons sued in connection with the assimilation campaign of 1984-1989. Two decrees of the Council of Ministers (no.29, 1990 and no.170, 1991) and the so-called Dogan Act (1992) constituted an indemnity package dealing with housing, property, and employment of Bulgarian citizens who emigrated to Turkey in 1989 and later returned. In conformity with these acts, no less than 3,000 houses were returned to their previous owners.\textsuperscript{xx}

The starting point for the territorial disputes between Serbs and Albanians is the Conference of Ambassadors in London in December 1912 when the independent state of Albania was established. Then British Balkan allies were awarded with areas claimed by Albanian representatives regardless of their predominantly Albanian ethnic composition. Large parts of northern and western Albania went primarily to Serbia and Montenegro, but also to Greece. As a result the state of Albania was reduced only to the central regions while over half of the Albanian population was left outside the borders of the new state of Albania.\textsuperscript{xxi} This situation, despite of the interchanging roles of the competing national groups, has been preserved to the present day. With the escalation of violence in Kosovo it becomes even more evident that the Albanian national question could present a greater and longer-term threat to peace and stability in the Balkans than Bosnia.\textsuperscript{xxii}
In the inter-war period Albanians from Kosovo and western Macedonia were subject to Serbian rule that can be characterized by oppression, economic strangulation, territorial ethnic restructuring through Serb colonization, as well as educational-cultural marginalization. Large parts of Albanian land were expropriated and handed over to Serb settlers while thousands of Albanians left the country as a result. This carried the seeds of a new explosive round. The Albanians under the Serb rule never gave up their irredentist hopes - the “Kosovo Committee” that was created in the inter-war period favored annexation to Albania and tried to prevent Albanians from serving in the Yugoslav army. During the World War II most of Kosovo and western Macedonia were occupied by the Italians and were given to the state of Albania. After the war an armed revolt of the Albanian Kosovars who refused to revert to Yugoslavia was suppressed and Kosovo was again made in fact part of Serbia, although nominally it was an autonomous region. The Serb oppression was particularly brutal while Alexandar Rankovic (a Serb and the second man after Tito, minister of the interior and head of the secret service) was in power when all key positions in Kosovo were given to Serbs. Albanian frustration erupted in the 1968 demonstrations that were put down with the use of force. Since then however steps were taken to improve the status of Kosovo within the process of political decentralization of Yugoslavia that fully crystallized in the 1974 Constitution.

According to the Constitution of 1974 Kosovo was proclaimed an Autonomous Province with a representation status in the Federation’s bodies almost equal to that of the constituent republics. Although Kosovo and Vojvodina acquired status close to the other republics within Yugoslavia, both provinces were formally within Serbia and as such had no right to self-determination. The constitution resulted in increased Albanian political control of Kosovo. The provincial party apparatus moved into the hands of local Albanians and made the Albanian authority in all spheres of public life almost complete, except for the armed forces and foreign relations. Kosovo acquired its own Albanian-language University in the capital city of Pristina. The university was instrumental for the formation of a rising number of intelligentsia conscious of its national rights. Furthermore, a whole new stratum of state and party officials, industrial managers, university lecturers, teachers, policemen and journalists was created. This process was in sharp contrast with the situation in the Republic of Macedonia where the power rested in the hands of the Slav Macedonians. The Albanians had to put up with the status of a second-class people and were further marginalized within the republic.

The Constitution of 1974 became a turning point and a bone of contention in the relations between Serbs and Albanians. In the opinion of Serbs the constitution had divided Serbia into three parts and had encouraged the two autonomous provinces to behave as federative units. Nationalist intellectuals draw the public attention to Serb complaints about Albanian persecution in Kosovo. Serb accusations are difficult to prove. Between 1974 and 1987 many Serbs left Kosovo due to rising unemployment (the highest in Yugoslavia) and the poverty of the province as well as pressure from the Albanians. The issue of the Albanian pressure is highly controversial for the two sides.

In the opinion of Albanians the constitution gave them less rights than they deserved as the third largest national group in Yugoslavia after the Serbs and the Croats. They argued that if Macedonia was recognized the right to be a state, on the same grounds, legally and historically such a right should also be recognized to Kosovo. What the Albanians actually wanted was the next higher status - that of “republic” that would include the right to secede. From the Serb point of view this was out of the question. The dissatisfaction of Albanians with the constitutional
status of Kosovo and their denial of the legitimacy of Serb authority in the province lie at the core of the political conflict between the two sides. An important change in Kosovo began in 1987 when Milosevic was elected president of Serbia and Kosovo was transformed into an exclusively Serb problem. He whipped up nationalist passions and hatred with speeches and mass rallies. The rise of Milosevic to power can be understood only in connection with the growing strength of aggrieved Serb nationalism, both over perceived threat to Serbs in Kosovo, and the status of Kosovo and Vojvodina as “republics within a republic”. Serb nationalism particularly on the Kosovo issue combined with Milosevic’s drive to power opened the door for the disintegration of Yugoslavia. (The root causes for the disintegration however are more complex.)

Nationalist speeches turned into deeds: martial law was declared in Kosovo in March 1989; Albanian demonstrations were violently suppressed; Kosovo was stripped of its autonomy; its communist leadership and parliament were abolished. The Albanians were dismissed from the administration, the police, the media, the hospitals, the educational system and public enterprises. The dismissal of over 100,000 Albanians from the work force in the early 1990s removed any possibility of regular face-to-face contact between adults from the two groups. Educational segregation, meanwhile, built up antagonism between their children. In general, the situation from 1990 onwards can be described as one of harsh Serb police repression.

2.3. Psychological Stereotypes and Ethnic Tolerance

The history of the ethnically based territorial disputes has created heaps of hostile images, mistrust, negative stereotypes and prejudices about “the other ethnic group” which can be described by two key words – fear and insecurity. This holds true for minorities as well as for majorities. In most cases the national majorities disclose a peculiar siege mentality and hypersensitivity concerning national identity that indicates the level of their sense of vulnerability. Being a local minority in some areas, ethnic majorities fear that they will be economically disadvantaged or even that they will be forced at some point to abandon their homes and property. The highest level of ethnic tolerance can be traced in Transylvania, which can be explained by the fact that in most of the communities there the Romanians are the majority. A peculiarity of the situation in Romania is that ethnic Romanians living in mixed communities show greater ethnic tolerance than those living in homogeneous communities. In all of the regions with mixed population, however there exists a strange mixture of love-hate relationship that has different intensity at different periods. When there is a stabilization of the relations the attitudes become friendlier. When the insecurity increases so do the negative images. As will be shown further in this report usually nationalism is not a product of the social environment in such regions, but rather it has been introduced from outside for political reasons.

Common for all these relationships are the peculiar attitudes built according to the perceived status –“masters” or “subjects”- of the different groups. This brings additional bitterness into the inter-group relationships. Here are some examples of such attitudes. Historically, for Hungarian politicians in Budapest, Romanians were sub-human barbarians, natural serfs, whom the Magyars were entitled to order about. Romanian politicians in Bucharest replied with resentment, and defensive hostility, presenting the Hungarians as savage Asiatic oppressors, whose pride it was the duty and pleasure of Romanians to humiliate. Similarly, at the London Conference of
Ambassadors in 1912 the Serb representatives claimed cultural and civilizing mission which had to be assigned to the progressed and civilized Serbs in regard to the allegedly backward and almost barbarian Albanians. Such approach has provoked negative reactions on the part of Albanians.

Inter-ethnic psychological stereotypes however are not a constant. They are among the dynamic variables of ethnic relations. During the years of transition one can clearly discern two opposite trends within the region. On one hand there has been marked escalation of hostilities, though at a different extent, between Serb and Albanians and Slav Macedonians and Albanians. The Serb mentality of depicting Albanians as their “sworn enemies” has been nurtured politically. For Serbs, the Albanians are “a nomadic population, a horde of invaders” who should be either expelled or held under strict control. A core ingredient of the Serb-Albanian conflict over Kosovo is the extreme mistrust and the marked demonization of the Albanians. Although in all conflicts there is a tendency the other party to be demonized, in the Serb-Albanian case the inaccuracies are so glaring and much more on the Serb side that the need for correcting misperceptions and historical inaccuracies is much greater. A similar, though much less hostile attitude takes hold of Slav Macedonians too. They view Albanians as criminals, as the ones responsible for the drug trade, prostitution and crime. Albanians are blamed for Macedonian difficulties in getting visas to the West. These stereotypes are in a direct connection with the perceived threat coming from the Albanian minority to the integrity of the state in the Serb case and to the very existence of the state in the Macedonian case. Both cases clearly demonstrate the classical stages of ethnic conflict in a process of escalation with the following shift in the perceptions: 1. Relatively accurate; 2. Simple and negative; 3. An opposition of good (self) and evil (the other); 4. Depicting the opponent as something non-human. Such change in the perceptions corresponds to the questions that are at stake. In the first stage the questions have substantive characteristics – for example human and minority rights. In the second stage the problems revolt mainly around trust or distrust. The third stage is characterized by concerns over identity and security, while in the final stage the question is that of survival.

In compliance with this scheme the Serb and the Macedonian cases are in the third and the forth, the final, stage of ethnic conflict. On the other hand Bulgaria and Romania have been able to move along the road of de-escalation of ethnic conflict. Both cases show a shift of the tensions from a higher to a lower stage. Recently a team of American sociologists, using national survey data on levels of minority prejudice and tolerance for minority rights among the now dominant ethnic Bulgarians and ethnic Romanians, developed and tested the model of ethnic tolerance based on political ideology, democratic values, threat perceptions, and various social-background variables. The conclusions of the study reveal the multi-facet character of the problem and trace the process of gradual, though again to a different degree, decrease of tensions.

2.4. Demographic Indicators

Demographic data plays a very important role in ethnic conflicts. The size of a given ethnic group is the core element that determines the extent of its political representation, and as a result of this its real participation in the governing of the state. Demographic numbers define to a large extent the ability of an ethnic minority to influence in its own interests such major issues as resource control, economic allocation, access to investments, developmental inputs and social services. Numbers matter especially when demands for cultural and territorial autonomy are raised. On the
other hand the size of an ethnic minority is viewed by dominant ethnic groups as directly threatening the stability, integrity, and in some cases the survival of their nation-state. On this basis numbers are bitterly contested and this makes their objective estimation very difficult. While most official statistical data is inaccurate or unreliable, claims of ethnic groups about their real size are usually exaggerated.

Against this background the two most important demographic indicators are the numerical size of ethnic minorities within nation-states and their birth rates.

Analysts have tried to solve the problem of objective estimating the size of ethnic minorities in Eastern Europe by applying different approaches. Andre Liebich for example suggests a model with four possible variables: 1) lowest available figure that is generally not credible; 2) official or semiofficial figure of variable credibility; 3) highest credible figure; 4) highest available figure that is generally not credible. \(\text{xxvii}\) This model has been applied in 1993 for Bulgaria and Romania \(\text{xxviii}\) (see table 1).

The model however does not solve the problem of counting because numbers of minorities in the Balkans are not a constant. There are current intensive flows of ethnic migration that in some cases change the size and the concentration of minorities.

According to the results of the December 1992 census in Bulgaria the number of ethnic Bulgarians is 7,271,185 which presents 85.67 percent of the total population. Ethnic Turks are 800,052 or 9.42 percent. According to the World Factbook 1994 –1995 Bulgarians are 85.3 percent and Turks are 8.5 percent. The difference in the percentage of the Turkish population between the two sources can be explained by its migration after 1990 due to economic hardships. Bulgarian experts have estimated that during the period 1990-1997 annually some 30,000 to 60,000 Turks have left Bulgaria, in total some 400,000 for the period 1989-1996. According to the same experts because of this large emigration, the size of the Turkish minority had been reduced to about 600,000 which makes it almost numerically equal to the Roma population in the country. \(\text{xxix}\) There is however a reverse process of Turks returning to Bulgaria which has also to be taken into account.

According to the results of the January 1992 census in Romania the number of ethnic Romanians is 20,352,980 which is 89.4 percent of the total population. Ethnic Hungarians are 1,620,199 or 7.1 percent. According to the World Factbook 1994-1995 Romanians are 89.1 percent and Hungarians are 8.9 percent. The difference in the percentage of the Hungarian minority between the two sources indicates that in the second source most probably have been taken into account Hungarian complaints on the results of the census. The Hungarians contest the official figures, saying that their actual number is about 2,000,000. There are no indications of mass emigration of Hungarians from Romania as was the case with the German and Jewish minorities.

The last available census figures for Kosovo are from 1981, since Kosovar Albanians boycotted the 1991 census. According to the 1981 census, Serbs comprised 13.2 percent of the population (209,498) and Albanians 77.4 percent (1,226,735). According to the Provincial Institute of Statistics estimate used by UNICEF, at present roughly 90 percent of the province’s total 2,150,000 inhabitants declare themselves to be ethnic Albanians. \(\text{xxx}\) Most observers tend to agree that the total number of Albanians in Southeastern Europe is about six million that are distributed as follows:
• 3,080,000 in the state of Albania;
• 1,800,000 in Kosovo – Serbia;
• 443,000 in Macedonia;
• 100,000 in Italy;
• 50,000 in Greece (plus 300,000 Albanian migrant workers);
• 80,000 in Serbia, outside Kosovo, mainly in the municipalities of Presevo, Bujanovac and Medvedja;
• 37,000 in Montenegro, in the municipalities of Plav, Ulcinj, Rozaje.xxxi

The most contested in the “Balkans Proper” is the number of Albanians in Macedonia. Immediately after the proclamation of Macedonia’s independence Albanians claimed that they comprise 40 percent of the population in the new state. Albanians largely boycotted the census held in 1991 while their political leaders argued that the count was manipulated and biased against them. To settle the dispute the Council of Europe oversaw a European Union-sponsored census in 1994. According to the 1994 census the total population of 2,075,196 people is divided into 1,288,330 (66.5 percent) Slav Macedonians, 442,914 (22.9 percent) Albanians and some 24 other ethnic groups. Outside observers monitoring the census pronounced it accurate and Western governments consider the matter closed. However many experts feel that a more accurate figure for Albanians is around 30 percent. A reason for the differences between the official figures and Albanian claims may be that the 1994 population figures exclude persons with a residence permit who have been in the country less than one year and refugees. The case of Macedonia is indicative of how important numbers are in the overall framework of ethnic conflict. In order to put some barriers against Albanian expansion the Macedonian legislature (the Sobranie) passed a law in 1995 which says that in order to be eligible for citizenship, one must reside in Macedonia for 15 years. The law affects the 150,000 or so Albanian immigrants from Kosovo living in Macedonia. For them the acquisition of Macedonian citizenship is designed to be a lengthy procedure.xxxii The passage of this law reflects the fear felt by many Macedonian Slavs of losing control of their country as a Slav and Orthodox state.

As has been illustrated the issue of the numerical size of ethnic groups is quite controversial. There is however one indicator that can provide some guidelines for objective estimates. Within the context of the highly polarized ethnic politics in the “Balkans Proper” the number of the votes for different ethnic parties gives quite reliable data for the actual composition of the population in a given area.

Another highly sensitive demographic indicator is birth rate. Here the case of Kosovo comes first. Albanians in Kosovo have the highest birth rate in Europe (23.1 per 1000 in 1989). Around 70 percent of the Albanians are under the age of 30. The number of children per family depends on the mother’s social position – from an average of 2.74 children for a woman working in the city, to an average of 6.74 for a housewife in the countryside. Some partial explanation of this process can be found in a deep-rooted tradition of child bearing within the Moslem Albanian society. The comparison of several demographic variables show that while the current population ratio of Albanians to Serbs in Kosovo is 9 to 1, the growth rate is 16 to 1. If this birth rate continues at its current level and Kosovo remains part of Serbia, Serbs could form a minority of the population in Serbia by 2020.xxxiii This situation creates a particular aspect of the Serb – Albanian ethnic conflict. Such routine decisions as whether to have children and immunize them are politically and ethnically charged. According to Serbs this birth rate is the Albanian secret weapon.
According to Albanians family planning is a Serb plot against them while Serb vaccines cause sterility.

In the case of Macedonia the birth rate situation is not so clear. Some scholars are of the opinion that the Albanian birth rate is considerably higher than that of Macedonians. Robert Mickey and Adam Albion write that according to census statistics from 1971 to 1981 the number of Albanians increased more than 36 percent while in Tetovo the birth rate for the same period was more than three times the national average. This opinion supports the view that “the high birth rate of Albanians in Macedonia alone is sufficient to generate passionate reaction from many Macedonians, who contend that it is decidedly political, actively promoted through religious teaching, and directed toward taking over the country through sheer numbers”. Fears on the part of Slav Macedonians that soaring Albanian birth rates are threatening the territorial integrity of their homeland are combined with some additional concerns. It is the discontent over a disproportionately large share of state funds for children going to a part of the population that does not contribute proportionally to maintaining those funds. The comment is “Why should we support their children through our contributions to social welfare funds?”

Other analysts make the conclusion that birth rates of Albanians in Macedonia do not resemble those in Kosovo. According to them overall population growth has been slow, averaging about 1.4 percent per year. The proportion of Albanians has increased slowly, from 17.1 percent according to the 1948 census to 20 percent in 1981 and 23 percent in 1994. Their opinion is that the concerns of Slav Macedonians have been exaggerated, and that the growth of the Albanian population in Macedonia has been within the international growth rate norms for the same period.

Similar fears of Turkish high birth rates were widely spread among Bulgarians in early 1990s. Higher birth rates were characteristic for Turk and Pomak families through most of the 20th century. Since 1974 however no statistical data has been gathered about birth rates among different ethnic groups. Recent demographic data indicates that though the birth rates for Turks and Pomaks are higher, the differences are not very big and are gradually decreasing. According to the 1992 census the average birth rate for the country was 10.5 per 1000, while in the region of Kurdjali it was 14.7 per 1000. This change is mainly due to the economic crisis in the country. Another dimension of the same trend is the higher mortality rates for the whole group of Muslims. As a result of the two processes some 50 percent of the Turks in Bulgaria are under the age of 30. A recent sociological survey for mixed regions in southern Bulgaria (the Rhodope Mountains) showed that by the end of 1997 substantial similarities developed in the demographic behavior of young Bulgarians, Turks and Pomaks. The average number of children in Bulgarian families is 1.9; for Pomaks it is 2.3 and for Turks – 2.9. All young families in the region show the same tendency toward late birth of children and only one child in the family.

What is of particular interest in the case of Bulgaria is that the decrease of negative attitudes among ethnic Bulgarians toward the Turks and the appearance of more peaceful and friendly approaches are connected to these demographic trends. Fears of “demographic invasion” on the part of the Turkish minority have disappeared. The similar demographic patterns of behavior and the decreasing number of the minority because of emigration have changed the perception of threat coming from Turks and Turkey.

A key indicator of communal relations is the number of inter-ethnic marriages. It shows the level of tolerance and integration between ethnic groups. Inter-ethnic marriages between Serbs and
Albanians and Slav Macedonians and Albanians are a rare exception. The same holds true, though to a lesser extent, for Turks and Bulgarians. A higher number can be found in Transylvania between Romanians and Hungarians. This is mainly due to the existing similarities in the economic and educational background of the two ethnic groups and in their demographic behavior. This indicator was the highest in Vojvodina while it was a part of former Yugoslavia. The province had greater national diversity than Bosnia and a rate of inter-ethnic marriages that was twice as high as in Bosnia – a major indication that “multi-ethnic society was once a reality here”.

2.5. The Role of Religion

With the democratic changes taking place in the “Balkans Proper” it became modern to talk about the role of religion. There were a lot of speculations and a lot of attention to the subject. For this reason it is necessary to analyze briefly the problem of how religion affects ethnic relations.

Many in the Balkans as well as some authors in the West tried to explain the ethnic conflict in the area by cultural and religious incompatibility. As a cross point between Catholicism, Eastern Orthodoxy and Islam the region was described and defined in terms of “revived cultural-religious identities”. Former high ranking communists and present-day nationalists in the Balkans were particularly fond of the idea. They tried to preserve their right to stay in power by arguing that they are best positioned to defend ethnic majorities from threats coming from the “other hostile cultural-religious group”. Radovan Karadzic and president Tudjman elaborated at length on the “clash of civilizations”. During the last elections in Romania former president Iliescu even used airplanes to drop leaflets showing a map of a divided Romania along the line of Huntington’s “clash of civilizations.”

There is however not enough evidence to prove that religion it the Balkans plays any significant role in ethnic conflict. This holds true also for fears of spreading of Islamic fundamentalism. The Balkans never experienced the kind of religious wars that were fought in western and central Europe. In all the former communist states of the Balkans religion was brutally suppressed and persecuted for more than 40 years. This has left its imprint on contemporary Balkan societies making them very secular and free from serious religious influences. The Eastern Orthodox Churches as well as religious Muslim institutions were infiltrated by agents of the communist secret police and are all in deep crisis at the moment. They are incapable to be the spiritual leaders of their followers. This is one of the reasons why recently the fastest-growing religion in Romania, Bulgaria (and Russia) has been evangelical Protestantism. The situation in the Balkans is at variance with the situation in Poland for example where the Catholic Church played an important political role. Within the context of this difference could be explained the case of the Hungarian Reformed Church pastor Laszlo Tokes who played a prominent role in the opening acts of the “Romanian revolution” of 1989. Representatives of both Orthodox and Muslim religious institutions are not generally identified with political parties and are not in the vanguard of nationalist or separatist movements. On the other hand, all leaders of ethnic parties of Muslim groups in the “Balkans Proper” without any exception were very careful not to be identified with Islam, not to speak of any form of Islamic extremism.
The case of Albanians in Macedonia is somewhat different and deserves more attention. Religious practices and Islamic influences among Macedonian Albanians are more pronounced. In the existing literature there are two different explanations of this phenomenon. According to some authors the reason has been “the harsher nationalist regime” in Macedonia. Thus, at variance with Kosovo, expressions of Albanian ethnic identity in Macedonia were seriously curtailed during most of Titoist times. As a result Albanians gravitated toward their religious institutions and mosques in order to preserve their community coherence. \textsuperscript{xli} The other opinion is that religion became a tool of the state for convincing a large part of the Albanian population to refrain from participating in the broader society by seeking better opportunities for employment or for education. The state, working through religious leaders, engineered the installation of simple, uneducated teachers who would then teach the local Islamic community that they should be satisfied with the situation as it is, thus marginalizing the Albanian minority in Macedonia. \textsuperscript{xlii}

Whatever the explanation, it is a fact that Macedonian Albanians are the most religious group among the Albanians in Southeastern Europe. For this reason it is even more interesting to note that all Albanian leaders in Macedonia have been under pressure from Islamic powers to become more Islamic and according to some reports there have been attempts by pro-Iranian and other groups to supply weapons and military equipment. These attempts so far have been unsuccessful and political life among Albanian minority remains firmly secular. Where Islamic bodies have succeeded in recovering their religious buildings from the state, it has often been difficult to assemble enough popular support to open them on a regularly functioning basis, although new mosques are being built in some places. \textsuperscript{xliii} This curious paradox illustrates the extreme cultural conservatism and provincial nature of western Macedonian Islamic life. It is also a further proof of the thesis that religion in the Balkans at present is not an active player in inter-ethnic relations.

3. THE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK FOR THE UNDERSTANDING OF THE CAUSES FOR ETHNIC CONFLICT IN THE “BALKANS PROPER”

All the countries included in this study have one thing in common: their transition to democracy and market economy was burdened by the complicated relations between dominant ethnic majorities and sizable ethnic minorities. At different stages of their transition these states experienced different levels of ethnic conflict. In order to create the background against which ethnic relations can be better understood and analyzed it is necessary to introduce our Balkan case studies into a broader theoretical framework about roots and causes of ethnic conflict in general.

The resurgence of nationalism and ethnic conflict after the end of the Cold War has brought into being a very large and contradictory literature that includes works written by anthropologists, sociologists, historians, philosophers and political scientists. Because of the complexity of the subject however the spread across disciplines has tended to produce not so much a synthesis as several partial views. As analysts struggled to define the forces that shape international relations and prospects for democracy and economic development, nationalism linked to ethnic identity
emerged in the literature as a key factor. Yet, as many of these analysts also highlight, the relationship among ethnicity, nationalism, and conflict generates vastly different analyses.\textsuperscript{xliii}

This report is built on the understanding that ethnic conflict is a complex phenomenon. Because of this no single-factor explanation is able to present an accurate picture of the whole problem. Neither “ancient hatreds” nor “economic discrimination” can alone produce the explanation and the understanding of the issue. The problem is not that historical grievances or inequitable distribution of social and economic benefits are irrelevant in the context of ethnic conflict. It is the methodological approach that is not correct because a single independent variable is said to be responsible for a wide variety of dependent variables. From this methodological perspective ethnic conflicts in the “Balkans Proper” have to be examined and analyzed in the framework of all possible variables that influence the emergence and the evolution of the phenomenon.

In compliance with this methodological approach special interest for our study present the latest works of the two most prominent experts on ethnic conflict - Michael E. Brown and Donald L. Horowitz.\textsuperscript{xlv} Both authors have approached the problem with the understanding that there is a pressing need for a theory that by summarizing previous achievements should produce a synthesis. Both authors each in his own way have tried to suggest such a synthetic approach to the problem.

In our study an attempt will be made to apply the theoretical concepts suggested by these two authors to the situation in the “Balkans Proper”.

According to Brown the scholarly literature has identified four main clusters of factors that make some places more predisposed to conflict than others: structural factors; political factors; economic/social factors; and cultural/perceptual factors. This chapter of report is built according to Brown’s classification of factors. Within the scheme suggested by him are then introduced ideas and analyses that are relevant to the situation in the “Balkans Proper”.

3.1. Structural Factors

Three main structural factors have drawn scholarly attention: weak states; intra-state security concerns; and ethnic geography.

1. Weak state structures are typical for the region of the Balkans. This is mainly due to the political transitions brought by the collapse of communist rule in the area. But there is also a historical legacy that compounds present weakness. All the states in the area lack continuous democratic tradition. Thus there are no established democratic rules over the power struggles within the state. Wide spread corruption and high level of crime are indicative for the institutional weakness of the states. In communist times the central state mitigated ethnic conflict mainly by blatant suppression or in some instances by granting limited minority rights. With the disappearance of the communist type of central state its repressive apparatus was eliminated and there was no structure in place, no alternative institution to mediate between ethnic majorities and ethnic minorities or to strike new balances between them.\textsuperscript{xlvii} The combination of the removal of repressive apparatus and a lack of institutions to deal with potential ethnic problems has created fertile ground for ethnic unrest and conflict. Most cases of state orchestrated campaigns against ethnic minorities in the area reveal the weakness of Balkan governments. Such was the case, for example, with the “flag issue” in Macedonia and the organized trial against the Albanian Mayor
of Gostivar Osmani in 1997. Many foreign observers pointed to the events in Gostivar as an indicator of the developing governmental paralysis in Macedonia.xlvii

2. Security concerns of individual groups within states are directly linked with state weakness. Recently a growing number of authors have analyzed this factor and have concluded that ethnic conflict is most often caused by the common sense of vulnerability or in other words by collective fears of the future. These authors point out that when groups begin to fear for their safety, dangerous and difficult to resolve strategic dilemmas arise that contain the potential for tremendous violence. Such approach is useful in understanding why ethnic conflict is frequently characterized by disproportionate responses such as excessive fears of harm and excessive reactions to harm. According to these authors three different strategic dilemmas can cause violence to erupt. First, information failure situation can cause ethnic tension when groups possess private information and have also the incentives to misrepresent that information. Second, problems of credible commitment arise when one group cannot reassure the other that it will not exploit an agreement at some future date. Stable ethnic relations can be understood as based upon a “contract” between groups. Such contracts contain provisions and mechanisms that each side lives up to its commitments and feels secure that the other will do so as well. Looked though this angle ethnic conflict can be a result of the fear of a minority that it cannot trust the guarantees offered by a majority. Third, the security dilemma is understood to follow directly from anarchy. Under the conditions of anarchy, states or groups within states are dependent upon self-help for their security and must therefore create, maintain and even expand their military capabilities. A typical example of such situation is the case of Kosovo. After hoping for many years that the international community will intervene to solve the problem, at the end Kosovar Albanians created their Kosovo Liberation Army and resorted to the use of military force. The analytic core of the security dilemma lies in situations where one of the disputing parties has incentives to resort to preemptive uses of force so that by attacking first it can reap a military advantage.xlviii

All the described above strategic dilemmas take place in a highly complex social environment. Some analysts have felt the need to trace the link between rising collective fears, ethnic activists and political entrepreneurs who polarize society on the basis of these fears and existing political memories and emotions.lix In the Balkans this kind of link is quite salient. Fears of the future are linked with the acute social uncertainty and historical memories of ethnically based territorial disputes. In all the case studies the national majorities are inclined to think of sizable ethnic minorities as threatening their national identity and the coherence and the territorial integrity of their state. There exists, though to a different extent among the national majorities, a peculiar siege mentality that indicates a high level of national insecurity.1 On the other hand the minorities in question have their fears of state repression and persecution, expulsion from the territories where they live, ethnic cleansing, and marginalization within the state. A prominent role in taking advantage of such situation play politicians in their fights for power-a peculiar problem which we shall address further in our study. As fears grow stronger the two main groups within each of the states prepare for the worst. In the “Balkans Proper”, as if in a laboratory, one can trace the different stages of these strategic dilemmas – from their almost invisible presence in Bulgaria, to the loud nationalistic rhetoric in Romania, to fears of the disintegration of the state in Macedonia, to the state of war in Kosovo.

3. Ethnic geography has received attention as the third main structural factor that can cause ethnic conflict. As has been already shown in this report all the sizable minorities in the “Balkans Proper” occupy territories that are adjacent to neighboring kin-states. This kind of ethnic
concentration creates a situation of regional instability despite numerous political attempts to look upon these minorities as bridges between states. The problem of geographic concentration of minorities along the borders with national kin-states is compounded in some of the cases by increasing demographic concentration of minority populations on the territories where they reside because of high birth rates. The result is demographic expansion and even explosion as is the case with Kosovo. The problem of ethnic geography is tightly connected with the problem of the regional dynamics of ethnic conflict. In his latest work Brown has particularly highlighted that the latter problem is poorly understood. No systemic study exists of the ways in which internal conflict engages and involves neighboring states. The problem is of particular importance for the “Balkans Proper”. The effects of ethnic conflict within a state on neighboring states can include refugee problems, economic repercussions, political instability and military entanglements. In the Balkans there have been numerous illustrations of all of these effects. What is more important is that, as Brown argues, neighboring states can be the passive victims of regional turmoil but they can also be active contributors to regional instability. In some cases regional aspects of ethnic conflict are “the product of discrete decisions taken by identifiable individuals and nearby governments not necessarily immune to international pressure”. Such a scheme however could have an effect only if permissive conditions for a conflict already exist in the target country. This aspect of the regional dynamics of ethnic conflict shows that some cases can be controlled internationally.

3.2. Political Factors

In the scholarly literature four main political factors have attracted attention: discriminatory political institutions; exclusionary national ideologies; inter-group politics; and elite politics.

1. Discriminatory political institutions exist when the degree of the fairness of the political system is low. This is a typical situation in most of the states in the Balkans. The representatives of the minorities as a rule are inadequately represented in the courts, the military, the police, and some other state and political institutions. Although in the process of transition to democracy ethnic minorities created their political parties and minority representatives can be found in Balkan parliaments and governments, the tendency of under-representation remains and it is a cause of resentment on the part of minorities.

2. Exclusionary national ideologies in the Balkans are built around the ideas of ethnic nationalism. Western scholars have explained the serious differences between civic nationalism and ethnic nationalism. While civic nationalism is usually a product of well institutionalized democracies, ethnic nationalism as in the Balkans has emerged historically as a spontaneous reaction against the rule of the Ottoman and the Austro-Hungarian empires in a political environment that was characterized by institutional vacuum. Thus Balkan ethnic nationalism is built not on institutions but on culture, on previous experience, on historical myths and memories. It is a good example of the power of ethnic affiliation and the loyalty that is typically connected with it. In his latest attempt for synthesis Horowitz pays a lot of attention to the foundations of ethnic loyalty because of its power and persistent presence in ethnic conflicts. His analysis takes seriously the claims of some scholars named somewhat misleadingly “primordialists” that ethnicity is a thick Gemeinschaft affiliation. In the Balkans the strong sense of ethnic affiliation is compounded by the idea of justification, that is the rightness of the struggles of Bulgarians, Romanians, Macedonians, and Serbs against their previous oppressors. The Balkans confirm Horowitz’s definition that “ethnicity is grounded in a deep sense of
sociality, buttressed by the birth nature of the affiliation, the sense of similarity among group members, and their sense of difference from others”.

In order to understand the power of ethnic affiliation or in other words of ethnic nationalism in the Balkans one additional point has to be made. As Jeane Kirkpatrick pointed with a great deal of justification nationalism is “an expression of pride in one’s identity”. This specific aspect of nationalism has particular importance for understanding the nature of ethnic conflict in the Balkans. The only author who has paid the necessary attention to it, and who seems unnoticed in the large stream of literature on ethnicity and nationalism, is Leah Greenfeld. On the basis of her fascinating analysis of the emergence of nationalism in five major countries – England, France, Germany, Russia and the United States, Greenfeld comes to the conclusion that by replacing medieval privileges nationality elevated every member of the community. In the case of mostly egalitarian Balkan societies, where the majority of the population was the object of oppression and humiliation on the part of the ruling elite of the Ottoman and the Austro-Hungarian empires, nationalism offered and guaranteed status. “National identity – writes Greenfeld – is fundamentally, a matter of dignity. It gives people reasons to be proud...It would be a strong statement, but not overstatement, to say that the world in which we live was brought into being by vanity. The role of vanity – or desire of status – in social transformation has been largely underestimated, and greed or will to power are commonly regarded as its mainsprings. In all the five cases in this book, however, the emergence of nationalism was related to preoccupation with status”. If this aspect of nationalism has been blurred in the West, it is quite salient in the Balkans. It is a remedy and a substitute to all the good things that the Balkans at variance to the West did not have – uninterrupted peaceful development, stable democratic systems, robust economies, and prosperity.

3. Inter-group politics can create the potential for ethnic violence if ethnic groups have ambitious objectives, strong sense of identity and confrontational strategies. This is exactly what happened in the “Balkans Proper” with the introduction of western type of democracy. The ethnic minorities created their own political parties that presented openly the minorities’ claims for rights and freedoms and their dissatisfaction with their present situation. The majorities responded by establishing their nationalistic parties that led to rising level of nationalistic rhetoric. The results were typical - dangerous polarization in all Balkan societies and maximal inclusiveness along ethnic lines. The situation that was created is a good illustration of Horowitz’s observation that “the recurrent tendency of groups to cleave from other groups and claim disproportionate share of rewards fits remarkably well with incentives to bifurcate that typically obtain in democratic politics. This tendency and these incentives make it both easy for political leaders to mobilize along ethnic lines and difficult to break the centrifugal tendencies that prevail in divided societies”. Ethnic politics in the Balkans with its two major aspects - the politics of nationalism and the role of the ethnic parties of the minorities - has a number of nuances and need to be examined more closely. Such examination is necessary for the clarification of the causes of ethnic conflict in the area. For this reason specific attention will be paid to these two aspects further in the study.

4. Elite-politics are identified also as a cause for ethnic conflict. By elite-politics in this particular case is meant the tactics employed by desperate and opportunistic politicians in times of political and economic turmoil. The major conclusion in Brown’s analysis is that elite-level factors such as bad leaders and bad neighbors play a more prominent role in conflicts than mass level phenomena such as bad domestic problems and bad neighborhoods. This is a serious step forward
in understanding ethnic conflict especially if we bear in mind that very little scholarly attention has been paid to this side of the problem. Brown claims more specifically that although many conflicts are triggered by internal, mass-level factors, the vast majority of them are triggered by internal, elite-level factors, that is - the bad leaders are the biggest problem. For this reason leaving elite decisions out of the equation, as many social scientists do is analytically misguiding. Current history of the Balkans gives ample evidence that political leaders in their struggle for survival play a crucial role in ethnic conflict. In the Balkans the factor of elite-politics raises three questions that are closely linked: a) in what ways ethnic nationalism and elite-politics interact? b) What exactly is the role of political leaders and c) why leaders are followed by followers?

Ethnically based nationalism became the chief alternative to communism for a number of reasons. It was easy for the dominant majorities to associate with, it provided some guideline through the chaos of transition but it also gave a chance to old leaders to acquire new political images. The breakdown of political authority and the profound systemic change in the Balkans created the conditions in which political leaders mainly from the former communist elite exploited preexisting ethnic tensions as well as political and economic hardships and elevated some crises to conflicts. This made some analysts rightly to emphasize that in order to escape the dangers of ethnic conflict as well as all the distortions in Balkan transition it would have required something akin to the process of de-Nazification seen in post-war Germany. Political leaders of the above type in their attempts to retain power used quite cynically ethnic mobilization as a means to gain popular support and thus political power. In the ethnic politics of the Balkans the message has been simple – “us against them” – and usually employs a real or imagined threat for the national majority coming from the ethnic minority. Ethnic minorities have been singled out and blamed for the problems inside the countries. Ethnic scapegoating became a widely spread political practice. In the context of fierce power struggles political leaders in the Balkans not only described sizable ethnic minorities in threatening terms but also grossly exaggerated these threats with the aim to bolster group solidarity (perceived threats are extremely powerful unifying devices) and strengthen their own political positions.

In the case of Bulgaria former communists manipulated with notions of Bulgarian national interests and the “Turkish threat”. They argued that if the Turks in Bulgaria pass the 12 percent threshold the country’s survival is at stake. Then a situation similar to that in northern Cyprus might be created, that is Turkey by force could occupy some territories in southern Bulgaria.

Though nationalist politics as a basis for political survival of certain groups of the political elite did exist, Bulgaria is not a typical case in the Balkans. Nationalism in Bulgaria does not have the same intensity that it has in other neighboring countries and it is somewhat elusive political force. The link between ethnic nationalism and elite-politics can be better examined in the case of Romania and Serbia (and Croatia). Tom Gallagher’s book on the politics of nationalism in Romania is quite illustrative in showing how nationalism can play a significant role in fostering a sense of solidarity across different social groups. Ultra-nationalist parties such as the Vatra Romaneasca Union (Romanian Cradle) and the Party of Romanian National Unity (PRNU) both of which are organizations of Romanians living in Transylvania emerged as important players in Romanian politics. This was largely because of the contributory role of the government, the Securitate and the state media. The National Salvation Front (NSF) scored an overwhelming victory in the general elections of 1990 and 1992 primarily because it openly sided with these two parties and skillfully manipulated with anticommunist and nationalist symbols. Gallagher describes the NSF as “essentially a non-ideological grouping which had emerged from the party
apparatus with the aim of protecting a set of caste interests in new conditions”. The case of Romania has repeatedly demonstrated that nationalism could be a source of power to whoever was capable of using its emotional energy. The close connection between appeals to nationalism and efforts to utilize it for personal or group advancement can be traced in Romania from the 19th century onwards. Since 1990 one can examine the symbiosis between leaders who held high office in the Ceausescu era and who were included in the new Romanian leadership and the ultranationalist parties. The latter are the most authentic heirs of the national communist era. The leaders of ultra-nationalist parties argued that efforts to obtain collective rights for the Hungarian minority, particularly in the spheres of education and local government, were obvious attempts to undermine the Romanian character of Transylvania the final result of which will be detaching it completely from Romania. They “uncovered” numerous conspiracies against the country and argued that the “multiple threats” to Romania’s national integrity can be averted only by suspending democratic political rules. The driving force behind Romanian nationalism was the administrative and technocratic elite in Transylvania that was created during the communist era. In order to preserve its privileges this group was predisposed to argue that any threat to its interests was also a threat to the Romanian nation.

The same kind of situation arose in Serbia where a wide coalition was created among elite groups that felt mostly threatened by the changes. It included conservatives from the Serb party leadership, Marxist intellectuals, nationalist writers, and parts of the Yugoslav army. They were instrumental for provoking the ethnic conflict in former Yugoslavia. In the context of the conflict they managed quite skillfully to define their own interests in terms of the survival of the Serb people. The decisive role of Serb political elite in the destruction of Yugoslavia was so salient that it attracted attention in some commentaries and analyses. In his work V. P. Gagnon, on the basis of the study of the Serb case, gives his answer to the question of what the role of leaders is in ethnic conflict. The author closely analyzes five episodes from 1960 onward in which conservative forces, especially in Serbia, were threatened with the radical restructuring of political and economic power. He then studies their responses and the effect of those responses. Gagnon’s very interesting conclusions however need certain precision. He is right that the Serb leadership from 1987 onward actively created rather than responded to threats to Serbs by purposefully provoking conflicts along ethnic lines. Thus a domestic political context was created where ethnicity became the only politically relevant identity. Against this background the author concludes: “violent conflict is caused not by ethnic sentiments, nor by external security concerns but rather by the dynamics of within-group conflict”. More specifically his opinion is that the violent conflict along ethnic lines in the former Yugoslavia “was a purposeful and rational strategy planned by those most threatened by changes to the structure of economic and political power”. It was the result of such strategy “rather than irrational acts of the masses”. These conclusions are just another illustration of the typical liability of studies on ethnic conflict – their one-sidedness. Here again the single-factor explanation tries to make the link between one independent variable and a wide range of dependable variables. Such approach has rightfully attracted the attention of scholars like Brown and Horowitz who asked the two questions that logically arise from the explanation quoted above. First, how leaders lead and why do followers follow? Or to put in other words, is there a way to create a theory that integrates elite-level and mass level factors? And second, is it possible to overcome the opposition existing in the literature on ethnic conflict between passion and interest as wellsprings of human behavior? Or in other words what is the relationship between affective and instrumental behavior? On the latter question the answer according to Horowitz is that just as the family is simultaneously an emotional and economic unit, so the ethnic group takes instrumental tasks but cannot be reduced
solely to the performance of those tasks. Starting from the understanding of ethnicity as a powerful Gemeinschaft affiliation Horowitz rejects the opposition between passion and interest in ethnic conflict. He suggests that “while passion and interest sometimes operate separately, there are also reasons why they are so often found together (those with interests seek to harness passions)”. Thus, the power of ethnic affiliation attracts the interest of those who wish to use it instrumentally, so ethnic-group behavior is likely to be both passionate and calculative. This synthesis is important for the Balkans. It shows that it is difficult to extract political entrepreneurs from the atmosphere of ethnic emotions that, true, can be whipped up but cannot be manipulated if they are entirely lacking.

The first question is important for the understanding of the relationship between leaders and followers. If groups from the political elite manipulate ethnic identities in their quest for power then it appears that followers do not know they are being manipulated – a thesis that lacks credibility - and thus creating an inaccurate image of evil politicians and innocent masses. Horowitz particularly emphasizes that “the freedom of elites to foment conflict and violence is limited by their followers’ definition of the situation and what they are willing to fight over”. Brown goes further in the explanation of why large numbers of people follow the ethnic flag in some places at some times, but not in others. He suggests that two factors are particularly important –the existence of antagonistic group histories and mounting economic pressures. This explanation is especially relevant for the situation in the Balkans. It does not contradict with the conclusions of observers who correctly have blamed Balkan political leaderships, particularly leaders like Milosevic and Tudjman, for the ethnic conflict in the region and the horrifying violence that accompanied it in former Yugoslavia. For leaders like them destruction of their countries and the thousands that were killed or made refugees are small prices to pay for staying in power. This explanation is important because it identifies further the permissible conditions within which conflict is possible. In Brown’s opinion “all three factors – irresponsible leaders driven by intensifying elite competitions; problematic group histories; and economic problems – must be present for this kind of conflict to explode”. This conclusion is particularly valuable for understanding the problem of ethnic conflict in the Balkans. It shows that the danger is not yet averted. It also enriches the theoretical ground for understanding ethnic conflict by introducing the need to examine closely how two sets of variables interact – the proximate causes for conflict and the permissive conditions that make violence more likely.

3.3. Economic / Social Factors

As the above conclusion has demonstrated economic and social factors can be potential sources of ethnic conflict. In the case of the Balkans two kinds of such factors are important: bad economic problems and discriminatory economic systems. These factors will be studied more closely further in the present report and for this reason will be only outlined here.

1. The bad economic problems in the Balkans are a result of both the transition from centrally planned to market-based economies and the economic legacy of the previous communist regimes. The transition in the Balkans proved to be a lengthy and costly process that created a number of serious economic problems ranging from high levels of unemployment to rampant inflation. This situation was made even worse by the U.N embargo on Serbia, which badly affected all the countries included in this study. In all the countries of the region there is rapid decline in the living standard of the population and increase in the percentage of people under the poverty line. These kinds of problems make Balkan countries susceptible to economically and socially induced
turmoil and present a threat to their stability. This is compounded by the fact that impoverished groups of the population are more susceptible to manipulations based on nationalism and ethnic scapegoating.

2. Discriminatory economic systems can generate feelings of resentment that are fertile soil for conflict along ethnic lines. The core problem here is this of distributive shortfalls. Competition for resources typically lies at the heart of ethnic conflict. The question is which ethnic group – mobilized by which elite - gets what. Struggle for control over resources is usually more fierce in less developed states where the economic “pie” is small and the resources are scarce as is the case in the Balkans. Unequal economic opportunities, unequal access to resources such as land, capital, and property rights or to jobs, government contracts and allocations, to developmental inputs and social services – all of these arise envy, fear and hatred. Ethnic tensions grow upon underlying socio-economic inequities. In a situation of serious regional economic stagnation resulting from the destruction of the previously existing socialist economic systems in the Balkans, basic economic allocation could cause, under certain conditions, ethnically defined conflicts. Within this context politics matter because the state controls access to scarce resources and groups that possess political power can gain privileged access to resources.

In Central and Eastern Europe the effect of resource allocation problems became visible in a number of cases. In Yugoslavia, Slovenians and Croatians resented the system of federal redistribution of their republican wealth to the poorer provinces in the federation. Their desire for a divorce with the federation grew upon this resentment but the war was not provoked solely because of this. In Czechoslovakia, which is an almost pure example of a conflict over the distribution of resources within the federal state, Czechs and Slovaks developed a mutually agreeable separation in order to avoid a potentially violent confrontation. These cases prove that although distributive shortfalls can be a cause of resentment and particularistic objectives, the concept that attributes violence to competition over scarce resources is an overstatement. Authors who analyze collective fears of the future and the connected with them strategic dilemmas argue that the existence of ethnic struggles over resources is not sufficient for violence to arise. Since violence is always costly, there exist in principle certain bargains short of violence. Thus, there should be additional factors at work in order for violence to erupt.\textsuperscript{lxv}

3.4. Cultural / Perceptual Factors

According to Brown, two cultural and perceptual factors have been identified in the scholarly literature as sources of ethnic conflict.

The first factor is cultural discrimination against minorities. This factor is well known in the Balkans. Constrains on the use and teaching of minority languages, inequitable educational opportunities, programs of bringing large numbers of the majority population into the areas inhabited by the minority groups are not only part of the history of the region but continue to be politically highly contested issues. The “rural resettlement project” designed by the regime of Ceausescu and Zhivkov’s campaign for the changing of the names of Bulgarian Muslims were policies that threatened the cultural values and heritage of Hungarians in Transylvania and of Turks in Bulgaria. Since the political debate over cultural discrimination continues in the “Balkans Proper” to the present, it will be more closely examined further in the study.
The second factor that is identified touches the problem of ethnic groups’ histories and perceptions of themselves and others. The main point here is that many groups have legitimate historic grievances against other groups. At the same time groups tend to glorify their own histories while they often demonize their neighbors. This aspect of ethnic identity with its different dimensions and its link to the causes of conflict has attracted the attention of a number of scholars.\textsuperscript{lxvi}

This theoretical overview has illustrated that ethnic conflict in the “Balkans Proper” is a complex phenomenon and that all the main clusters of conflict causing factors in Brown’s classification are present in the region. From this perspective it is important to take into account all the variables that shape the nature and the expressions of ethnic conflict in the “Balkans Proper”.

Another important theoretical problem that has to be taken into account when analyzing the Balkans is the one about the cultural identity of the region. It is determined by the need to treat the region as belonging to Europe and at the same time to be aware of its regional idiosyncrasies. The understanding of the inhabitants of the region that they have always been part of Europe as well as their desire to integrate with Western institutions has proved to be an important tool for international organizations to influence regional political behavior and decision making. The deeply rooted sense of belonging to Europe even among the Muslims in the area is the main reason why Islamic fundamentalism has not found so far fertile ground in the Balkans. On the other hand it is important to understand the reasons for the differences between Central Europe and the Balkans. Historically the Balkans were perceived as Europe’s unstable and backward periphery. Then for some 45 years the regions of Central and Eastern Europe had been substantially reshaped by communist domination. In the process of transition after 1989 Balkan states were less successful than Central Europe and experienced vicious circles of political and economic setbacks.

As the process of transition evolves one can clearly distinguish two groups of countries. Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Slovenia have been the most successful at enacting reforms while in contrast reform efforts and policies were often inconsistent, delayed, and corrupted in the Balkans. The reasons for this are several: The countries in the first group have more effective democratic systems; they had earlier histories of economic reforms and oppositional activities; they also maintained in the past more extensive relationships with the West and the global economy. In these countries former communist parties lost power in the first round of democratic elections and new political elites were more committed to change. As a consequence of this more comprehensive macro-economic stabilization reforms were introduced.\textsuperscript{lxvii}

The differences listed above stem from such factors as the prospects for economic prosperity and the nature of the regime change. Within this context it is important to understand why nationalism has played a dominant role in the politics of the states in the Balkans but not in Central Europe. Here such factor as ethnic geography plays a determinant role. History has simplified the ethnic geography of Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary thus making them relatively homogeneous. For this reason nationalistic appeals as a rule do not have audience and the political debates are usually along ideological lines. On the opposite, in all the countries of the “Balkans Proper” there are cohesive ethnic minorities that reside in border area with their ‘kin-states’. Post-communist nationalists in these countries have been successful to bolster their political positions by manipulating popular prejudices against the minorities because the minorities are large, because they have formed effective political organizations and because history lends credibility to assertions that minorities harbor separatist agendas.\textsuperscript{lxviii} The newly
formed political organizations of the most sizable ethnic minorities in the “Balkans Proper” have played a significant role in the process of transition and for this reason will be studied more closely in the next chapter.
4. POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS OF THE ETHNIC MINORITIES AND THEIR EVOLUTION

The undergoing socio-economic processes after 1989 and the created conditions for political pluralism opened entirely new opportunities for political expression and participation. A main feature of the political life in the “Balkans Proper” became the political mobilization around ethnic identities. Along with the emergence of nationalist parties of the national majorities and elite-politics, the political organizations of the ethnic minorities became the other major element of ethnic politics that shaped to a large extent the process of transition in the area.

The purpose of this chapter is not to describe the existing political organizations of the ethnic minorities per se but rather to analyze the general process of radicalization of ethnic parties that is taking place in the region. The political evolution of most ethnic parties (with a possible exception of the Movement for Rights and Freedoms in Bulgaria) in the direction of radicalization is a good illustration of the tendency inherent to ethnic politics to spiral out of control and to speed up the centrifugal tendencies that exist in divided societies.

The Hungarian party in Romania – the Hungarian Democratic Federation of Romania (HDFR) which existed for some time after World War II was reestablished at the outbreak of the Romanian revolution with the aim of representing the interests of the Hungarian minority in the country. HDFR membership - reportedly over 500,000 members - is organized in local chapters grouped into autonomous county branches. HDFR has 21 local affiliates in 21 counties and 16 legal organizations that cooperate with it. HDFR has the features of an umbrella formation covering a number of smaller political parties and other professional and civic organizations. Among these are the Hungarian Christian Democratic Party in Romania, the Party of Small Landowners, the Federation of Hungarian Youth Organizations, the Association of Hungarian Workers, and the Federation of Hungarian Students in Romania. A number of other professional, cultural and scientific societies and organizations are also affiliated with it. HDFR consistently won a high percentage of the ethnic Hungarian vote. It won about 7.5 percent of the total vote in the May 1990 and September 1992 parliamentary elections. After the 1990 elections HDFR became the largest opposition party to the NSF in parliament. In 1992 HDFR entered in a coalition within the Democratic Convention which brought together the main opposition parties.

A characteristic feature of HDFR that is common for most of the ethnic parties in the “Balkans Proper” is its dual identity. On one hand these are political organizations that represent and advance the interests of the ethnic minorities in the nation-states of the area. On the other hand as participants of the political process in these states, they enter into coalitions and deal with more general issues of the transition. The two components carry different weight and are usually an object of heated political debates within ethnic parties. When the main focus of activity concentrates on ethnicity then inevitably a process of radicalization takes place.
In the case of HDFR two fractions – moderate and radical - were formed that suggested two different approaches for its political activity. The first president of HDFR, Geza Domokos, believed that Romanian-Hungarian relations would improve only as a result of gradual changes in the political culture and the economic and social life. Because of this he advocated a gradualist policy for promoting the political and collective rights of the Hungarians, not ruling out occasional compromises with the government. The other wing led by HDFR’s honorary president Laslo Tokes increasingly opposed gradualist policies. This radical wing used the rhetoric of self-determination and autonomy to gain support within the party. At the third Congress of HDFR in January 1993 a new president, Marko Bela, was elected who served as a bridge between radicals and moderates. In the new program of HDFR the controversial term territorial autonomy was replaced by more moderate phraseology about local and regional self-administration, personal and cultural autonomy.

The process of radicalization of HDFR came as a response to the increasing influence of Romanian nationalists and to the refusal of the government to meet Hungarian demands in the sphere of education and local administration. The result was that HDFR decided to work for territorial autonomy. In January 1995 it held a conference on self-government in a town of Covasna County where the Hungarians constitute a majority of the population and elected a new body, the Council of Mayors and Local Councilors. The Council was given full jurisdiction over matters of local administration. The legality of the Council was contested by almost all political parties in Romania, including President Iliescu. This step taken by HDFR made opposition parties rally around the government in a shared suspicion about the final political goals of HDFR. As a result the Romanian opposition parties, which had previously sought to promote Romanian-Hungarian dialogue, expelled the HDFR from the Democratic Convention in February 1995. The intensity of the clash between HDFR and the rest of the Romanian parties grew when HDFR and Hungary repeatedly insisted that Romanian authorities should include the much disputed Recommendation 1201 of the Council of Europe in the text of the bilateral treaty. On the grounds of this Recommendation HDFR representatives argued also that the draft law on education in Romania did not comply with international standards and discriminated against the Hungarian minority.

These developments in Romania give grounds for two conclusions. First, the moves of HDFR toward self-determination and calls for territorial autonomy have made it an easy target for Romanian nationalists and an impossible ally for Romanian moderates. And second, there exists a socially based explanation for specific nationalist outbreaks in which ostensibly moderate parties and social sectors are also involved. The radicalization of HDFR was viewed by these parties as a socio-economic threat to Romania because it could block Romania’s entry in the European union and could impede the country’s economic progress. In more recent years the tensions between HDFR and Romanian opposition parties have been mitigated. After the elections in 1996 the new coalition government includes representatives of HDFR and the ruling coalition has disposed its commitment to ensure a range of minority rights. However the precarious economic conditions and the disruptive behavior of nationalist parties could rekindle ethnic tensions.

In the Republic of Macedonia the tendency of radicalization of ethnic politics is even more salient. All the political parties there define themselves ethnically rather than by interests in an atmosphere of virtually complete politicization of life. Thus Albanians belong to one of the three Albanian parties, Macedonians to one of the Macedonian parties, Turks to the Turkish party, and so on. For Albanians the right to create their own political parties was an entirely new beginning.
Before this they had very limited political experience, at variance with Kosovar Albanians, because they were never part of the Macedonian political system.

The first multiparty elections in Macedonia were held a year before its declaration of independence in 1990. The Albanian coalition formed by the Party for Democratic Prosperity and the Peoples’ Democratic Party PDP/NDP won twenty-two seats in parliament (18.3 percent) and became the third largest party in parliament. The first was the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization-Democratic Party for Macedonian National Unity (IMRO-DPMNU) that won 31.7 percent and the second - the party of reformed communists called the Social Democratic Union of Macedonia (SDUM) with 25.8 percent of the vote. Election results in the first round indicated that Albanians were acting as a voting bloc. As a consequence many ethnic Macedonians voted in the second round for IMRO-DPMNU. Thus the end results of the election reflected an ethnic divide between Macedonians and Albanians.

The particular relationship of Albanians with the majority population and the Macedonian society as a whole, that is shared with none of the other minorities living in Macedonia, is the context in which Albanian political radicalization is taking place. Until November 1992 when paramilitary police fired on a peaceful protest in Skopje killing four Albanians the leadership of Albanians exposed comparatively moderate views. However in 1993 serious political struggle began within the main Albanian party – PDP. The younger Albanian politicians articulated a radical agenda. In June 1993 the city committee of Tetovo came under the control of the radicals. By 1994 the radical forces took control of the old PDP and the moderate wing formed a new party.

The moderate PDP under Abdurman Haliti (or Abdurahman Aliti) predominates among Albanians in Skopje. This faction has been willing to accept incremental change and to work within the framework of state institutions. The moderates have been willing to remain in parliament and to work in coalition with the Crvenkovski governments. In 1994 four ministers in the government were PDP members. When in 1996 a new government was formed, two Albanians were dismissed while the overall representation of Albanians in the government rose from four to five. However Albanian ministers are either without portfolio or hold relatively unimportant ministries. Most Albanians think that this has not brought them benefits and view the moderate party as being the ‘lapdogs’ of the ruling SDUM.

The radical wing named itself Party of Democratic Prosperity-Albanians (PDP-A). Its leaders are Arben Xhaferi and Menduh Thaci who is still more radical. This faction has not been willing to work with the government and opposes compromise. It is now the larger party controlling the main local administrative bodies in all Albanian towns except Skopje. The overwhelming political dominance of the PDP-A in most communities with about 70 percent of the Albanian vote in the local elections held in the fall of 1996 has led to the inclusion of PDP-A leader Xhaferi in some political consultations. Since the summer of 1997 Macedonia has been in a state of political paralysis that has contributed to the escalation of inter-ethnic tensions. It encouraged some Albanian leaders to take more extreme positions and has prevented Macedonian politicians from offering some modest solutions to reasonable Albanian demands.

The political radicalization of ethnic Albanians in Macedonia finds expressions not only in the statements of PDP-A leaders that if “Macedonians go on refusing Albanians’ demands, there will be bloodshed here” and that violence is a likely outcome if the government does not enact major reforms. An additional new element is that weapons, which had been seized from the armories of the state of Albania in the course of the popular uprising there, began to find their
way across the border and became a factor in Macedonian politics. It is generally believed that Albanians are armed in Macedonia. What is even more disturbing is that the Albanians used these weapons in Gostivar in July 1997 in a dispute over the right to fly the Albanian flag. Then three Albanians were killed after government paramilitary police stormed the town hall. The fact that such bloody ethnic violence could erupt on such a symbolic pretext illustrates the level of radicalization. It also indicates that there are certain tendencies in Macedonia that could lead toward Kosovization of the situation there. On the other hand the government authorities see coercive methods of social control as legitimate thus extending the spiral of declining human rights, protest, repression and then violence.

The highest point of radicalization of ethnic politics in the region can be seen in Kosovo. The process started after Serbia revoked Kosovo’s autonomy and has already a long history of moving further in this direction. With a number of political acts the Kosovar Albanians denied the legitimacy of Serb domination and created an ethnic Albanian state within the state. In July 1990 the Parliament of Kosovo proclaimed the Declaration of Independence of Kosovo; two months later it met in the town of Kacanic and proclaimed the Constitution of the Republic of Kosova; a year later in a referendum the majority of the population voted for Kosovo as an independent and sovereign state; on May 24, 1992 elections for a multiparty parliament and presidency were held. The most popular political party, the Democratic League of Kosova (LDK) constituted the backbone of the parallel government. Since the outset LDR declared that its ultimate goal was Kosovo’s independence. LDK’s program was based on two main pillars – maintaining the parallel state structures and pressuring the international community to get involved in solving the Kosovo problem. In the May 1992 elections LDK won 76.44 percent of the vote, and 96 of a total of 140 seats. It is a coordinating policy making body with 36 branches all over the province. Its leader, Dr. Ibrahim Rugova was elected a President of the self-styled “Republic of Kosova”.

The Kosovar “parallel system” is unique in its conception and its massive support. The parallel state employs tax collectors and finances parallel education and health systems as well as a science academy, sports league and a welfare system. The shadow Albanian government has been able annually to collect and spend 27 million dollars of which 19 million devoted to education and 4.2 million spent to health clinics. (This budget however has received little public scrutiny and has reportedly been a subject to abuses). The taxes are collected in the province as well as from abroad – all Kosovars in the Diaspora are expected to contribute 3 percent of their income to the Republic of Kosova. The Albanian system has been tolerated by Belgrade (despite the fact that it often has been an object of harassment) because of two main reasons. First, if stopped it would have caused greater unrest. And second, it relieved the Serb government of a substantial financial burden. Belgrade’s annual budget for all Kosovo expenses, besides security, has been 2.5 million dollars which is less than 1 percent of the state budget.

Until recently LDK has been dominating the political scene. Its leader, Dr. Rugova, followed Ghandian policies of peaceful non-obedience and was extremely popular among Kosovar Albanians. However, in 1995 sharp political divisions appeared between Prime Minister Bukoshi and President Rugova. The consequence of this was the decrease of the flow of foreign remittances going to LDK. The internal strife deepened by 1997 when as a result of the growing dissatisfaction with the passivity of Rugova’s policies, fractions began to emerge within LDK. Rugova’s response to this was to strengthen his own position by dropping all of his closest allies. He was able to do this at the internal party elections held in December 1997 and at an assembly meeting of the Executive Committee of the LDK in February 1998. These developments made
some analysts to describe LDK as a curious mirror image of Milosevic’s SPS party. Rugova also became the only candidate for president in the new elections that were held on March 22, 1998. By doing so he distanced and isolated himself from all the other players in the Kosovar politics since the opposition to holding these elections, in view of the events in Drenica, was almost unanimous.

Apart from the power struggle within LDK two new political players emerged that are challenging Rugova’s dominant position and political approaches. The first is the student movement that developed as a force outside and beyond Rugova’s influence. The active engagement in politics of the Students’ Independent Union came as a result of the lack of progress in the implementation of the Rome Agreement on education between Rugova and Milosevic. At first the students staged protests with the sole aim of regaining access to university buildings. Their protests however illustrated the fact that political parties have lost credibility and that popular concern over the lack of any progress in the solution of the Kosovo problem is mounting. Since August 1997 the students have organized several rounds of demonstrations with their agenda switching from purely education issues to a non-violent struggle against violence, war and Serb terror.\textsuperscript{lixxix}

The most significant development within the trend of radicalization of Kosovo politics came as a result of the emergence of the Kosovo Liberation Army (UCK). For a number of years UCK was an almost mythical body. By September 1997 however it began to play an increasingly important role in the province. A fertile ground for UCK activity was created after more than a million guns disappeared from Albania. In this way anyone in Kosovo could easily purchase weapons that were smuggled across the porous border with Albania. Later in the same year UCK claimed responsibility for several recent terrorist attacks and publicly called Kosovo’s shadow prime minister to hand over to it the money coming from the Albanian Diaspora. According to observers, the Diaspora that tended to be more radical since the beginning of the struggle for Kosovo independence has responded positively to these appeals. Thus the major part of Albanian remittances from abroad go now to UCK. In December 1997 UCK reportedly published advertisements in the Norwegian and Swedish press seeking financial donations and urging young Kosovars abroad to volunteer.\textsuperscript{lxxx} The first one who publicly acknowledged UCK’s existence well in advance of the recent violence was the chairman of the Parliamentary Party of Kosovo Adem Demaci. He said that UCK’s emergence proved that the Kosovars were prepared to pay the highest price for their freedom. UCK political platform is close to that of the Basques’ ETA, Northern Ireland’s IRA and Corsica’s Liberation Front. Its main goal is the achievement of the independence of Kosovo through armed struggle against Serb security forces, and ultimately the union of all Albanian territories with Albania. Milosevic launched his first military attack against UCK in February/March 1998 in the region of Drenica. Instead of nipping UCK in the bud the Serb military attack emboldened UCK. In the course of military operations, by late June it controlled reportedly about a third of Kosovo’s territory. The fighting between Serb paramilitary forces and UCK had as a consequence the displacement of some 300,000 people (in the beginning of October 1998) the vast majority of which are Albanians either on the territory of the province or beyond its borders, mainly in northern Albania.

One particular aspect of the Kosovar political life has to be understood within this context. The clan structure that dominates Albanian society plays an important role in the decision-making process. Thus, for example, when leaders of extended Kosovar families decided that the best policy was non-violence their will was strictly observed. In the same way if after the events in
Drenica region the clan leaders decided to support guerrilla units or a liberation army movement their position would also be strictly followed.

Within this general trend of radicalization of ethnic politics in the “Balkans Proper” the Movement for Rights and Freedoms (MRF) – the Turkish party in Bulgaria has been the only exception. The reasons for this are twofold. First, the numerical size of the Turkish minority in Bulgaria was considerably diminished due to several migration waves after 1989 that came as a result of the assimilation campaign of 1984-1989 and of the deteriorating economic conditions afterwards. As a direct consequence of this the level of ethnic tensions in Bulgaria substantially decreased. The second reason is to be found in the way the party was created. After secret files were opened in 1997 it became clear that a number of MRF leaders including its chairman Ahmed Dogan were agents of the former communist secret police. These were not genuine ethnic leaders but rather political players who were assigned certain roles in the broader context of Bulgaria’s political transition. Despite this, MFR’s role and influence came mainly as a result of the monolithic support of the Turkish minority. Besides, the strong polarization in Bulgarian politics in the first seven years of transition made MFR a more powerful force than its own electorate. Within the simple two-party model that was established in Bulgarian political life MFR acquired for some time the position of holding the balance of power. Due to the diminishing votes coming from the Turkish minority, MRF joined a hastily-formed coalition with several small parties like the monarchists, the Green Party, the Agrarian party (Nikola Petkov) and some other in order to overcome the 4 percent barrier in the pre-term parliamentary elections in April 1997. The coalition called Alliance for National Salvation won 7.6 percent of the votes and 19 seats in the Bulgarian Parliament that has 240 seats. As a whole, in the years of transition MFR acted as a responsible political force. It was successful in curbing the radical elements within its ranks and it never called for territorial autonomy.
5. THE MOST SENSITIVE ISSUES IN THE POLITICAL DEBATE BETWEEN NATIONAL MAJORITIES AND ETHNIC MINORITIES

There have been three main issues around which the political debate in the region revolved. These are the question of the status of the ethnic minority vis-à-vis the nation-state, the question of minority education, and the question of local government. The disputes varied from country to country in their intensity and in the scope of the questions involved. The debate was defined largely by historical precedents. In other words the rights that minorities enjoyed in previous periods of time were used as a starting ground for their present demands. Against this background there exist serious differences in the scope and the substance of the debate in the different countries in the region.

5.1. The Question of Status

The question of constitutional status is a matter of great importance since it concerns such problems as ethnic minorities’ treatment and standing within the state. Majorities on the other hand are fearful of losing their dominant position in the state, of secession or foreign intervention and for this reason attempt to provide themselves with guarantees for their own future. Thus status is of greatest interest for these two groups and concerns over status supersede “conflicts over needs and interests”.

A main point around which the political disputes revolved in Romania was the issue of the character of the state and the status of Hungarians in the state. Romania’s draft constitution became the main target of these disputes. HDFR representatives tried to prevent the passage of articles that would assign to the Hungarian minority a position of ‘inferior’ or second class citizens against whom the state may discriminate. The main object of the dispute was Article 1 that defines Romania as a state that is “national, sovereign and independent, unitary and indivisible” because of the term “unitary state”. This term existed in the constitutions of 1923 and 1965 and was at the core of the concept of the modern Romanian state as a centralized nation-state, that is, the state of the Romanians in which the ethnic minorities do not have an equal role. By November 1991 HDFR decided to vote against the new constitution claiming that it had failed to secure political, economic, and cultural rights for minorities as required by international covenants. The dispute became more heated and bitter as Romanian nationalists rose to power and radicals within HDFR in turn started the talk for territorial autonomy. One outcome of the spiral of inter-ethnic hatred was the Cluj Declaration, adopted by HDFR in October 1992 that defined the Hungarian minority in Romania as a “co-nation” or a “state-building nation”. With its emphasis on the multinational character of the state of Romania the declaration presented a further rejection to Article 1 of the Constitution. Following its political goal to promote the political equality of Hungarians HDFR called for “communitarian autonomy” that it described as the continuation of the long tradition of self-government and ethnic pluralism in Transylvania.
The Declaration raised the demand for self-government but did not define clearly the concept of autonomy thus creating grounds for its conflicting interpretations. The Cluj Declaration was criticized by most of the other political parties in Romania.

Similar disputes arose in the Republic of Macedonia. The ethnic Albanians are striving for equality with the Macedonian majority and because of this some texts in the constitution are highly contested. In 1989 the constitution of the Socialist Republic of Macedonia was amended. It declared Macedonia a 'nation-state' of the ethnic Macedonians and the previous text that Macedonia is “a state of the Macedonian people and the Albanian and Turkish minorities” was abolished. With independence in 1991 a new constitution was written that emphasized Macedonian language and culture over that of Albanians and other minorities. Albanians strongly disagree with this interpretation and claim that it redefines the state as being of and for ethnic Macedonians rather than of and for the people of Macedonia. They demand that the constitution be amended so that they can acquire equal status with Macedonians. These demands include: free use of Albanian as an official language; recognition of Albanians as a constitutive or state forming nation in the constitution; proportional representation in government and greater participation in organs of local administration, public institutions, and the armed forces (police and military) as well as the right to display Albanian national symbols. The government has been unwilling to agree to Albanian demands and is unlikely to do so because most Macedonians would consider such an action a relinquishment of basic Macedonian identity that is barely two-and-a-half generations old and for this reason is quite unstable and fragile.

In the case of Kosovo, as has been mentioned already, the Yugoslav constitution of 1974 became the bone of contention between Serbs and Albanians. Since 1989 the two sides have formulated their incompatible and irreconcilable positions. For Serbs Kosovo is part of Serbia and it has no right of self-determination. The Serb view is that any extended self-rule that is legally recognized would lead to secession and union with Albania. On the other hand Kosovars have been so far unanimous that restoring the autonomy that Kosovo enjoyed between 1974 and 1989 in the framework of the broader federation structure is neither acceptable nor appropriate within the present rump state. A Kosovo Republic within Serbia in their view is not a just solution – Yugoslavia has ceased to exist and Kosovo should have been granted the same right that the other republics of the federation had to form its own independent state. Kosovars claim that any form of autonomy within Serbia can be easily revoked as already happened. They say that Serbia cannot be trusted and for this reason they want international mediation. Besides Kosovars rightly fear that without international mediation they would be in a very weak position. Kosovo has declared itself independent and according to Albanians it is only a question of persuading the international community to accept this.

In Bulgaria the picture seems quite different. Turks have not demanded territorial autonomy or the status of constituent people. This is mainly due to the fact that Turks in Bulgaria, at variance with Hungarians in Transylvania, Albanians in Kosovo or even Albanians in Macedonia, did not enjoy in past periods of time substantial minority rights. There were in fact periods when Turks were deprived of almost all minority group rights. Legally Bulgaria is built as all the rest countries in the region on the principle of the unitary nation-state. What is more, in political practices and in national legislation the term national minority is not used. The main argument behind this is that the official recognition of the term would create grounds for claims that go beyond the sphere of human rights and involve certain complications in the sphere of inter-state relations. The political agenda of MRF has been more limited. It included demands for legal protection of minorities in conformity with international law, political rights and participation at
all levels of local and government structures, as well as guarantees for their cultural and linguistic identity. While insisting on collective rights and cultural autonomy, MFR has declared that it is against the idea of political autonomy and consider it harmful for the integration of the Bulgarian nation as well as for the struggle of Turks and Muslims in Bulgaria to preserve their ethnic and religious identity.

5.2. The Question of Education

Problems of minority education have been among the most hotly contested issues between majorities and minorities in the “Balkans Proper” in the process of transition. Minorities see the issue of language instruction as a means of preservation of group cultural identity and coherence as well as a way to acquire the right of equal opportunities by reforming previously discriminatory educational policies. For majorities the problem of minority education is seen as weakening of the integrity of their state and creating separatist atmosphere. Besides demands for minority language education can intimidate insecure majorities about the eventual loss of their status as owners of the state at the hands of better educated and wealthier minorities. Education as a policy issue is so divisive because it is considered by both sides to be, at root, about the future. Thus the problem of education in the minority language can be seen also as an important part of the struggle between the two groups over resources and control.

In order to understand the significance of the issue and the underlying reasons why the linguistic co-existence at the political level is so difficult to establish one has to be aware of the way in which ethnicity operates within culture, politics and society. Ethnicity is tightly connected with the need of cultural reproduction. The role of language in this context has been particularly salient in Eastern Europe as a whole and in the Balkans in particular. Language as a primary instrument of mobilization is seen as highly effective political resource. It is believed that when a group has its own language, its political, social, cultural and civic institutions can operate without interference from outside. As a main component of the nation-state building, the language historically had been an object of particular political attention. It was identified, codified and imposed; diverse dialects were forged into a single standard. On the other hand multi-lingualism is understood as a weakness that potentially threatens the future of the nation-states in the region. This is the reason of the very high level of linguistic intolerance at the political level. The problem of education is directly connected with the problem of language. The difficulties in the sphere of minority education are rooted not in technical educational policies. As George Schopflin points, it is a matter “of a symbolic issue that the majority simply cannot accept, that the minority has intellectual aspirations that might make its members fit for high office and compete in the world of moral values where the majority insists on exclusivity.” Here lies the core reason for the refusal of Romanian and Macedonian authorities to allow the establishment of minority-language university for Hungarians and Albanians respectively.

In the case of Romania it has not been just the issue of restoring the Hungarian language Babes-Bolyai University in Cluj (Transylvania). The education law that was passed in 1995 became the cause for a long and bitter political struggle. The essence of the debate can be understood only if one bears in mind that the Hungarians had traditionally a well developed education system in Transylvania that had been degraded step by step since the region was transferred to Romania in 1920. Hungarian hopes after 1989 were that they will be able to rebuilt it and to have self-government over education. The version of the law that was passed by the Romanian Chamber of
Deputies in June 1994 had drawn many objections from HDFR. The Hungarian representatives submitted their own draft law that suggested the establishment of a separate educational system for the Hungarian minority from the kindergarten through the university. In an atmosphere of growing nationalist passions the Senate commission produced a draft law that was much harsher than the law passed by the lower house of the parliament. All amendments to the draft presented by HDFR senators were rejected. The protests of the Hungarian minority were joined by the political organizations of the Czech, Slovak and German minorities. At this point the Hungarian Prime Minister Guala Horn phoned the Romanian President Ion Iliescu urging him to support the HDFR-proposed amendments. Iliescu, however, replied that there is no constitutional provision for presidential ‘interference’ in legislative affairs. The two chambers of the Romanian parliament voted on the law article by article on June 28 1995 without taking into consideration HDFR demands for revision. HDFR boycotted the parliamentary session. The law that emerged was formulated so as to make learning in Hungarian possible only for Hungarian-language teachers. It specified that schools that teach Romanian must exist in every settlement in the country and at all levels of instruction. All university entrance examinations has to be conducted in Romanian. Article 166 of the law precluded any restitution of parochial schools. As HDFR showed more that 80 percent of parochial schools nationalized in the communist period were Hungarian. In a declaration issued after the passing of the law HDFR said that the law was “more discriminatory, more anti-Magiar and anti-minority than the similar laws and regulations of the Ceausescu system”. On the other hand, the Romanian president in a communiqué accused the Hungarian minority leaders of promoting ‘separatism’ and the ’ghettoization’ of Hungarian youth. Official Hungarian authorities also interfered pointing that the new education law as well as “extremist anti-Maguar manifestations as of late” did not “set a good premise for concluding the Romanian-Hungarian basic treaty”. HDFR made appeals for help to the European Union, the Council of Europe, the CE Parliamentary Assembly, the Helsinki Committee, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe’s High Commissioner on National Minorities, the European Parliament and others. It also organized series of demonstrations and protests to mark the struggle of the Hungarian minority for the preservation of its national identity.

The debate over educational issues provoked similar reactions and emotional responses in Macedonia. The language issues often framed by Slav Macedonians in terms of “defending the constitution” since it provides for Macedonian to be the only official language, have become one of the flash points in Macedonian society. Albanian language instruction in the Skopje University was stopped in 1985 because of fears of Albanian separatism. After Macedonia’s independence in 1991 Albanains, in view of the serious lack of qualified teachers, made demands for reinstating Albanian-language instruction at the 2-year Pedagogical Academy and upgrading the academy to a 4-year Pedagogical Faculty. By 1994 Albanian majority municipalities took up actions to establish an Albanian language university in Tetovo. The movement came as a result of the closure of the University of Pristina that was the only Albanian language institution of higher education in former Yugoslavia. The initiative was also reinforced by the return of Pristina-educated Macedonian Albanians who were eager to assert leadership in their community. For Albanians the issue of the university in Tetovo is seen as a key to achieve parity with Slav Macedonians by having greater educational opportunities and thus greater opportunities to participate in state administration. For Slav Macedonians the demand is seen as a challenge to state authority. They say that sanctioning an Albanian-language university in Tetovo is tantamount to accepting Albanian aspirations for regional autonomy and ultimately unification with Albania. On this issue each side proceeded as if the other did not exist. The first building of the university was destroyed in a Macedonian police action which killed one and wounded dozen of others. The university re-opened but while tolerated, it is regarded as illegal by the
Macedonian government. The university has not achieved external recognition thus failing to attract the international attention it was meant to win. It is financed largely by remittances from Albanians living abroad.

Another aspect of the problem is the serious under-representation of Albanians at the secondary and university level. According to enrollment figures for 1995/96, 28 percent of elementary students and 11 percent of secondary students are taught in Albanian. The official estimates are that the percent of Albanians studying at the two state universities in Macedonia has increased from 4 percent in 1992 to 7.25 percent in 1997.\textsuperscript{\textasteriskcentered lxxxvi} In an action to ease the tensions, the Government of Macedonia established a 10 percent quota system for minorities at the state universities and increased it to 23 percent for 1996/97. Following ten years of strictly Macedonian language education at the University of Skopje, in January 1997 the parliament passed a law enforcing an Albanian language university education within the pedagogical faculty to provide teachers for Albanian primary and secondary education. This move caused mass daily demonstrations in February and March 1997 on the streets of Skopje by high school and university students who claimed that they were ‘defending the constitution’. This opposition to the Government’s higher-education policy had some extremely ugly expressions such as posters demanding ‘gas chambers for Albanians’.\textsuperscript{\textasteriskcentered lxxxvii}

In Kosovo the confrontation in the field of education has gone to the extreme. According to the 1974 Yugoslav Constitution Kosovo had full decision-making authority over all levels of education. The crisis started when the Serb parliament repealed the education legislation passed by the Kosovo parliament and adopted uniform curricula for primary and secondary education throughout Serbia. Kosovar teachers refused to adopt the change and shortly after that the Serb authorities cut off funding for Albanian-language schools. At the beginning of the 1991/92 school year, Serb police prevented Albanian teachers and students from entering their school buildings. The same happened with Pristina University. As a result Albanian classes during the second term started in private homes. By the end of 1991 the Serb regime dismissed all Albanian teachers from secondary schools and from Pristina University.\textsuperscript{\textasteriskcentered lxxxviii} Since then most expenses and teachers’ salaries have been covered by the 3 percent tax that Kosovars and the Albanians from the Diaspora pay in order to maintain the parallel state institutions. According to some estimates the parallel state spent 90 million German marks for maintaining the Kosovar education system between 1992 and 1996/97. Talks over allowing Albanians to return to official school premises were conducted in 1992 and 1993 within the framework of the Geneva peace process for former Yugoslavia but the issue was dropped. After secret negotiations mediated by the Italian religious charity Sant’Egidio (which is partly funded by the US government through the US Institute of Peace) Rugova and Milosevic, then President of Serbia, signed an agreement on normalization of education in Kosovo in September 1996. However the two sides interpreted the agreement in two different ways. For Serbs it meant that Albanian students would be reintegrated into the Serb education system, while the Kosovars saw it as an approval of their system and they expected to return to all school premises without conditions. The agreement was never implemented, though it was used to serve the political goals of the men that signed it. Milosevic was able to demonstrate to Washington that he was willing to negotiate while Rugova pointed out that he was officially recognized. After the massacre in Drenica a new protocol was signed that provided for the gradual re-entry of Albanian students into schools and faculties. The agreement was accompanied by demonstrations of Serb students in Pristina that were backed with solidarity actions by their counterparts in Belgrade. One of the most frequently used slogans in these protests has been “Don’t give them pencils”. Efforts to implement the new agreement revealed that the obstacles are not only in official Serb politics but much more so in the local Serb
Minority education has been a sensitive issue in Bulgaria too. MFR insisted that instruction in the Turkish language should be introduced as part of the regular curriculum in all Bulgarian schools. The demand caused a Bulgarian nationalist backlash. As a result the Bulgarian Parliament passed a Law on Public Education in October 1991 legislating that Turkish could be taught only outside of state schools. Several months later the newly appointed Minister of Education revised this policy. In view of the fact that most schools in Bulgaria are controlled by the municipalities and not by the state, the Minister instituted Turkish instruction in public schools on an extracurricular basis. After 1989 two colleges for training of Turkish teachers as well as four religious high schools and a High Islamic Institute were established in Bulgaria. The teaching of Turkish language and literature were restored at the universities of Sofia and Shoumen. As in the case of Albanians in Macedonia, the educational level of Turks is not equal to that of Bulgarians. According to the data from the latest census in Bulgaria hardly 2 percent of the adult Turks had college or university education (for Bulgarians the indicator is 20.2 percent).

The issue of minority education raises many questions that cannot be easily resolved. They concern the quality and the availability of such education but also the ability of economically weak states in the region to make budgetary spending on minority education. Another aspect that is common for all the countries under consideration is the problem of the adequate integration of the members of the ethnic minorities into societies that have been built on the premise of belonging to the national majorities. Children from regions inhabited predominantly by ethnic minorities who do not speak the language of the majority cannot successfully gain admittance to faculties of higher learning where the instruction is in the majority language and easily drop out of school.

5.3. Problems of Local Government

A main area of interactions between majorities and minorities on a day-to-day basis is the local level. Even if ethnic relations are successfully managed at the state level there still may be a spiral of tensions and violence if local level problems are not tackled properly. In a number of regions in the “Balkans Proper” ethnic minorities equal or outnumber the majority group and have claims for commensurate local political representation. All the countries under consideration have experienced heightened tensions and even outbreaks of violence emanating from such problems. In Romania riots in Tîrgu-Mureș and in Cluj resulted in several deaths. Ethnic Bulgarians who are minorities in some Turk-dominated municipalities have exhibited
fears and increased hostility toward Turks. Such fears and hostility are even more pronounced among ethnic Macedonians in western Macedonia and Serbs in Kosovo.

The main focus of the debate between majorities and minorities is who and how will govern the local administration. The issue is quite sensitive because it concerns the relationship between central authorities and local administration. Demands for decentralization usually are interpreted as encouraging the ethnic minorities to move in the direction of self-government and local autonomy.

In Romania, in the February 1992 local elections, 161 mayors, 2681 local councilors and 151 county councilors, who were members of HDFR were elected. The process of changing the guard in local administration however was not smooth and easy. In Târgu Mureș despite efforts to block a Hungarian ethnic from being elected mayor, a moderate HDFR member was elected in May 1992. The Mureș county council however was not able to convene for almost a year because councilors from the nationalistic Party of Romanian National Unity (PRNU) boycotted it by taking advantage of a law requiring two-thirds of newly elected members to attend a council’s first session in order for it to commence its activities. It was only in February 1993, after four previous attempts, that enough members turned up for the council to convene. Another example for the fierce struggle between the two ethnic groups was the election in 1992 of the leader of PRNU Gheorghe Funar as mayor of Cluj in Transylvania where half of the population is Hungarian. Funar’s preoccupation with the danger posed by ‘anti-national’ forces (read Hungarians) left little time for him to deal with the serious infrastructural problems faced by Cluj. His methods and discourse revealed also the extent of nationalist passions among ethnic Romanians. In turn HDFR took bolder steps to strengthen its position in matters of local government. In January 1995 it elected the Council of Mayors and Local Councilors that was given full jurisdiction over this area. Its main responsibilities included: protecting the interests of the Hungarian minority; coordinating the activities of HDFR within local governments; preparing strategies and proposals for local elections; establishing its own expert committees in the main fields of local administration and others. The establishment of the Council provoked another wave of Romanian nationalist reactions. The most extreme nationalists like Funar and Tudor took the opportunity to reiterate their call for outlawing HDFR.

In Macedonia some of the most dangerous confrontations between Albanians and the Macedonian authorities during the late 1980s occurred because Albanians had little or no political influence in municipal governments. Since independence, the situation became worse because the central authorities established tight control over the municipalities. This policy-line went to the extreme in 1990 when Albanians won the elections in Gostivar and Tetovo. The state refused to allow the elected representatives to take office and as a result the Albanians formed their own municipal assembly and elected their own mayor. In the next four years the question of the relationship between municipalities and the state was hotly disputed, until October 1995, when the national Parliament passed the Law of Local Self-Government. According to it each municipality is to have a directly elected mayor and council which are to deal with local issues. Further developments indicated however that the realistic limits of municipal authority are insufficiently defined in the law. Consequently, city councils have been passing statutes that the central government considers as exceeding their constitutional limits. In the process of restructuring local self-government that followed after the law was passed, in 1996 Macedonia redistricted the original 31 municipalities inherited from former Yugoslavia. Among the new 130 municipalities 20 have an ethnic Albanian majority. Local elections in 1997 brought to office a number of Albanian mayors who are members of the Albanian Democratic Prosperity Party
As has been already mentioned, DPA advocates a more hard line stance toward the Macedonian Government and is thought to harbor aspirations for some form of autonomy for western Macedonia. Tetovo and Gostivar both elected DPA mayors. After the election the mayor and the city council of Gostivar decided that next to the Macedonian flag they would fly two other flags indicating the municipality’s ethnic composition, namely the Turkish and Albanian flags. This decision became the cause of a prolonged political crisis in the course of which three civilians were shot dead and up to 400 wounded including a number of police. The mayor of Gostivar was tried and sentenced to more than thirteen years in prison.

In Kosovo the will for self-government combined with the repressive policies of the regime in Belgrade produced the shadow state of the self-styled ‘Republic of Kosovo’. The ‘parallel system’ created by the Albanians consists of a parliament that has never met and thirteen commissions that meet regularly, especially the education, finance and health commissions. A coalition shadow government, comprised of six ministers, was formed in October 1991. Prime Minister and at the same time foreign minister is Bujar Bukoshi. All ministers, with the exception of the health minister, live abroad. The main activity of the shadow government is to collect taxes and to maintain the education system and health care. In Kosovo, there are a number of political parties of the Albanians. The most popular among them are the Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK) and the Parliamentary Party of Kosovo (PPK). Although Kosovars use and pay for utilities from rump Yugoslavia (they also pay taxes on top of the parallel taxes for their self-styled “Republic of Kosovo”) and Yugoslav dinars are the currency, Albanians have systematically boycotted the Yugoslav and Serbian elections since 1981, considering them events in a foreign country. Kosovars also refuse to participate in Serb or Yugoslav political life. The boycott by Kosovars of the rump state of Yugoslavia in almost total in such spheres of life as politics, education, and health care. This political stance in turn has contributed to the radicalization of Serb and Yugoslav politics. Kosovars have not served in the army since 1989 as a result of the tacit agreement that exists between the two sides. Serbs authorities obviously have no interest to supply with arms a very hostile youth while the Kosovars have no wish to serve in an army that they view as an alien army of occupation. As a result of the apartheid-like situation all contacts between Serbs and Kosovars at any level of life have been diminished to a minimum.

The issue of local government in Bulgaria’s mixed regions has not been so politically charged. The only exception in this respect was the contest around the election of mayor in the city of Kurdjali in 1997. Otherwise, the disputes are oriented more toward some practical questions like the need of restructuring the local economy and of support for the private business. For example the municipal representatives from the Rhodope region have requested without success for a number of years to the Council of Ministers to be consigned the buildings and the equipment of the closed down factories since they have been built with money from the municipalities. If granted the opportunity local administration could more easily privatize them or put them on lease. These requests have failed partly because of the lack of trust between MRF and the central authorities and partly because of the unwillingness of the government to deal seriously with the bad economic and social problems of mixed regions. Another aspect of the problem is that local authorities have expectations about the re-establishment of old degrees that guaranteed border and mountain regions privileged regime. These expectations do not take into account the weakness of the state and its changing nature. However, the way in which these issues are tackled creates conditions for the transformation of social contradictions into ethnic tensions. In Bulgaria too the process of self-isolation of Muslim groups and the restriction of different social activities solely into the group of Turks and Pomaks is quite visible. One of the reasons is that before 1989 Bulgarians held the major positions in local administration of mixed regions. With the changes
taking place, more Turks and Pomaks were elected at the local level while the Bulgarians gave this change a cold reception.
6. BILATERAL RELATIONS IN THE “BALKANS PROPER”

Bilateral relations between ‘kin-states’ and ‘host-states’ of trans-border ethnic groups in the “Balkans Proper” have a determinant role for the security situation in the region. Domestic debates over such issues as the status and education in the mother tongue of the ethnic minorities, disputes over local government and state symbols have international repercussions and are increasingly shaped by the “triadic nexus” of the nationalizing state, ethnic minorities within the state and external homelands claiming a special interest in the fate of ‘their’ minorities abroad. Trans-border ethnic minorities act as important political agents beyond the boundaries of individual states first of all because in terms of international law the treatment of ethnic minorities is today a transnational and trans-state issue. The processes of democratization and marketization in the Balkans have opened up new channels of influence for ethnic minorities by creating more transparent and open political systems that ensure that a variety of actors are able to influence political outcomes. Global communications networks as well as the present-day international environment increase the chances of well-organized ethnic populations to play a role in influencing the politics within both their ancestral homelands and the states in which they live.

6.1. Bulgarian-Turkish Relations

The assimilation campaign of 1984 in Bulgaria toward the Turkish and Muslim minorities caused an extreme deterioration of relations with Turkey, leading to complete cessation of political contacts and to the entire closing of the common border. The conflict between the two countries was transmitted and intensified within the framework of the UN, the CSCE and other international bodies. The Bulgarian political class, at variance with the current political and military behavior of Milosevic and his circle, chose the option of finding a prompt, effective and civilized solution to the Turkish problem immediately after November 1989. It made its best to defuse the most explosive consequences of a previous policy viewed as shortsighted. Bulgarian Turks were given the freedom to choose their names, practice Islam, speak and study their mother language, publish books and newspapers in Turkish and have their organizations. These steps were strongly encouraged and appreciated accordingly by the United States and Western Europe and paved the way for a radical change in the development of relations with Turkey.

The turning point occurred in late 1991 when the first non-communist government was formed based on a coalition agreement between the Union of Democratic Forces (UDF) and MRF. The policy of this government in favor of overcoming the mistrust and negative legacy of the Cold War in Bulgarian-Turkish relations resulted in the negotiation and signing of the Treaty of Friendship, Good Neighbory Relations, Cooperation and Security on May 6, 1992. It is the third such treaty between Bulgaria and Turkey after those signed in 1925 and 1975. The signing of the Treaty came as a proof that the basic open questions between the two countries, most notably the
treatment of the Bulgarian Turks, have been resolved. The Treaty confirmed the principles of territorial integrity, sovereignty, non-interference in the internal affairs of the other state, non-aggression, equality and mutual interest. The two countries agreed that they would not allow their territory to be used for aggression against the other state nor by organizations and groups aiming for subversive or separatist activity in the other state. The Treaty created the general political framework within which the remaining problems could be tackled.

However, the persistent presence of ethnic issues can be seen on a number of occasions. While in the period immediately after November 1989 the most urgent problem was the restoring of the civil rights of Bulgarian Turks, during the next years the most dramatic question became that of the legitimacy of the MFR in Bulgaria and its links with Turkey. Bilateral relations were strongly influenced in the period after the signing of the Treaty by Bulgarian domestic disputes over such important for Bulgaria issues as the extent of threat posed by Turkey, the actual ability of Turkey to influence Bulgaria’s domestic politics, as well as the need for further introduction of international norms in the field of minority rights protection so that the country could meet the criteria for membership in Euro-Atlantic organizations.

The two main political parties in Bulgaria - BSP and UDF support two different approaches toward Turkey. BSP puts stronger emphasis on relations with Greece and supports and encourages the views popularized by a number of smaller nationalist parties and organizations. According to these views MRF is illegitimate and is serving Turkish expansionist interests. Turkey has been attacked for trying to use Bulgarian Turks as ‘its fifth column’ and to change the identity of the Pomaks - ethnic Bulgarian Muslims. These political forces emphasize fears of Islamic fundamentalism coming from Turkey and hold the view that Turkey cannot be an ally or a model of development. They insist that Bulgaria should play the role of a wall against Islamic fundamentalism and a border between Christian Europe and the Muslim world’ by preventing a privileged development of Bulgarian-Turkish relations. These forces also kept warning that granting collective rights to ethnic Turks would be the first step toward political autonomy that would be followed by territorial claims by Turkey.

UDF supports another political philosophy. According to it the building of a stable positive relationship with Turkey in the political, military, economic and humanitarian spheres as well in the field of regional cooperation can create the solid basis for the solution of the ethnic issue to the best of Bulgarian interests. This philosophy has found its practical realization during the periods when UDF governments have been in power. In 1992, UDF was instrumental for the signing of the bilateral treaty. Although the Treaty set up an important framework for cooperation, it left a number of issues unresolved. Among them was the question of precise delimitation of borders in the region of the Rezovska River and of territorial waters and adjacent economic zones in Black Sea. Another quite complicated issue are the mutual financial and property claims. The heirs of Bulgarian refugees from Eastern Thrace who immigrated to Bulgaria after the Balkan wars (1912-19113) have complained that their property rights were not sufficiently protected by the treaty of 1925 nor by the successive negotiations held in 1966, 1975, and 1980. The Turkish side however has insisted that the most urgent problem waiting for solution is the welfare support by the Bulgarian government of the Bulgarian Turks who immigrated to Turkey mainly after May 1989. Another open question is that of the properties of the Bulgarian Orthodox Church (the Bulgarian Exarchate) in Istanbul and Odrin (Edirne) and the holdings (the Vakif properties) allocated for the support of mosques and Turkish schools in Bulgaria.
After 1997 with the formation of the second UDF cabinet, there has been substantial progress in settling these remaining open issues. Of particular importance in this respect was the visit of the Bulgarian Prime-Minister Ivan Kostov in Turkey (November 1998). Since then operates the Agreement for the delimitation of the border in the area of the Rezovska River and the Black Sea (signed on Dec.4, 1997 after 40 years of negotiations). During that visit, the two countries signed the Agreement about the welfare payments by the Bulgarian government to the Bulgarian citizens permanently residing in Turkey. This agreement affects some 40-50,000 Bulgarian Turks who immigrated to Turkey after May 1989.

The economic problems of ethnic Turks living in the southern regions of Bulgaria is another open question in bilateral relations. The two countries have been discussing for years possible measures that would help to improve the economic hardships of this population. This has been a particularly sensitive issue because of Turkey’s unwillingness to accept the stream of Bulgarian Turks. The main reason for them to want to immigrate to Turkey have been the economic conditions in Bulgaria. One side effect of Turkey’s attitude has been the introduction of visa limitations particularly for children. As a result many illegal attempts have been made in recent years to transfer Turkish children across the Bulgarian-Turkish border. Within this context, Kostov’s visit in Turkey is of special importance because of the signing of the Agreement of power engineering and the infrastructure. This important agreement will define the bilateral relations both on micro political and economic level and it can play the role of a vehicle for partly solving the described above issue. The agreement creates the legal basis for Bulgarian long-term (for a period of 10 years) export of electricity to Turkey. Beginning in the year 2000 Bulgaria will become Turkey’s biggest supplier of electricity. The Turkish Prime-Minister Edgevit evaluated the deal as a significant success for Turkey not least because it was signed despite Greece’s objections. The expected revenues for Bulgaria according to Turkish estimates are to be some 1.2 billion U.S. dollars. In compliance with the same agreement Bulgaria and Turkey will start the construction of the highway “Maritza” between Plovdiv and the Bulgarian-Turkish border as well as a cascade of three power plants called “Gorna Arda” in southern Bulgaria where the majority of Bulgarian Turks live. The highway and the power plants, which are to be built in the next six years, are expected to provide some 4-5,000 jobs for the workers, mainly ethnic Turks, who have been laid out from the closing mining industry in the area.

A positive trend in the relations has been the substantial growth of bilateral trade. In the last five years, it has expanded eight-fold with substantial surplus for Bulgaria. In 1998 Bulgarian exports to Turkey were 340.349 millions U.S. dollars while imports from Turkey were 136.786 million U.S. dollars. Turkey is the third most important importer of Bulgarian goods ahead of such traditional Bulgarian trading partners as Russia, Greece and Ukraine. In July 1998, the two countries signed an Agreement for free trade that operates since January 1, 1999. After the liberalization, 60 percent of Bulgarian industrial exports to Turkey will be duty-free. The expectations are that the overall turnover in the next years will reach one billion U.S. dollars. According to the speaker of the Turkish parliament, Hikmet Chetin Bulgaria will become his country’s third most important trading partner leaving behind such countries as Greece and Italy.

Turkish business circles have displayed considerable interest in Bulgaria’s large privatization projects such as big hotels and industrial enterprises. According to some Turkish estimates the Turkish investments in Bulgaria for the period 1991-1998 are well over 100 millions U.S. dollars. In case this pace of investments is preserved, Turkey might become one of the biggest investors in Bulgaria along with such states as Germany, Belgium and the U.S.
The most important area of cooperation is in the field of infrastructure. Bulgaria and Turkey have concluded that they have strategic common interests within the Southeast European Cooperation Initiative (SECI) that is supported by the Clinton administration. Turkish political establishment is well aware of the fact that Bulgaria can be used as a bridge toward the EU. Because of this, Turkey participates willingly in the financing of large infrastructure projects that will be realized with EU participation. Such are the all-European transport corridors number 4, 8 and 10. These are not only the roads connecting Turkey with the EU countries but also the east-west corridor (railroad and highway) in the Balkans, the so called Via Egnatia that will connect the deep-water port in Durres, Albania with Varna and Istanbul. As a large gas consumer, Turkey has displayed considerable interest in the construction of a number of gas pipelines. Bulgaria and Turkey have already agreed that the gas pipelines from Russia for Turkey and from Turkmenia via Turkey to Europe will pass through Bulgarian territory.

The two countries are founding members and important partners within the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC). Despite Bulgaria’s fears of Turkish hegemony and because of this its quite cautious approach toward this originally Turkish initiative the two countries have been instrumental for the progress made in the practical realization of this idea.

In recent years, the political exchanges between the two countries have reached new levels of trust and cooperation. One result of this has been the institutionalization of the discussions on mutual financial and property claims in consecutive rounds of negotiations that are held regularly in Ankara and Sofia. Bulgaria and Turkey have also agreed to cooperate in the struggle against international crime, drug trafficking and terrorism within a trilateral initiative together with Romania. An important dimension of the improved political relations has been the military cooperation. The two countries diminished their military forces and activities near the common border and negotiated a number of measures strengthening their mutual confidence. This came as a result of the signing of the Sofia Document (Dec. 1991), and the Odrin Document (Nov. 1992). These two basic documents were supplemented by an agreement on cooperation in military training (March 1992) and an agreement on cooperation in the area of military technology (March 1993). The most recent umbrella document that provides the general framework - the Agreement on cooperation in the military sphere, was signed on July 7, 1997 again by the UDF cabinet. Within this context, Turkey has become the staunchest supporter of Bulgarian membership in NATO, which is very much appreciated by Sofia. Turkish President Demirel sent letters urging the U.S., Great Britain and Germany to adopt special steps allowing Bulgaria and Romania to join the Alliance. At a news conference during his March 1999 visit to Bulgaria Demirel said, “a NATO without Bulgaria and Romania is unthinkable”. In the same vein, the Turkish parliament included a special text obliging the government to do its best for the inclusion of Bulgaria in NATO in the document that ratified the agreement of membership of Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic in the Alliance.

Bulgaria and Turkey developed also a number of common approaches for the support of international efforts to contain the wars of Yugoslav succession. Most recently, Bulgaria became the main proponent of a new initiative for a regional force that would contribute further to this end. The new formation, called the Balkan multinational peacekeeping force, was established by Turkey, Bulgaria, Romania, Albania, Macedonia, and under certain conditions also Greece and Italy, with its headquarters for the first four years in Plovdiv.

The overall development of Bulgarian-Turkish relations in recent years made the well-known Oxford expert on Eastern Europe and particularly on Bulgaria Richard Crampton to characterize
these relations as “exceptionally good”. The obvious achievements have made Bulgarian-Turkish relations indeed a success and contribution to regional stability. They can serve as a model of relations between two countries that have been able to overcome the hostility and mistrust springing from ethnic issues. The reasons for this success are several. In the first place, the two countries displayed the will to tackle all problems with moderation and realism. Despite the desire of certain extremist forces in both countries to highlight the tensions and create hurdles on the road toward overcoming the crisis of 1989, the political leaderships in Sofia and Ankara showed caution, flexibility and consistency in their policy of reconciliation. The most recent illustration of this in Bulgaria has been the initiative of the UDF government on the integration of minorities into local and district administration, police, army, as well as the ratification by parliament of the European Framework Convention on the Protection of National Minorities.

Another reason for the positive development of bilateral relations is the behavior of MRF as a moderate and responsible political force in Bulgarian domestic politics. It publicly denounced all sorts of extremism, separatism and violence. With some few exceptions, MRF played the role of a loyal political actor that built its political platform on the principles of the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the Bulgarian State. MFR proved through its political behavior that it is not a “fifth column” of Turkey thus contributing to the creation of a model for peaceful resolution of ethnic conflicts.

6.2. Hungarian-Romanian Relations

Ever since the signing of Trianon Treaty of 1920, the relations between Hungary and Romania have been burdened with the problem of Transylvania and the treatment of the large Hungarian minority there. Because of Trianon, Hungary became a country with insignificant number of internal minorities. At the same time, the fate of Hungarians that remained outside of Hungary’s state borders became an important issue of the country’s international relations. There are Hungarian minorities living in all of the seven states neighboring Hungary. However, none of Hungary’s bilateral relations has attracted as much worldwide attention in the late 1980s and the first half of the 1990s as its relationship with Romania. Illustrative in this respect have been the closing acts of the Cold War in regard to this issue. Not least because of the activity of Hungarian authorities at a number of international forums, the UN Commission of Human rights in Geneva adopted in February 1989 a resolution condemning human rights abuses in Romania and appointed a Special Rapporteur to investigate the situation. A month later the European Parliament passed a resolution condemning the “brutal suppression of minorities” in Romania, which led to suspension of a trade accord.

Not surprisingly, relations between Hungary and Romania improved immediately after Ceausescu’s fall. Some positive steps were made toward reopening of the Hungarian Consulate in Cluj, signing of a Hungarian-Romanian cultural agreement (Feb. 1990), the renewal of Romanian-Hungarian Friendship societies and others. However, the escalation of ethnic tensions in Transylvania and the nationalist Romanian reaction caused an immediate negative response from Hungary. These reactions highlighted the fact that the deep-rooted tensions and mistrust between the two states cannot easily be overcome. The Hungarian foreign policy at that time was defined by the views of the conservative government of Jozsef Antall that served its full four years term of office (1990-1994). This government perceived itself responsible for the fate of Hungarian minorities abroad and it declared its intention to work actively in their support. A
close analysis of Antall’s statements, which in many cases were accompanied by intolerant rhetoric, indicates his philosophy that the treatment of Hungarian minorities, though not the only factor determining interstate relations, was certainly the decisive one.\textsuperscript{cv}

Romanian-Hungarian relations in the first half of the 1990s revolved around the issue of the preparation and signing of a basic bilateral treaty. The two countries started negotiations on the treaty in 1992 but populist attitudes and approaches typical for both governments at that time made them hostages of their own rhetoric. The talks were bound to stall also because of the close interrelation between the two core issues in the bilateral relations - the rights of the Hungarian minority in Romania and the guarantees on the status of the mutual border. The Hungarian side refused to include in the treaty any recognition of the border using the argument that the issue has been solved by the Helsinki Final Act to which Hungary was a signatory. The rationale behind Antall government’s stance according to Pal Dunay was that “keeping the status of the common border pending was the ultimate bargaining chip to persuade the government of Romania to respect the rights of the Hungarian minority”.\textsuperscript{cvi} The result however was quite the contrary. Romanian political leadership adopted a Ceausescu-like posture and refused to include any reference to the treatment of the Hungarian minority insisting that this is a strictly internal affair. The main reason for this were strong Romanian fears that Hungary sees the process of transition in Eastern Europe as a historical window of opportunity and will try to bring about a revision of the common border.

It is difficult to answer the question whether the Hungarian leadership cherished such hopes indeed. However, certain important aspects of the problem have to be taken into consideration. First, as a result of Ceausescu’s policies, in the vicinity of the border with Hungary the majority of the population is Romanian while the areas inhabited predominantly with Hungarians are situated in the center of the Romanian state territory. Another factor are the attitudes of Transylvanian Hungarians who have traditionally had a strong consciousness of their own “and do not automatically identify with the Hungarian state”.\textsuperscript{cvii} Because of the centuries long cohabitation between Hungarians, Romanians and Saxons, there exists a genuine spirit of a special brand of ‘Transylvanian way of life’ at the grassroots level where relations between the members of the different ethnic groups were often very good. For this reason, Hungarians from Transylvania are more concerned about a decent standard of living and preservation of their minority rights rather than unification with Hungary. Third, the majority of the population in Hungary, as the results of the 1994 elections have indicated, did not show any interest in border revisions. Moreover, military relations between the two countries, dating back from the days of the Warsaw Treaty, have been traditionally far better than co-operation in other areas. Consequently, “the military capabilities of either side have been far from sufficient for any military adventure”.\textsuperscript{cviii} Thus, the Romanian perception of threat coming from Hungary did not have any genuine military grounds.

The Antall government proved incapable of finding an appropriate formula to tackle the ethnic issue confronting the bilateral relations with Romania. One explanation for this is that many representatives of the new political elite have not been able to go beyond the ‘Trianon syndrome’, which has never quite ceased to exist in Hungarian foreign policy thinking and behavior.

The results of 1994 elections in Hungary placed on record the extent of the failure of the conservative government’s policy toward neighboring states. The three parties of the former conservative coalition could keep only 20 percent of the seats in parliament while the Hungarian Socialist Party gained an absolute majority of 209 out of 386 seats.\textsuperscript{cix} The balance sheet for the
Antall government was that it could not improve the situation of Hungarians beyond the borders because of its unwillingness to build new relationships with Hungary’s neighbors based on mutual confidence and equal partnerships. Consequently came also the lack of a breakthrough in the issue of the country’s economic and political integration in Euro-Atlantic institutions. This determined the political platform of the new socialist government. Its prime minister Gyula Horn in an address to the Hungarian parliament said: “this government is going to complete the process of accession to the EU and accession to NATO...The government will subordinate everything else to this end.”

Given this political platform the opposition feared that the Horn government would go ahead with the improvement of the relations with Hungary’s neighbors at the expense of the support of Hungarian minorities abroad. However, the change in the Hungarian foreign policy, though quite significant, was not fundamental in its nature. The new government continued in many respects its predecessor’s foreign policy. It renounced officially any territorial claims but it did not make unilateral concessions concerning minority rights. The Danube television that was important for Hungarian cultural and political influence abroad continued its broadcasts. The Office of Hungarians Beyond the Borders that was established in 1991 and that was criticized by Socialists as being provocative for some of Hungary’s neighbors was maintained, though with certain personnel reductions.

The negotiations on the basic treaty resumed in September 1994 on the ground that the two sides were committed to conclude the agreement and that most pending issues could be regulated. After endless talks held by the two sides, the unresolved issues narrowed down to the question how to regulate the status of minorities. The Hungarian side demanded that since the relevant international and European documents on the guarantees and implementation of minority rights are not legally binding, these principles should be incorporated in the bilateral treaty in the way this has already been done in the treaties signed with Ukraine, Slovenia, Croatia and later Slovakia. Under international pressure, Romanians eventually agreed to mention in the treaty the Council of Europe Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities. Thus, the most important pending issues remained the incorporation of Recommendation 1201 of the Council of Europe in the treaty. The Romanian government, in a clear propagandist distortion, interpreted the provisions of this document, more particularly Article 11 referring to autonomous authorities of minorities, as the first step bound to gradually detach Transylvania from Romania and annex it to Hungary.

The negotiations stalled again, since the position of the Hungarian government was such that it could not make concessions beyond a certain point. One reason for this was the false ideological, even theological element in the bilateral debates that included such catchwords as individual versus collective rights and autonomy versus its absence. However, much more important role played the constrains imposed on the Horn government by the conservative opposition in the parliament and the political organization of ethnic Hungarians in Romania (HDFR). At variance with MFR, this organization had a major influence on the development of Hungarian-Romanian relations. Its leaders, particularly the honorary president Bishop Laszlo Tokes, were supportive to the attitudes of the conservative coalition that gave them a prominent role in bilateral negotiations.

In 1995, Horn’s election slogan about the need of a “historic reconciliation” with Hungary’s neighbors was suddenly introduced in the political vocabulary of Romanian President Ion Iliescu. At a conference marking the 55th anniversary of the Vienna Accord that gave Hungary control
over northwestern Transylvania, Iliescu launched the proposal for a historic reconciliation with Hungary following the model of Franco-German reconciliation after World War II. He suggested the drafting of three documents: a joint declaration of the historic reconciliation, an agreement on the reconciliation process and a ‘code of conduct’ concerning the treatment of national minorities. Iliescu’s initiative was designed to counter balance Romania’s increasing international isolation, particularly in its bid to join EU and NATO. Since the discrepancy between Romania’s continuous nationalistic positions and the display of a will to compromise by the Hungarian public was obvious, the proposal’s aim was to demonstrate to the international community a will for cooperation with Hungary. The nationalist approaches in Romania were the inevitable product of the governing coalition that consisted of the Party of Democratic Socialism in Romania (PDSR), the Party of Romanian National Unity (PRNU), the Greater Romania Party, and the Socialist Labor Party. These alliances were regarded as extremist and were ill viewed by the Western democracies. Consequently, Romania’s chances for promoting its application for NATO and the EU membership suffered considerably. Thus, another aim of the proposal was to help Iliescu to distance himself from the extremist nationalists.

The three documents were handed over to the Hungarian side in late September 1995. The legal rights of minorities - the issue on which the treaty negotiations stalled - was avoided and completely unaddressed in the documents. Besides, the Romanian-Hungarian conflict was described as an interstate tension based on territorial claims that threaten the regional peace. The Hungarian diplomacy faced a dilemma. If it were to reject the proposal, this would have signaled that Budapest did not want reconciliation. After a week of silence and hesitation, Horn’s government responded that it was ready to start a dialogue based on the Romanian initiative. However, Budapest stressed that its further steps would be preceded by consultations with HDFR. Hungarian minority leaders saw the proposal as an attempt to isolate them from the negotiations and make a deal that ignores the interests of Hungarians in Romania who at that moment were protesting the new education law. HDFR president Bela Marko pointed out that “the conflict is not between the two countries, but within Romania”. The peak of the dispute came when Bishop Tokes demanded the two states to involve constructively the Hungarian community in the process of negotiating the reconciliation and the basic treaty. Tokes rejected the Franco-German model and instead proposed the Austro-Italian reconciliation, in which significant autonomy was granted to the German minority living in South Tyrol. The Bishop argued that “the matter at stake in the Romanian-Hungarian relationship is not so much the interstate relationship as the resolution of the situation of the Hungarian community in Romania”. Iliescu, in his statements, found particularly irritating the attempts ‘of confusing interstate relations with interethnic ones’. He rejected any possibility of discussions on the legal status of the Hungarian minority or on its role in the reconciliation process.

Despite of the tense atmosphere, the two sides agreed to continue negotiations in January 1996 and finalize the historic reconciliation agreement and the basic treaty. However, negotiations stalled again after the Horn government, obviously under the pressure of the conservative opposition and the Hungarian organizations abroad, launched a new initiative for promoting the rights of Hungarian minorities. In July 1996, the government issued a joint declaration with organizations of Hungarians abroad that underlined its support of their demands for local autonomy and self-government. The declaration provoked a new crisis of Hungary’s relations with Romania and Slovakia. The official announcement on August 14, 1996 that Romania and Hungary had “practically finalized” the text of the treaty came as a surprise. The explanation
for this abrupt diplomatic success is that the two countries have become more aware of the imperatives in their quest for membership in NATO and the EU. In the course of the heated bilateral exchanges concerning the basic treaty, the West exerted a decisive amount of political pressure. The U.S. government made it absolutely clear to politicians in Budapest and Bucharest that admission to NATO is contingent upon the resolution of any pending territorial and ethnic disputes with neighboring countries. Washington’s reaction toward the joint declaration issued by the Horn government in support of Hungarian minorities’ demands for autonomy was that the U.S. rejected any drive for territorial autonomy based on ethnic criteria. Thus, the hasty agreement between Romania and Hungary came not as a result of a genuine reconciliation but because of their desire to fit more appropriately into the international environment of principles and regulations accepted by Western institutions.

The bilateral treaty was signed in September 1996. The breakthrough was a result of a change in the Hungarian position on Recommendation 1201. Romania suggested a compromise that the recommendation could be mentioned in the treaty in case that the two sides attach a joint interpretation on this document. Consequently, the sides agreed to introduce in an annex to the treaty the clarification that “Recommendation 1201 does not refer to collective rights, nor does it obligate Parties to grant those persons the right to a special territorial autonomy status based on ethnic criteria”. The sequence of events before the signing of the treaty clearly demonstrated that “were it not for the American reaction to the Hungarian joint declaration (with Hungarian organizations abroad), Hungary would have been more hesitant about the Romanian-proposed compromise”.

The pay off for Hungarian concession in the relations with Romania came soon. NATO’s decision in Madrid (July 1997) to invite Hungary into the alliance was a result of Western appreciation for this country’s “contribution to strengthening security in Central and Eastern Europe” as Hungarian President Arpad Goncz put it. Goncz particularly emphasized that Hungary would be able to export stability to its neighbors. “Over the past few years, we have managed to come to terms and sign basic treaties with all our neighbors except for the former Yugoslavia. So there should be no concerns that we might bring new problems to deal with into the alliance”.

The Hungarian-Romanian basic treaty should be seen as a historic breakthrough in one of the most divisive and explosive ethnic issues in Eastern Europe. Although the treaty could not wither away the long-standing bilateral animosities, it certainly introduced a greater level of stability in the relations between the two countries as well as in the region and provided an important element for their admission to Euro-Atlantic institutions.

The mixed results reached with the signing of the bilateral treaty are well illustrated by the most recent developments in Hungarian-Romanian relations. These can be characterized as a mixture of heading toward ‘European standards’ and sticking to nationalist stereotypes and sentiments. A Transylvanian journalist describes vividly the reopening of the Hungarian consulate in Cluj in 1997. The Hungarian Foreign Minister Laszlo Kovacs, in his speech at the opening said: “Today we close the era of distrust, provocation, and interethnic conflict”. Yet, someone stole the Hungarian flag from the building of the consulate the very next day. In an interview, the new Hungarian consul said that from the window of the consulate he saw a man on a ladder grabbing at the Hungarian flag. “I asked the man what he was doing there. He answered he was just carrying out an order…and went away with the flag under his arm”. The flag was returned several days later by the Romanian police. The incident is an episode in the activities of the
mayor of Cluj, Funar, who is the president of the extreme nationalist PRNU and is notorious for his anti-Hungarian agenda. He declared the Hungarian consul persona non grata and forbade the flying of the Hungarian flag over the consulate. In recent years he has ordered the benches in the center of Cluj to be painted in the colors of the Romanian flag, while the statue of a 15th century Hungarian King Mattias that stands in the main square is surrounded by six Romanian flags.

Another important development was the victory in the Hungarian elections in May 1998 of the Fidesz party. Its leader, Viktor Orban managed to transform a party that in the past could not gather more than 6 percent of the parliamentary seats into an all-embracing umbrella of the center-right, prepared to become one of the two main parties in Hungary. The elections indicated that the only parties that supported the bilateral treaties Horn signed with Slovakia and Romania were the Socialists and their allies from the liberal Alliance of Free Democrats. In the opinion of most Hungarians, the treaties “traded land for ethnic rights”. However, the new Hungarian prime-minister Orban denounced the treaties, claiming that Horn had “sold out” the ethnic minorities. Echoing the late Jozsef Antall’s famous statement that he was not merely the prime minister of the 10 million Hungarians in Hungary but of all 15 million Magyars, Orban responded to a question about the Hungarian minority in Romania in the following way. "The Hungarian nation encompasses not only those who live in Hungary, but all Hungarians. This government will be part of the Hungarian nation". As it happened in the past, the statement provoked a storm of criticism in Romania and Slovakia.
6.3. The Impact of the “Albanian Question” on the Relationships between Albania, Macedonia and Serbia

The complicated relationships between Tirana and Belgrade and Tirana and Skopje were driven to a great extent by minority issues. These relations have been formed as a result of the interaction of a number of factors. The first among them was the way in which Albania acquired its national independence. The London Conference of Ambassadors of 1912 that created the modern Albanian state left half of the ethnic Albanians outside the borders of the new state. Ever since then the issue of Kosovo and other territories inhabited by ethnic Albanians in former Yugoslavia has bedeviled Tirana’s foreign policy. Although it had to accept the principle of the inviolability of borders, Albania remained essentially a revisionist state that was never content with its borders. Significant strata of Albanian communities inside and outside Albania never viewed the Albanian-inhabited territories as legitimate parts of Serbia and the former Yugoslavia and their belief that the borders should be changed has been persistently present. These sentiments in combination with the unresolved status of Albanian minorities in former Yugoslavia created a tense atmosphere in bilateral relations and gave rise to suspicions among Albania’s neighbors about its long-term territorial ambitions.

Another major factor has been the mass-based, extreme brand of Serb nationalism connected with the rise of Slobodan Milosevic. Its main characteristics have been the strong commitment in various Serb circles to the pursuit of “Greater Serbia” based on the collectively accepted myths of victimization but also of Serb ‘civilizational superiority’ over their neighbors. This has promoted and determined the weight and longevity of ultra-nationalistic views in the Serbian body politics. The phenomenon of political forces advancing extreme nationalist sentiments that are further reinforced by the state media fit adequately into the Serb political culture of xenophobia and authoritarian attitudes. These features of Serb political culture found particularly strong manifestation in the realm of the issue of Kosovo. Kosovo demonstrated in the most painful way the inability of the moderate and liberal forces in Serbia to forge a stable coalition as well as to propose a peaceful and civilized solution to this issue. Thus, the clash between the Serb and the Albanian viewpoints was bound to produce a military conflict.

On the other hand, the foreign policy behavior of Albania in the 1990s has to be put and explained in the context of several defining factors. One was that Albania’s foreign policy approaches had to be adjusted to a highly volatile and dramatic domestic and regional environment. The dilemma was of such magnitude that it would have bewildered even the most experienced leaders, let alone those who were just entering politics and had to operate under extraordinary constrains.

Another fact that has to be taken into account is the Gheg-Tosk cultural-linguistic division of the Albanian nation. This division has largely defined the chaotic character of Albania’s domestic developments as well as the country’s attitudes toward its neighbors. While the Albanian communism was a predominantly southern Tosk phenomenon, the leadership of the Democratic Party and Sali Berisha himself come from the northern Gheg regions and have direct connections and interests in the fate of the Kosovar Albanians. Within the domestic context, senior positions in the army and in the old security apparatus were filled almost exclusively by southerners during the communist era. These men had been made redundant in the U.S.-supervised military reform in the period 1992-1995. They were unemployed and highly dissatisfied not least because northerner Ghegs were the ones that were strongly favored in the military. This produced the pool
of potential leaders with military training who stood in the head of the armed uprising of March 1997. This was compounded by the fact that Albania’s arms factories are in the south, near Berat.\textsuperscript{cxxxiv} In the foreign policy sphere, former Albanian communist leadership showed no interest in the Kosovo issue not least because it realized that if Ghegs from Kosovo were to be included in “Greater Albania” this would move the political gravity to their detriment from Tirana to Prizren. Thus, by tradition Tosks are not particularly interested in the fate of their Kosovo brethren in contrast to the concern and involvement of Ghegs in the Kosovo crisis.\textsuperscript{cxxv}

An additional factor whose influence on Albanian foreign policy has been steadily growing in the 1990s is the Albanian diaspora. Of particular importance in this respect have been Albanian-Americans who are estimated to be some 350,000-400,000 people and who have played a role in the process of formation of recent U.S. Balkan policy. They were quite active in establishing the Albanian-American Civic League in 1986 and promoting an influential Kosovar lobby under the leadership of the former Senator Robert Dole. In the words of James Pettifer “the notion of a ‘Unified Albania’ has much more active support in New York than it does in Albania”.\textsuperscript{cxxvi} The other important stream of Albanian diaspora came from Kosovo. In the early 1990s, there has been considerable emigration of Kosovars to Albania, most of them settling in Tirana. Because of the worsening conditions in Kosovo and their expulsion from some West European countries, these new émigrés were anxious to consolidate their economic position in Albania. Soon their arrival had significant impact since even with limited amounts of hard currency Kosovars were able to establish their control in several areas of economic activity. Some years later they became an even stronger factor in Albanian domestic and regional politics.

After a period of political turmoil as Albanian communism collapsed, in 1992 the government of Sali Berisha was elected producing apparent stability well until the end of 1996. As a Gheg with many close family connections with Kosovo, Berisha showed much more sensitivity toward the idea of finding a solution of the Albanian national question than did Tosk politicians. Besides, his arrival to power coincided with the growing sense even among the most patient ethnic Albanians that the status of Kosovars was intolerable. However instinctively unsympathetic some Albanians were to the Kosovar cause, the nightmare of life in Kosovo under the Serbian martial law had become apparent to all Albanians. Against this background, Berisha’s government supported the demand of Kosovars for independence. Tirana became an outspoken critic of Milosevic and a vehement proponent of Western military action against him. Albanian leadership perceived the violent collapse of Yugoslavia both as a historical chance for Albanian unification and a direct military threat from Serbia. However, if these two perceptions are to be evaluated one against the other, the strong sense of vulnerability was the driving force that stood at the root of Albania’s foreign policy initiatives. These initiatives were motivated primarily by the objective traditionally embedded in Albanian political thinking to prevent an Athens-Belgrade alliance directed against Tirana. Albanian leaders were well aware of the fact that their armed forces were not in a position to prevent the spread of war to Kosovo and to deter a highly possible Serbian aggression. Consequently, their main objective became the forging of close links with the U.S., Turkey, and other NATO members. The Albanian government offered its air and sea facilities to NATO for peacekeeping missions in the course of the wars in former Yugoslavia. The response of Milosevic was the increase of the number of troops on Albanian-Serb border that lead to many border incidents. An important nuance in Berisha’s policies was the distinction made between Serbia and Montenegro. Berisha tried to take advantage of the tensions between them and made steps to treat Montenegro more favorably that Serbia. After the lifting of UN sanctions, in December 1995, Tirana and Podgorica signed a series of agreements on economic cooperation.\textsuperscript{cxxvii}
While Berisha was in power, his party struggled continuously with the dilemma of finding a balance between hard-line and moderate positions on the Albanian national question. This caused the nervous oscillation between outspoken support for the Kosovar cause and the admission that the Kosovo issue could be resolved only through a dialogue between Serb authorities and the Kosovar leadership. Berisha tried to divert public attention from the difficult situation at home by advocating radical approaches toward Kosovo and Macedonia. However, western pressure on his government to recognize the inviolability of Albanian’s borders persistently reminded of Albania’s limited options and its dependence on desperately needed foreign assistance. Since the time of the opening of an office in Tirana of Rugova’s LDK in late 1991, the contacts between the Albanian leaderships in Tirana and Pristina intensified. However, despite official statements from Tirana that endorsed the idea of unity among all Albanians, Kosovars did not enjoy Albania’s full support. In view of the desperate condition of Albania’s armed forces, Tirana’s overriding concern and first foreign policy priority remained the prevention of armed conflict with Serbia. The increasingly anarchic and catastrophic situation in Albania pressed Berisha to turn his energies away from Kosovo and concentrate on finding foreign aid. Within this context, talk of confederation, let alone unification with Kosovo was considered premature. Regardless of all this, Berisha expressed strong concern at numerous international forums about the plight of the Kosovars and the unacceptable police regime of apartheid imposed by Milosevic. This stance helped to keep Kosovo on the international agenda. It sent the world a message that Albania, however ill equipped it might be would be compelled to intervene in case of massacres against outside Albanian minorities. Berisha warned repeatedly that “in the event of a conflict in Kosovo or in other territories inhabited by the Albanians, the Albanian nation will react and resist with all means at its disposal”.

The Dayton agreement had serious implications for Albanian political thinking throughout Southeast Europe. The exclusion of Kosovo from the peace talks was seen as an enormous affront to Albanians both in Kosovo and in Albania. It led to the hardening of the Albanian position – a process in which the radical elements began to take the upper hand. The end result of Dayton – the de facto division of Bosnia – raised fears among Albanians about the possible partition of Kosovo. The reinforcement of such fears came also because of the number of proposals made by prominent Serb intellectuals in the post-Dayton period about the desirability of Kosovo’s partitioning. Taking into consideration the fact that the 8 percent Serb population is scattered throughout the province as well as Serb designs to retain the largest, mineral-rich part of Kosovo, the Albanian leadership was quick to declare that such outcome was unacceptable.

Albania’s policy toward the newly independent state of Macedonia was based on two main objectives. The defining one was to encourage a stable and viable Macedonia that could play the role of a buffer state between Serbia and Greece. The fears of Berisha’s government were that any destabilization of the fledgling state could lead to Serbian intervention and consequent encirclement of Albania by its traditionally hostile neighbors Greece and Serbia. Thus, Tirana viewed the independence and the territorial integrity of Macedonia as vital to its interests. Albania was among the first countries that recognized the newly created state. Inside Albania, the opposition criticized strongly Berisha for the unconditional recognition of Macedonia thus losing an important leverage over Skopje with regard to the treatment of the Albanian minority. Berisha’s response was short and clear: “An independent Macedonia is better than a Macedonia under Milosevic”. Tirana’s steps during the Greek embargo against Macedonia were a good illustration of this kind of attitude. Albania demonstrated a strong support for its neighbor in need by offering Albanian port and transport facilities.
The other important objective was improving the status of ethnic Albanians in Macedonia. There have been noticeable differences in the attitude of the Albanian government concerning this issue with regard to Kosovars and to Albanians in Macedonia. While in the case of the former, Tirana built its approach on the belief that in the longer run Kosovo will acquire either a status of a republic in a loose confederation or independence, in the latter case its attitude was much more restrained and careful. According to Elez Biberaj, “Berisha exerted a moderate influence on ethnic Albanians, urging them to participate in Macedonia’s political life and to work for the stability of the new state”. Tirana discouraged separatist tendencies among ethnic Albanians in Macedonia because it was well aware of the need to keep this state intact as the lesser evil, even at the expense of increasing human rights violations against the Albanian minority. A side effect of this attitude was that Albanians from Macedonia were able to establish a representative office in Tirana only in 1996. However, there were certain contradictions within this line of Tirana’s political behavior. The differences existing between Skopje and Tirana over the treatment of the Albanian minority in Macedonia as well as a series of incidents that happened after 1993 caused serious deterioration of bilateral relations. One such incident was the arrest by Macedonian authorities of a group of Albanians who were accused of smuggling arms from Albania and of planning to create an underground organization. Even more serious impact on the relationship had Tirana’s public calls for the replacement of the leadership of the Party for Democratic Prosperity (PDP) and the endorsement of the more radical faction led by Xhaferi and Thaci. The Albanian government reacted strongly against the violence used by the Macedonian police in order to prevent the opening of an Albanian language university in Tetovo. These steps were taken by Tirana because of Kiro Gligorov’s failure to deliver on his promises about improving the rights of ethnic Albanians. They however raised fears in Macedonia about Albania’s real intentions and ambitions.

In the years after Berisha’s fall, Albanian policies toward its neighbors have been characterized by inconsistency and contradictions. They were more a hasty reaction to the torrent of domestic and international events rather than a visionary concept about the outside minorities. The collapse of Albania’s political and social infrastructure in the spring of 1997 caused substantial change in the approaches toward Belgrade and Skopje. The power in Tirana moved to the Socialist-led coalition headed by Fatos Nano who was engaged in a bitter personal feud with Berisha. This had its repercussions not only on the domestic scene but in the sphere of the foreign policy as well. Prime Minister Nano attempted to revise the previous Albanian policy toward Kosovo. As the brewing war in Kosovo intensified the threat to Albanian stability, Nano decided to seek a dialogue with Milosevic. Before the summit of Balkan leaders in Crete in November 1997, Nano announced his desire to meet Milosevic personally and discuss the possibilities of closer economic cooperation and of settling the Kosovo problem in a “productive European spirit”. Even though Western countries praised Nano for his courage, the subsequent developments indicated that he made a political mistake. During the summit, Milosevic showed that he had no interest in rapprochement with Albania or in solving the problem of Kosovo in a peaceful manner. Thus, Nano’s initiative backfired against him by causing acute criticism from the vast majority of the Albanians in Kosovo and in Albania. Nano was accused that he was trying to sell out Kosovo for minor economic interests, that he was betraying national interests, that his idea demonstrated serious lack of realism by regarding Milosevic as a serious negotiating partner. What was worse, Milosevic took Nano’s policy as a sign of Tirana’s weakness. Shortly after the Crete summit, Serb police forces cracked down student demonstrations in Pristina. This was a clear message to Tirana that its policy of reconciliation had failed.
Nano’s attempts to improve ties with Albania’s Balkan neighbors produced better results in the relations with Macedonia. The Albanian Prime Minister visited Macedonia in January and February 1998. Then the two countries agreed to sign eight agreements on cooperation in such fields as legal issues, customs tariffs, double taxation and others. In order to solidify these positive signs in bilateral relations, Gligorov was invited to visit Tirana and sign a treaty on friendship and cooperation. Emphasizing the new improvement in the ties with Skopje, Nano during a visit to Tetovo discouraged separatism, saying that “the future of all citizens in the Balkans, wherever they live…is only in the integration into a new Europe”.

However, the immediate problems that Albania faced were its internal instability and the inability of the main political actors to reach a compromise. The government was preoccupied with preserving its power in the capital while the northern parts of the country fell under the control of Berisha’s allies. As the Albanian military were not able to prevent the establishing of a base of the Kosovo Liberation Army (UCK), the northern region was transformed into a base and staging zone for Kosovar guerrillas. Another quite destabilizing effect of the meltdown of Albania’s political and military infrastructure in the spring of 1997 was the spread throughout the Albanian countryside of vast quantities of all kinds of armaments plundered from the armories in the south. The penetrability of Albanian borders resulted in increasing and unregulated flow of arms into Kosovo and Macedonia. This raised Macedonian fears “that western Macedonia with its Albanian majority is becoming ripe for eventual armed conflict”.

Meanwhile Albania continued to slide down to political self-destruction amidst devastating economic ruin. As former president Berisha felt embittered and betrayed because of his forced dismissal from power in March 1997, his opposition Democratic Party boycotted almost all parliamentary institutions thus leading to their complete paralysis. Soon after an attempted coup d’état by opposition forces on 14 September 1998, Fatos Nano resigned. As Miranda Vickers wrote Albania faced domestic unrest, a refugee problem, and a conflict between two liberation armies. The new prime Minister, 31-year-old Pandeli Majko took a similar line on Kosovo to that of his predecessor, saying that Kosovo should become a third republic in rump Yugoslavia. Majko reiterated also Nano’s calls for NATO deployment along Albania’s borders with Kosovo. As some analysts have correctly noticed these calls were motivated, more by the power struggle against Berisha whose strongholds are the northern areas than with the just solution of the Kosovo crisis.

With the start of the NATO air strikes against the regime of Milosevic, the Albanian government announced its full support for the operation. Tirana gave its entire military infrastructure, including its air space and ports to NATO. With the open support of the Tirana government, sections of northern Albania have become staging areas for UCK. The Albanian government has openly allied itself with the rebels and has called on NATO to supply them with modern arms. The Albanian government also called for the immediate deployment of more NATO troops in northern Albania, and for NATO to establish an international protectorate in Kosovo. Reiterating the idea of a protectorate in Kosovo for a period of ten years, the Permanent Representative to the Mission of Albania to the United Nations Ambassador Agim Nesho announced that Albania’s solution for the status of Kosovo does not involve changing any borders. Nesho emphasized that his government does not seek a “Greater Albania” by annexation of Kosovo. His statement made clear that after all the massacres, Serbs and Albanians cannot live next to each other and that Albania cannot accept any solution that entails either partition or cantonization of Kosovo. According to the official Albanian viewpoint both solutions are
impractical because “splitting up Kosovo would encourage Albanian-controlled parts of western Macedonia to secede, with very destabilizing results for the region”.cxxxix

The ethnic cleansing of Kosovo by the Serb army and paramilitary forces after the beginning of NATO air strikes has created an extremely tense situation in the southern Balkans. By pushing hundreds of thousands Albanian refugees outside Kosovo, Milosevic attempted to destabilize dramatically the neighboring Macedonia, Albania and Montenegro.cxl The tragedy in Kosovo intensified and deepened the search for a national and historic identity among the different groups of Albanians in the Balkans. While the new Albanian nationalism is not yet united in its objectives, the potential for regional instability is real despite the positive outcome of the NATO air strikes. The greatest threat is for the territorial integrity of Macedonia. Because of this, further consideration of the Albanian communities must become a priority in security analyses for the Balkans. Such analyses should pay attention to the strong cultural and emotional ties that connect Albanian in Macedonia to Kosovo.

Within this context, the political changes in Macedonia after the elections of November 1, 1998 have particularly important positive meaning. The election victory of VMRO-DPMNE and its leader Ljubco Georgievski signaled the will of the voters to end corruption and over regulation of the economy, thus changing in earnest this nationalistic party into a neo-liberal one. VMRO has promised to create thousands of new jobs, and to attract foreign investment. Equally important is that the election has been a marked advance for the ethnic Albanians. The old nomenclature Albanian politicians from the previous government have been replaced by a new coalition led by Arben Xhaferi that could be more effective in the implementation of some Albanian demands. The wider attempt to democratize Macedonia has produced a coalition government between parties that were characterized in the past by their nationalism and extremism. This fact indicates the process of transformation of the political ideologies of both VMRO and the Democratic Party of Albanians (the former Party of Democratic Prosperity-Albanians). As the inter-ethnic relations have improved, the new government pledged to address immediately the issues that for most of the decade have divided the Macedonians and the Albanian community. This could involve the introduction of basic European human rights for all citizens, the release of ethnic Albanian political prisoners, the equality for the Albanian language in public life, the recognition for the privately financed Albanian-language University in Tetovo. The new government is expected also to curb the strong Serb influence in such essential ministries in Skopje as the foreign ministry and the interior ministry. NATO has been also an immediate beneficiary of the election since the Gligorov government had refused to cooperate with NATO plans last summer. As the events have indicated, the new government was more flexible to accommodate NATO demands.cxli
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The present study has attempted to compare and evaluate the different dimensions of ethnic relations in Bulgaria, Romania, Serbia and Macedonia, and their impact on the security of South Eastern Europe. The most immediate conclusion that comes out of this study is that ethnic relations in the “Balkans Proper” are the most important variable in the calculus of the overall stability of the region.

The study has tried to illustrate that at the root of ethnic conflict in the region lie historic, demographic, structural, political, socio-economic and cultural factors. Besides, ethnic conflict is not concentrated at a single level - it is on all levels of society. One method of conflict reduction employed alone will not greatly improve the situation. Obviously, approaches aiming to lessen ethnic tensions will ultimately have to address all levels at the same time. For this purpose a combination of political, legal, and economic interventions is needed both at the domestic and international level.

The comparative approach is instrumental for sorting out the differences as well as the similarities between the four case studies. The present analysis makes clear that Bulgaria and to a lesser extent Romania chose (though with certain inconsistencies) the peaceful, West European type of solutions for the ethnic issues that plagued their domestic as well as interstate politics. These two countries together with their neighbors – Turkey and Hungary implemented into practice their mutually shared believes that it is possible to replicate in Eastern Europe the West European success story in the field of ethnic relations. The two pairs of neighboring countries chose to exorcise the historical ghosts and showed through their improving bilateral relations that ethnic hatreds, however deep rooted, need not be endemic and permanent. The case of Bulgaria and Romania illustrates that the only way out of ethnic conflict is political pluralism, ethnic tolerance and economic development. There are good indications that Macedonia will be the next country that will follow the same route.

The four case studies confirm a broader conclusion that ethnic conflicts in former East European member-states of the Warsaw Pact have not shown a tendency of military escalation at variance with the former Soviet Union and former Yugoslavia. In its theoretical part, this study has tried to outline the reasons for this. The most important among them is the difference between territories within federations, as was in the past with empires, and sovereign states. Romania and Hungary, and Bulgaria and Turkey have had seven decades to get used to the map as it was drawn after World War I and to accept the reality as it is. The same is not true for Serbia. It is only beginning to conceive the inevitability of its reduced status. As a commentator from Budapest put it, “our Trianon is 70 years behind us. The Serbian Trianon is taking place right now”.

Apart from this salient difference, the similarities in the four case studies are many. One common trait is that the issues at stake within the complex web of ethnic relations are not the same as
claims deriving wholly from material interest. Questions such as an ethnic group’s status within the state, language and education issues, the regulation of the use of ethnic symbols and local administration and decentralization are not readily amenable to compromise. They are so difficult to resolve because they reflect the fears of the two groups for their future within the state. The contradiction is deeply rooted in the concept of the unitary nation-state and the need to accommodate a sizable ethnic minority within it. The question is who will govern the state and who will be discriminated against. An interrelated problem is the role of neighboring ‘kin-states’ and the loyalty of the minority group residing in the nation-state of another ethnic group. Due to all this, the minorities have been an object of different kinds of discrimination and deprivation such as discrimination at the workplace, higher unemployment rates, lower level of education and qualification, lack of real opportunities to participate in the state or local administration. Among those in the Balkans who are most badly hit by this kind of discrimination are young girls coming from Muslim families.

The transition to democracy brought into being the ethnic parties whose electoral incentives, growing in the atmosphere of mutual distrust and antipathy, have played initially centrifugal role in Balkan societies. Ethnic parties do not compete for voters and have little motives to moderate their demands. Thus, they tend to exaggerate threats faced by an ethnic group. These parties became also increasingly vocal about the state’s responsibility, primarily through job growth and quotas to help minorities reach the socio-economic levels of majorities. Usually, ethnic parties are organized hierarchically and they are successful in suppressing a diversity of opinions from being expressed politically. The virtual monopoly over political expression allows these parties to generate very high and almost unanimous turnouts. Consequently, they gain in most cases political participation at levels disproportional to their size, thereby often heightening majority fears. However, there are reasons for modest optimism. The prevailing trend now is the willingness of minority parties in Bulgaria, Romania and Macedonia to participate in coalition governments, thus trying to satisfy the demands of their voters in the context of the emerging pluralistic democracy.

The tense ethnic relations in the “Balkans Proper” have been among the most important reasons for the dramatic social and economic cost of the transition. The net result of ethnic tension and conflict on the process of transition has been internal and regional instability that slows down political and economic reform, prevents foreign investments and postpones these states’ integration in European and Atlantic structures. The collapse of new investment in Southeast Europe is the most striking phenomenon. Indicative in this respect is the fact that the region has received just 1 percent of Germany’s post-1989 trade and investment total. The region can serve also as an illustration of the thesis that bad governance by weak states exacerbates intrastate ethnic conflict and threatens economic development.

The question that has to be answered is how to reverse the negative impact of ethnic relations on the development of the region. How to built reliable mechanisms that do not allow the transformation of political, social, economic, and interstate problems into ethnic conflicts? In other words, how to built multiethnic civil states in the Balkans. These are important questions tightly related to the problem of how to prevent the dangerous Western temptation to cordon off the entire “Balkan powder keg” from the rest of Europe. If Balkan states become increasingly marginalized from Europe and the United States, their unclear ‘gray zone’ status may encourage further political and ethnic instability as well as susceptibility to outside pressures including anti-NATO and anti-American forces.
Most recent events in Kosovo have illustrated that Western perceptions of South Eastern Europe are evolving and have begun to embrace a more inclusive approach. Ironically, the war in Kosovo has restored the area’s significance in Europe and has ensured international involvement. NATO air attacks against Serbia and the proposed ‘Marshal Plan’ for South Eastern Europe are the recognition that the region is “the new central front for NATO in Europe”. No other area in Europe has required such extensive use of military force after the end of World War II. It is encouraging that there is already a consensus among Western democracies that NATO should have a regional command, “making it clear to Balkan political and military leaders that NATO forces will be in the region for quite some time”. Recent Western policies are a result of the new understanding that South Eastern Europe is central to NATO and EU enlargements. It is in this area that European instability risks are the greatest and it is through involvement in South Eastern Europe that NATO and EU can redefine their future roles and assert their credibility.

The recommendations of this study concentrate on measures that should lead to the building of a framework for regional security and integration in Europe. They have to be applied at the domestic, regional and international level.

At the domestic level, it is important to develop an increasing sense of mutual responsibility and accountability between the ethnic groups. It is necessary for both sides to realize that both will lose if the situation in the state degenerates into underdevelopment, poverty and violence. In practical terms this means that it is necessary to work out more sophisticated ways for the inclusion of the minorities. Of course every country is a peculiar case and has to devise approaches that fit appropriately into the domestic circumstances. In the case of Kosovo, things are much more complicated. The situation there, as well as on a regional scale, will not improve entirely without a significant and lasting regime-change in Belgrade. A necessary step toward the inclusion of minorities is to satisfy their demands on education. An educational reform and a greater access to higher education will contribute to the stabilization of ethnic relations. This has to be combined with a careful attention to the educational system and its treatment of ethnic issues. A major avenue for the inclusion of minorities is sustained economic growth that can in the longer run overcome the dangerous effects of the shrinking economic pie on ethnic relations. If achieved, sustained economic growth can give even relatively disadvantaged groups incentives to avoid conflict and destruction of a system that is bringing more benefits to increasing number of people. Of particular importance are targeted economic investments and preferential economic policies toward areas with ethnically mixed population. In this respect particularly useful could be steps for rebuilding the regional infrastructure that can offer some solution to problems of unemployment. More attention has to be paid to rural investments that could discourage migration to the cities. Economic growth could strengthen and maintain the perception of fairness across ethnic boundaries. Improved economic climate can contribute to the transformation of present-day states where ethnic groups confront and fight each other into states of farmers, shopkeepers, and entrepreneurs. In the longer term disparities across ethnic divides could be diminished through a combination of economic opportunity and democratic pluralism, thus paving the road for possible withering of the concept of the nation-state and moving toward civil society.

At the regional level of primary importance is the establishment of better bilateral relations, particularly between ‘host-states’ and ‘kin-states’. Economists have convincingly shown that trade within Southeast Europe has greater potential than either the Black Sea or the Central European connections. Regional economic cooperation, so long as these states can be convinced that this cooperation will not delay their entrance into West European economic zones,
can contribute in a substantial way for diminishing of ethnic tensions. Particularly important are initiatives for cooperation in the border regions. However, the existence of ethnic conflict and differing levels of national development put constrains on initiatives for regional cooperation from within the region. Because of this the EU should have to be the moving force in this direction and should encourage, in particular, the intensification of bi and tri-lateral ventures.

Very important is the task to rebuild the infrastructure of South Eastern Europe. The different transport corridors are bound to contribute decisively to the structure of regional cooperation and integration in Europe. It is believed that the need to cooperate on their construction across state boundaries could defuse tensions among Balkan states and promote political stabilization in the region. The economic advantages of these projects could serve as a catalyst for neutralizing territorial nationalism and ethnic intolerance. The transport corridors in the Balkans would alleviate urbanization and encourage administrative decentralization. Their construction would bring capital and employment opportunities into the region while the functioning of the corridors could contribute to the reducing of state sovereignty.

The West is bound to play a determinant role in policies designed to reduce ethnic tensions and build a security framework in South Eastern Europe. Analysts are unanimous that there can be no substitute for greater international commitment and involvement. For the moment, the West has an extraordinary influence over the course of events in South Eastern Europe. Based on this, the West should have coherent and consistent policies for diminishing of ethnic conflict and anchoring the Balkan states in the European civilization to which they aspire to belong.

Apart from the NATO intervention in the conflict in Kosovo, the United States has successfully intervened also in the dispute between Hungary and Romania over the treatment of the Hungarian minority in Transylvania. Because of this, the two countries signed a bilateral treaty in 1996, which is a compromise on issues that appeared to be insurmountably divisive. This example clearly illustrates that the potential of instability can be greatly diminished by the yearning of these states to become integrated into the Western community of nations symbolized by membership in NATO and the EU. It is important to note that the Hungarian-Romanian treaty is in a position to push further the reform of existing legislation in the field of education in Romania. The reason is that the two countries have negotiated more favorable conditions for the education of minorities than those provided under the hotly contested Law on Education.

Another point that deserves attention is the need of clear supervision of foreign aid so that it is not stolen. The West is in a position to promote social stability in the “Balkans Proper” by taking the lead in the building of a firm, traditional, rural economy that should involve the mass of the people, the ethnic minorities included. However, it should do the possible not to finance a “kleftocratic elite” (to use Solzhenitsyn’s term) that has been able so far to put some of the foreign aid into its own bank accounts.

To this should be added the need to assist weak states. This need is part of the dilemma that the West faces in the 21st-century: can the international community find ways to limit the abuse of power within states without triggering new abuses of the power of intervention and aggression in relations between states? The future of the Balkans will depend on how this dilemma is solved.
Footnotes


ii Common Security Regimes, pp.112-113.


xv R. J. Crampton, A Short History of Bulgaria (Cambridge University Press 1987), p. 71


xvii All the information about Turkish periodicals published in Bulgaria during the period 1878-1996 can be found in Ibrahim Jalamov, Turskijat periodichen pechat v Bulgaria (1878-1996) – in Periodichnijat pechat na maltzinstvata v Bulgaria (1878-1997), (Sofia 1998),pp.6-67.

xviii See Milada Anna Vachudova, Peaceful Transformations in East-Central Europe, p. 88.


xxiii Ivanka Nedeva, Kosovo/a: Different Perspectives, pp.114-115.


See Ivanka Nedeva, Democracy Building in Ethnically Diverse Societies, p. 151.


See Ivanka Nedeva, Democracy Building in Ethnically Diverse Societies, p. 151.


See Dan Blumhagen, Clashing Symbols, p. 1; Duncan M. Perry, The Republic of Macedonia, p. 276.


A very good analysis of the problem can be found in Unfinished peace, pp.15-22.


Brian Shott, Albanian Society in Macedonia, p.39.


Making the World Safe for Nationalism, p.4.


One of the best analyses of the issue can be found in: Leah Greenfeld, Nationalism. Five Roads to Modernity (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1992).

Making the World Safe for Nationalism, p.4.

Leah Greenfeld, Nationalism. Five Roads to Modernity, p.488
For more details see: Ivanka Nedeva, Bulgaria’s Relations with Greece and Turkey and the Idea of Trilateral Cooperation, (Free Initiative Foundation, Sofia, Bulgaria, 1993); see also Vassil Prodanov, Ethnic Minorities and the Formation of Bulgaria’s Foreign Policy - in Ivanka Nedeva and Joost Herman eds., Minorities in East Central Europe and Their Impact Upon Foreign Policy, (The Centre for European Security Studies, Groningen, The Netherlands, 1998), pp. 18-20.


Ivanka Nedeva, Bulgaria’s Relations with Greece and Turkey, p.31.

All the data about Bulgarian-Turkish relations after 1997 has been gathered during the author’s interviews in early June 1999 with the deputy chief of the Department for South East Europe Theodore Rusinov at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Bulgaria and the staff of the Turkish section of the same ministry.

For more details about BSEC see: Ivanka Nedeva, Bulgaria’s Relations with Greece and Turkey, pp.21-23; a very good analysis on recent developments in BSEC is made by Oleksandr Pavliuk, Empire of Words – in Transitions, September 1998.


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Pal Dunay, Hungary, p.61.

George Schopflin and Hugh Poulton, Romania’s Ethnic Hungarians, p. 24.

Pal Dunay, Hungary, p.60.

Pal Dunay, Hungary, p.67.

Quoted after Dunay, Hungary, p. 68.


Matyas Szabo, ‘Historic Reconciliation’ Awakens Old Disputes, pp. 46-50.

Matyas Szabo, ‘Historic Reconciliation, p.49.

Ibid.


Michael Shafir, A Possible Light at the End of the Tunnel, p.29.


A good description and advocacy of this aspect of the Albanian viewpoint can be found in Elez Biberaj, Albania in Transition. The Rocky Road to Democracy (Westview Press, 1998).

One of the most recent analyses on the problem of Serb nationalism belongs to Lenard J. Cohen, Nationalism, the Kosovo Crisis, and Political Change in Serbia – in East European Studies Newsletter (The Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, November-December 1998), pp. 5-6.


See Ivanka Nedeva, Kosovo/a: Different Perspectives, p. 119


More on this see in Ivanka Nedeva, Kosovo/a: Different Perspectives, pp. 124-125; Miranda Vickers and James Pettifer, Albania, pp.154-156.
cxxx Ibid.
cxxxi Miranda Vickers and James Pettifer, Albania, p.178.
cxxxviii See Martin Sletzinger, Kosovo from the Albanian Perspective, News Report about the noon discussion “The Impact of Regional Crises on Albania’s Transition to Democracy” on April 28, 1999, at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Washington, D.C.
cxlvii See for example the analysis about the assets of the re-construction of Via Egnatia in Symeon Giannakos, A Balkan Network of Interdependence – Transition, Vol. 2. No. 9 (3 May 1996), pp.58-59, 64.
The article focuses on the most prominent features of nationalism within the European political environment and underlines its influence on the security state of the region. The article determines the factors and goals of the nationalist parties’ activity. The authors also analyse the main external and internal threats to European security. Nationalism is defined as an internal threat to European security. The authors reviewed modern examples of European nationalism and described changes that have taken place since the last elections in certain European countries. Guaranteeing security has always been one of the most important functions of the state. Throughout the course of history, fortress walls were built, castles erected, armies created, borders strengthened, taxes increased and military alliances forged, all in the name of protecting the people. Nothing could make up for weaknesses in national security. Today, guaranteeing security remains the major priority of public officials and politicians. Global military sp In general the security of South Asia external factors impacting, exasperating and garbling greatly depends upon the stable and progressive the situation. Apart from one of the most populated in the world as approximately large number of ethnic and religious minorities in a one quarter of the world’s population resides here. There are also significant cross-border nuclear states, Pakistan and India, intra-state conflicts among ethnic and religious communities in the different states. One of the very troubling internal conflicts is the replace the corrupt and inept government. In the late Naxalite movement.