The long nineteenth century in Europe

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Histories of European international politics are punctuated by turning points. Typically, these watersheds have been connected to major wars. What do such histories have to tell us about nineteenth century Europe? What, if anything, is left out in the telling? My purposes in posing these questions are, first, to suggest that these histories focus too narrowly on war and, second, to propose an alternative perspective on modern European politics.

This perspective does not dispute the importance of war in European history. Rather, it frames the phenomenon of war in a particular way. Thus, I discuss what I term ‘the long nineteenth century’—a phase of European history that is initiated with the French Revolution and that ends with the military defeat of fascism. Such a perspective offers an alternative to other accounts of European history. First of all, it picks out different dates, 1789 and 1945. The analysis does not begin in 1800, a chronologically convenient turning point, or in 1815. And this phase of European history does not end in 1914, or in 1918. So war counts in this story but not in the typical way, since I treat the long nineteenth century as a protracted phase of democratization in Europe.

There are four parts to this essay. In the next section, I consider two important arguments about war and change in European society that pick out the Congress of Vienna and the Concert system as a decisive watershed in European and international politics. In the second section, I emphasize the revolutionary background to the Congress and Concert. This discussion includes an analysis of the strategic structure of revolution when democratic republicanism is introduced into a social system composed of dynastic states. In the third section, I continue the discussion of democratic republicanism and its impact in France and Europe. In the final section, I consider a different republican experiment, conducted under different conditions, and its consequences for democratic development in Europe at the end of the long nineteenth century.

War and change in European politics

A frequently invoked turning point in the nineteenth century is the Congress of Vienna. This is often also considered a watershed in a longer sequence of development that begins in 1648 with the Treaty of Westphalia. European international politics, according to the authoritative work of Paul Schroeder, was transformed in the years 1813–1815. ‘A fundamental change occurred in the governing rules, norms and practices of international politics’. The rules, norms and practices of the
balance of power gave way to those of ‘political equilibrium’.\(^1\) Ikenberry, as well, associates the Vienna settlement with an emergent historical pattern. ‘Beginning with the 1815 settlement and increasingly after 1919 and 1945, the leading state [after major war] has resorted to institutional strategies as mechanisms to establish restraints on indiscriminate and arbitrary state power and ‘lock-in’ a favourable and durable post-war order’.\(^2\) Moreover, these three moments are linked parts of a larger dynamic in both accounts; they are not independent events. To study the meaning of 1815, 1914 and 1945 is not to study a random sample of events; there is serial correlation among these dates.

Ikenberry’s work in fact provides support for an assumption made by Schroeder. ‘[T]he history of international politics is not one of an essentially unchanging, cyclical struggle for power or of the shifting play of the balance of power, but a history of systemic institutional change—change essentially linear, moving overall in the direction of greater complexity, subtlety, and capacity for order and problem-solving’.\(^3\) This is precisely the story told by Ikenberry about 1815, 1919, and 1945. ‘Over time, post-war settlements have moved in the direction of an institutionalized order’.\(^4\) The settlement established in 1945 was superior to the settlement of 1919, and the latter was superior to the settlement of 1815. And this assessment is consistent with the criteria proposed by Schroeder: one international system is superior to another when it more satisfactorily meets the demand for order, legitimacy and welfare.\(^5\)

Their two stories converge. There has been progress in history; moreover the ‘history of systemic institutional change’ as recounted by Ikenberry is ‘essentially linear’. In each iteration, beginning in 1815, there is more constitutional order than in the previous settlement. There are three ways to account for this pattern. One way is through learning. This would be consistent with the arguments of Schroeder who proposed that what happened in 1815 ‘… was a general recognition by the states of Europe that they could not pursue the old politics any longer and had to try something new and different. … European statesmen, taught slowly and painfully by repeated defeats and disaster, finally and suddenly succeeded in learning how to conduct international politics differently and better’.\(^6\)

Ikenberry, however, does not rest his work about the rebuilding of order after war on learning processes. Rather he has two other arguments. A second way to account for this pattern would be to emphasize how the composition of the states involved changed over time. Ikenberry indicates that the twentieth-century settlements were truly global.\(^7\) The 1815 settlement was more strictly a European affair. But in 1919,

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and even more powerfully in 1945, the European post-war settlement was influenced by the United States. The third and final way to account for this historical pattern, initiated in 1815, is a centrepiece of Ikenberry’s argument. He argues that ‘[d]emocracies are better able to create binding institutions and establish credible restraints and commitments than non-democracies’. ‘The great divide’ he argues, ‘was really the twentieth-century settlements—in which the major parties to the post-war settlements were democratic—and the earlier settlements, which were basically between non-democracies’.8 So this process of linear change and progress, which begins in 1815, depended on the diffusion of democratic institutions in domestic politics. ‘The rise of democratic states and new institutional strategies allowed states capacities to develop new responses to the old and recurring problem of order’.9

This is where Ikenberry and Schroeder part theoretical company. There are two important and related differences. First, Ikenberry takes more seriously the distribution of types of regime. In 1815, for example, although Britain was ‘an emerging constitutional democracy’, the other major European states were ‘mostly monarchical and autocratic’.10 This matters for the degree of constitutionalism present in the post-war order. Schroeder, on the other hand, downplays the importance of ‘monarchic solidarity’ in the Congress and Concert system.11 The political equilibrium that emerged in 1815 had little to do with the domestic regimes characteristic of participants at the Congress of Vienna. Second, Schroeder is at pains ‘to go beyond unit-level analysis to systemic analysis’. ‘International politics does belong in history on its own terms, as an equal and autonomous element …’.12 However, domestic democratic political cultures and institutions are unit-level properties. Thus Ikenberry’s analysis is far more rooted in the unit-level.

This is also the point where problems arise for each of these arguments. The problems are curiously symmetrical. After identifying them, I will propose a solution. And I will use this solution to recast some of the central features of the long nineteenth century in Europe.

The problem for Schroeder is that the mechanism by which this transformation in international politics is accomplished in 1815 remains rather mysterious, even after we try to set our understanding of it within some theory of political learning. The problem for Ikenberry is that he does specify a mechanism, in some theoretical detail, but it still remains a mysterious historical process. A great deal in his argument about international order depends on the rise of democratic states, but he says nothing about the process of democratization in any case, or anything about the diffusion and extension of democracy. There are two stories in Ikenberry’s work, one told, the other untold. The story he tells is one of order-making after war in international politics since 1815. The story he does not tell is the story of democratic development, which remains untold despite its importance to his arguments. Ikenberry’s argument requires that there be democratic states after war because only these types of regimes have the qualities that conduce to constitutional international

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8 Ibid., pp. 75, 78.
9 Ibid., p. 18.
10 Ibid., p. 78.
12 Ibid., p. ix.
orders. Yet his argument also requires that democratic qualities be only weakly present in the *status quo ante* before war. Otherwise there would be no war to puzzle over, since by hypothesis democracies do not fight each other.\(^\text{13}\) There has to be at least one non-democracy in an international subsystem for war to occur.

Moreover, neither argument can be used to correct the problems of the other. Schroeder cannot fill in the gaps left in Ikenberry’s analysis because Schroeder’s work is too committed to a systemic level of analysis. And Ikenberry cannot fill in the gaps in Schroeder’s analysis for exactly the same reason—the two arguments are working at different levels of analysis and the two levels are watertight compartments. Schroeder is more self-conscious about this feature of his work, but much of what Ikenberry says about *international* order reduces to the patterns and consequences of domestic variables.

I believe that some of these difficulties may be resolved by considering what is distinctive about 1815, when this date is considered along with other dates that are usually considered turning points in European and international political history: 1648, 1713, 1763, 1815, 1919, 1945. All of these dates mark the end of wars, but only 1815 marks the end of a war which was closely associated with revolution. Neither Schroeder nor Ikenberry note this feature. Rather, they argue that the Congress and Concert system was distinctive because it marked a new way of doing international politics.

Much of the debate about the Congress of Vienna and the Concert system in international relations theory has focused on this question: Was it a balance of power?\(^\text{14}\) To argue that it was is to suggest, as Gulick did in his now-dated but influential study,\(^\text{15}\) that there was more continuity than rupture in interstate relations after the Napoleonic Wars. To argue otherwise is to see in the Congress and the Concert system new mechanisms of adjustment among states and to emphasize changes in interstate practices. Both Schroeder and Ikenberry take this point of view. But in taking this position, they have settled on an answer to a narrowly-framed question. Another question to ask is this: What was the relationship of the Congress and Concert to the French Revolution? This is a different question with correspondingly different implications for how we think about nineteenth and twentieth century European politics.

Schroeder has no choice—theoretical consistency compels him to deny that there was any causal relationship between the French Revolution and interstate war. However, theoretical consistency also has implications for the arguments of Ikenberry. As I suggested above, much of his analysis turns on a phenomenon—


Democratic change—that remains exogenous to his model of order-building. If one were to write the political history of democratic change in the modern world, the French Revolution would occupy a central place. If Ikenberry had in fact made explicit the story that remains untold in his work, it is not 1815 that might have loomed large, but 1789. But this could introduce into the narrative of progress something about democratic change that does not neatly fit his argument. The process of democratization and the rise of democratic states may contribute to war rather than, or as well as, contribute to constitutional order-building in international politics in the aftermath of war. \(^{16}\)

In one account of order, primarily of order in a European setting, no mention is made of the French Revolution despite the attention in this account to unit-level variables and types of domestic political regimes; in another account, the causal relevance of the French Revolution is explicitly denied, primarily because of the systemic theoretical orientation of the author. In the remainder of this article, I attempt to remedy this state of affairs by arguing for the importance of the French Revolution to the nineteenth century political order in Europe.

The long nineteenth century in Europe has a coherence—a dynamic—that stems from the diffusion of political innovations associated with the French Revolution. More specifically, the pattern of war and revolution that characterizes this phase of European political history from 1789 to 1945 is associated with how these innovations were simultaneously taken up and resisted in Europe after the Revolution. Domestic revolution initiates the ‘long nineteenth century’. Interstate war, and more specifically the defeat of fascism, concludes it.

Fascism substituted conquest for trade and equilibrium for growth. ‘At the best this equilibrium would be achieved by an increasingly nationalistic and autarchic economy withdrawing by stages from the international economy. At its worst, as in the case of Germany, it implied the extension by conquest of that autarchy to large areas of Europe’. As Milward has argued, ‘[t]he economic developments in Germany after the National Socialist revolution were meaningless in the long run if confined to one country …’ Fascism had to have at its heart the integration of domestic and foreign policy. ‘The expression of this integral nature was the New Order, involving nothing less than a total economic and political reconstruction of Europe’. \(^{17}\) The long nineteenth century thus ended as it began—with revolution and war.

This history is explicitly about the process of European-wide democratization. In general, it is a history of halting, limited, unstable and unconsolidated democratic development. The primary obstacles to democracy were endogenous to European civilization. It was not simply levels of economic development, or class structure in a narrow economic sense that was a barrier to democratic change in the long nineteenth century. Rather it was the dynastic quality of European states and the corresponding importance of aristocratic political cultures within them that made democratic innovations difficult to instantiate and reproduce over time. These qualities particularly came into play because democratic reform was closely associated with republicanism, especially after the French Revolution.

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This phase of political history that begins in 1789 and ends in 1945 suggests further that democracy was not self-sustaining in Europe. The consolidation of democracy in Europe, beginning in 1945, depended on outside leadership provided by a stable, consolidated republic which had been able to develop in a geopolitical context relatively unfettered by dynastic and aristocratic resistance and by interstate rivalry.18

In the next section, I discuss the strategic structure of the French Revolution. This section provides an argument about the relationship between revolution and war and, more specifically, about the relationship of the Revolution and 1815, a crucial turning point for both Schroeder and Ikenberry. Furthermore, it also specifies some of the obstacles to the extension of democratic republicanism in Europe. The commitments of democratic republicans were radical and they provoked substantial counter-mobilization within and outside France.

Republics in modern Europe were rare and unstable forms of government until 1945. Before 1914, there were only three, Switzerland, France and Portugal.19 By the end of 1918, there were ten new republics created by the collapse of autocratic empires. All of these republics, except Switzerland, Finland and France, failed in the inter-war period.20 It took the military defeat of fascism to clear the way for republican consolidation. By the 1980s, of the seventeen democracies of Western Europe, only eight were monarchies (excluding mini-states such as Liechtenstein).21

The strategic structure of revolution

This discussion is abstract and simplified; it is a way of describing the dynamics that I consider essential to the interaction of dynastic states in an interdependent social system when confronted with a republican challenge. I assume (1) a social system composed of several territorially organized political communities, (2) each of these territorial communities is a dynastic state and (3) revolution occurs in one of these communities.22 Revolution has these minimal features: it is a local option designed to transform a local situation of monarchical rule via a process of regime change and institutional redesign. The process of transition transforms subjects of a monarch into the citizens of a democratic republic.

18 There is a counterfactual implied here: leaving aside the American contribution to the conduct of the war and its military outcome, would the same patterns of European political and economic reconstruction after the war have been sustained, absent American participation? On counterfactual reasoning in social science and history, see Philip E. Tetlock and Aaron Belkin (eds.), Counterfactual Thought Experiments in World Politics (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996); Niall Ferguson (ed.), Virtual History: Alternatives and Counterfactuals (London: Picador, 1997); Jon Elster, Logic and Society: Contradictions and Possible Worlds (New York: John Wiley, 1978).


The revolution is local, but it has universal implications. These monarchical regimes are similar. They are all associated with dynastic states, and are organized around the courts and household economies of the ruling family. The principles used locally to challenge the political status quo have a wider extension. They can be used to challenge similar patterns of authority in all of the units of the subsystem.

Is the independent construction of a complete local republican society possible in such a society? Is 'republicanism in one country' feasible? In considering these questions, consider also these features of republican political culture in France and in Europe. There was nothing intrinsically 'French' about the democratic republican moment of the Revolution. Indeed, political actors in the Revolutionary conjuncture who invoked republicanism were seeking legitimating principles that stood outside French history. Moreover, the republican understanding of patriotism implied that a patriot was committed to the cause of free association, wherever it was limited by despotism. Free association would be stable only when despotism was eliminated not only locally but also universally. The stability of local republicanism in the long run depended on system-wide change.

The status quo ante before revolution, in other words, combines two elements. There are multiple sovereigns and they are all monarchs. Both elements are inconsistent with democratic republicanism. By separating these two dimensions, we can say that democratic republicans rejected both universal monarchy and multiple sovereignty.

Republican ideology was sensitive to the problems of local revolution. The strategic structure of this situation was systemic. The interdependent choices that were generated within it spanned all of the social system and they were not identified simply with the territorial boundaries of particular communities.

Suppose now that all of the princes in this system have devised a self-enforcing convention, such that a local revolution is explicitly recognized to be a revolution against the principle of kingship, wherever that principle is instantiated in the social system. The convention produces co-ordinated resistance among princes to the revolution. Revolution then must be more than local to be successful. It might be co-ordinated across the system—simultaneously local and universal. Or, revolution might be sequential. That is, the revolution could be secured locally and then exported or imitated. Such a sequence, however, depends on initial local success, and this is likely to be difficult given the assumption of a self-enforcing convention to respond to republican revolution wherever it occurs. Such a convention makes local republican revolution more difficult to achieve and encourages the formation of more modest goals associated with reform rather than revolution, whether this change is tactical or more or less permanent.

Suppose that this co-ordination among princes is imperfect. It does not include all of the princes, for example, or even if the alliance is universal, it is not perfectly co-ordinated. A local transition to republicanism might then be more likely to succeed because resistance to it is more likely to be purely local or only incompletely co-ordinated amongst princes.

And it does not follow that republican consolidation is assured, if a transition does occur. The new republic is still surrounded by hostile princes. They have the opportunity to co-ordinate once again, either to attempt to remove the new republic or, failing that, to resist the extension of republican principles to other parts of the social system. They can also pursue similar goals by acting unilaterally.
Princes are motivated to co-ordinate because they are vulnerable in similar ways. Their vulnerability does not arise because their rule is territorial, but because the revolutionary challenge threatens to do away with princes wherever they are located. If co-ordination is successful (and its success might be assessed by the number and importance of the princes inside the arrangements and the extent of their individual commitment), an encompassing coalition emerges. At the limit, this coalition approaches a universal alliance, constructed to defend a widespread principle and political practice—kingship and dynastic rule—against another potentially universal principle and practice—democratic republicanism.

These principles represented two different versions of cosmopolitanism. Metternich, for example, could feel at home anywhere in Europe—which he considered his fatherland23—only if an aristocratic way of life could be preserved across it. A democratic republican could feel at home anywhere in Europe only if Europe was democratic and republican. The important cleavages in this social system were not defined simply by territory—that is, by conflict among states—but by the differences between princes and republicans.

Clearly it is still important that this social system was stratified by territorially-ordered political communities. It is this feature that makes co-ordination among princes difficult to achieve if it is deemed socially necessary, whatever the shared interest that princes might have in resisting democratic republican transitions. And yet it is also this feature that makes co-ordinated system-wide revolution difficult.

The primary intention of the alliance introduced in the above discussion is not to eliminate or regulate war among princes but to eliminate revolution. It is not the conventions of the alliance per se that lower the incidence of wars among princes, but rather the fear of revolution. Peace is not incidental, but it is a by-product of the desire to avoid revolution. In this model of revolution and reaction, this desire is the primary source of those conventions that regulate relations among members.

Princes, or their delegates, constructed the European Concert. This feature was an important source of similarity among the contracting parties. The parties were not simply ‘... historic states that had been major actors in European diplomatic relations since at least the middle of the seventeenth century ... [and that] all had undergone a common set of historical experiences and the socializing effects of diplomacy, war and peacemaking’.24 A principle of monarchical solidarity was put down on paper, once the occupation of France was ended, and Louis XVIII had been returned to the throne. The protocol was signed at Aix-la-Chapelle on November 15, 1818 by the Foreign Ministers of Prussia, France, Austria, Russia and Britain. ‘The intimate union established among the Monarchs associated with this


system by their principles, no less than by the interest of their Peoples, offers to Europe the most sacred token of its future tranquility’.25

Monarchical solidarity, which extended a weak version of the principle of dynastic legitimacy, was a ‘consensus principle’ at Vienna and the corresponding convention was ‘if kingship was in danger anywhere, all rulers had a duty to intervene to uphold it’.26 The prominence of this convention contributed to the ‘non-reestablishment of earlier non-dynastic actors (Genoa, Venice, Poland) … it helped to prevent the destruction of another (Saxony).’27 As Osiander indicates, this was the first attempt to establish a criterion of membership in the states system of Europe.

What I have done to this point in this section is to ask the question: What social interdependencies were implied in European society by the convention of monarchical solidarity? I have been led as a consequence to consider cleavages in European society that were not territorial. The Congress and Concert system were part of a larger pattern of interaction between princes and democratic republicans in European society, a pattern that was crystallized, if not initiated, by the French Revolution. This discussion accords well with some features of Ikenberry’s work. He is sensitive to the implications of regime type in general, and within the Concert system. On the other hand, it is more difficult to reconcile this discussion with the arguments of Schroeder.

His examination of the European Concert after 1815 drew six central conclusions. First, the Vienna settlement did not rest on a balance of power but rather on ‘political equilibrium’. ‘The international system [constituted after 1815] required and rested on political equilibrium … mutual consensus on norms and rules, respect for law and an overall balance among the various actors in terms of rights, security, status, claims, duties, and satisfactions rather than power … a balanced political order’.28 Second, and closely related, the Vienna settlement was not a revival of the competitive eighteenth-century balance of power. ‘A move away from the eighteenth-century balance of power politics to a different kind of politics was an essential element in the revolutionary transformation of European politics in 1813–1815’.29

Third, the Concert initiated a golden age of interstate peace, markedly different than the eighteenth-century history of interstate warfare. Fourth, the break in European society came in the early 1800s. Fifth (actually an assumption that is regarded by Schroeder as confirmed by the detailed historical research), the explanation for the revolutionary break can be located at the systemic level. Schroeder argues that ‘… it is vital to show how systemic rules and structural limits influenced and shaped these outcomes [of international politics]’.30 By ‘system’, Schroeder means ‘essentially what I understand Michael Oakeshott to mean by the constituent rules of a practice or a civic association: the understandings, assumptions, learned skills, and responses,

27 Ibid., p. 223.
29 Ibid.
30 Schroeder, The Transformation of European Politics, p. xi.
rules, norms, procedures and so on, which agents acquire and use in pursuing their individual divergent aims within the framework of a shared practice ... the practice of international politics'.

Although Schroeder does not deny that the late eighteenth-century revolutions had ‘profound structural effects on Europe and the world’, he argues, sixth, that the French Revolution had little to do with the outbreak of war that provided the final catalyst for the transformation of the international politics of Europe. ‘Europe in the 1780s was not heading inexorably toward revolution, but toward war, whether or not there was revolution. Revolution was contingent, war systemic and structural’. ‘The French Revolution, considered as an event which occurred in 1789, was not inevitable ... [yet] during the same period, no state seriously threatened by war avoided it in the long run. The explanation is structural, not contingent’.

Revolution could have been avoided, even if it was not, and for this reason, the Revolution apparently has an inferior causal status. The wars that broke apart the old world would have occurred, even if the revolution had not happened.

According to Schroeder, it was the Polish, rather than the French, Revolution that was integrally linked to international politics. The Polish Revolution was more important precisely because it was not an independent event. The explanation for the Polish Revolution is structural and systemic, and thus the French Revolution is different. It was a contingent bundle of events and, as should now be clear, associated with unit-level properties and processes. Schroeder identifies contingency with unit-level properties, such that system-level constitutive rules map neatly on to non-contingent causes. In the end, however, the argument about the French Revolution appears to be that the Revolution had causes independent of the constitutive rules of the game in the international system. The Polish Revolution did not, which in turn implies that it had no independent ontological status, other than as an instantiation of the dynamics of the systemic level.

These conclusions summarize a powerful explanation of large-scale political change in Europe. This explanation is located at the systemic level of analysis. It individuates the European interstate system into two different types: the balance of power system and the Concert system of political equilibrium. Each is a ‘shared practice’ and, by extension, a ‘civil association’, but they are not constituted by the same rules of practice. And the transition from one set of shared practices to another is explained endogenously.

This implies that the causes of breakdown (and transition) were internal to the balance of power system. This implication further suggests that the balance of

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32 *The Transformation of European Politics*, p. 51.

33 Ibid., p. 52.


35 *The Transformation of European Politics*, p. 74.
power system was incoherent at some level. That is, its constitutive rules were contradictory, or the balance of power system, as a system, was dynamically unstable or inefficient. Its breakdown was inevitable, or at least a major war was inevitable, and this seems to be an indicator of thoroughgoing breakdown according to Schroeder.

These ways of explaining endogenous change may collapse one into the other, as variations on a single theme. I leave that issue aside, in order to point to a problem with this kind of explanation. To invoke contradiction, instability or inefficiency is to introduce a criterion external to these practices themselves, which is used, for example, to assess inefficiency. Hence a claim of this sort—that transition from one type of system to another occurs endogenously—is potentially inconsistent, or is incompletely specified.

While Schroeder emphasizes that the Revolution and international politics were ‘only tenuously linked by contingent events and developments’, he does concede that there was another way in which they were ‘organically connected’. The Revolution changed the nature and rules of the international game.36 Having made this concession, however, he quickly abandoned its implications and went on to argue that the Revolution did not immediately pit France against the great monarchies of Europe. What he appeared to mean at this point was that the French Revolution did not necessarily have to pit France against these powers. That it did at a later stage in the Revolutionary process was, once again, merely a contingent outcome of a contingent event.

His overarching argument about late eighteenth and early nineteenth century Europe is largely dependent on endogenous change at the systemic level, whatever the attention to unit-level detail in the actual historical narrative. Schroeder is single-minded. He wants to relegate everything that is not systemic to an inferior explanatory role. He is intent on arguing that the balance of power system itself, and it alone, was responsible for the military contests of late eighteenth and early nineteenth century Europe. Anything that appears to have an existence independent of the balance of power system is rendered contingent and thus less important. Schroeder firmly believes that a balance of power system is bound to result in major war. Major war can be extinguished by entrenching a superior set of constitutive practices at the systemic level. He is led to argue that anything that is not thoroughly structured by these constitutive practices, whether in a balance of power system or a system of political equilibrium, can in effect be shunted off to one side in explanation.

In the end, therefore, I want to separate two parts of Schroeder’s argument about the French Revolution. I agree that it was contingent in the following specific sense: ‘The French Revolution ... was not inevitable; it came about because reform programs designed to avoid it happened to fail’.37 The Revolution was a classic example of a political transition that could not be controlled by those actors who initiated demands for reform. I believe I can take this argument on board without accepting the larger claims that Schroeder wants to make about the Revolution and its importance.

36 Ibid. pp. 70–72.
37 The Transformation of European Politics, p. 52.
It is ironic that the French Revolution, considered a contingent event by Schroeder, has been treated in comparative politics as a determined outcome in a larger process of structural change. Moreover, this literature brings the international system into the explanation of the Revolution, usually through the effects of war and interstate military competition on the fiscal sociology of the state. Theda Skocpol has developed these arguments the most forcefully and the most successfully. Her ‘nonvoluntarist structuralist perspective’ on the causes and processes of social revolutions, including the French Revolution, takes as a problem to be solved the gap between intentions and outcomes in the revolutionary process. The intentions of the actors were not revolutionary, but the outcome of the process of change set in motion in 1789 was a social revolution. This gap was reason for Schroeder to propose that the revolution was contingent; yet it is for Skocpol reason to argue that the French Revolution, like other great historical revolutions, was determined by structures. To explain revolution, Skocpol argued, one must focus ‘… simultaneously upon the institutionally determined situations and relations of groups within society and upon the interrelations of societies within world-historically developing international structures’.

Her argument was both structuralist and historicist. Given the path of French history, the Revolution was inevitable. But what was inevitable: the initiation of a process of reform, or the outcomes that emerged from a complex phase of political competition? If it was the former, Skocpol cannot specify the political processes that shaped the transition. Her theory is structuralist, yet the French Revolution is an example of a political transition that could not be controlled by those actors who sought reform, and structural theories have limitations in the analysis of political transitions. To admit a gap between reformist intentions and actual outcomes, and to leave this gap unexplained, is actually to acknowledge the weakness of a structuralist theory of revolution. It is to admit that a structuralist theory can say little or nothing about the process by which a revolution unfolds. But this does not entail that a systematic account of this process cannot be developed. It simply means that such an account is not structuralist. Further, if it was the actual outcome that was determined by the path of French history, rather than the initial demand for reform, Skocpol would be hard put to explain the quite specific political behaviours, patterns and institutions that constituted the ‘outcome’. A structuralist explanation of the French Revolution that sees the latter as a determined outcome thus is unlikely to be a convincing alternative to Schroeder’s emphasis on the contingency of the Revolution.

Skocpol modified the earlier work of Barrington Moore by adding arguments from the work of Max Weber and Otto Hintze to Marx in constructing a theory of revolution. At about the same time as Skocpol was working, some historians of France were modifying their approaches, also by revising their dependence on Marx.

39 Skocpol, States and Social Revolution, p. 14.
40 Ibid., p. 18.
Furet, in particular, but also Baker, Hunt and Sewell argued that the events of the Revolution had an autonomous dynamic that could not be read off from the structural context (especially economic structures) of old regime France. But they took this to be a weakness of structural theory, rather than a reason to stop where a structuralist explanation left off. The influences were diverse: de Tocqueville for Furet, cultural anthropology (and some literary theory) for Sewell, Baker and Hunt. They agreed that the Revolution was fundamentally a political and cultural process, although some drew much more on the ‘new cultural history’ than others. The autonomy of politics and culture during the revolutionary conjuncture—this was their way of breaking with the Marxist emphasis on the ‘bourgeois revolution’ in France. Skocpol modified Marx by introducing another set of structures associated with states. These historians broke with Marx by emphasizing the autonomy of elements of the ‘superstructure’ during periods of political reform, although their work had varying emphases. More recent investigations have continued in this vein, but without the strong commitment to culturally-informed theory. The work of Tackett, Woloch and Walt, for example, looks in detail at the politics of revolution in France.

A revolutionary republican political culture did emerge in France in the 1790s. We can agree with Schroeder that this development was not an inevitable result of the attempts at reform. But should we be surprised that a republican option emerged? A central claim in the politics of republicanism was constitutional: a republican regime was superior to a monarchical regime, even a constitutionally limited monarch. In a period of challenge to a monarch, then, republican ideology might understandably become a focal point for challengers.

The republican moment of the Revolution combined a non-monarchical political principle and a legitimating ideology organized around the importance of republican virtue. Its specific weight and centre of gravity was neither liberal nor nationalist. A liberal nationalist outcome of the reform process would probably have produced a constitutionally limited monarchy. The politics of republican virtue sought more—to break free of the conventions of the old regime. Republicans harked back to earlier republics in the classical world, in a sense attempting to abandon the French past in the search for a new beginning.

Republicanism implied commitments that distinguished it from liberalism. Republicans sought to define an alternative route out of old regimes that did not culminate in liberal markets and states. Liberals found it easier to accommodate themselves to constitutional monarchs and representative government, to market

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economies, and to modern states in an anarchical international society, and thus to specialized professional armies. Republicans opposed absolutist monarchy and, often, constitutional monarchs. In juxtaposing virtue and commerce, they opposed or were ambivalent about market relations, commercial society and capitalism. Republicans also harboured reservations about the institutions of representative government. They opposed standing armies and favoured citizen-militias.

Holsti remarks that Jacobinism is merely a pejorative label used by conservatives to describe liberals. Democratic republicans, however, rejected the political commitment that was characteristic of European liberals: constitutional monarchy. Liberals also tended to favour limited political participation, much more so than the extensions to the suffrage supported by democratic republicans. Liberals, moreover, were less concerned with replacing organized religion with a civil religion. Republicanism, especially in Catholic societies that escaped the liberalizing effects of the Reformation, provided a way to challenge the Catholic Church and republicans in these societies often wanted to implement a civil religion. Liberals, as well, could consistently be nationalist. The political concept of the ‘nation’ was compatible with a restored relationship between a constitutionally-limited monarch and the body politic. Republicanism, however, was more radical than this liberal nationalist position, which used the notion of the nation to legitimate liberal limitations on monarchs. Republicans rejected foreign rule and valued self-government. Yet republican patriots denied that they were nationalists and associated nationalism with the politics of dynastic states.

Finally, republicanism also enlarged the range of options that nineteenth century radical democrats and socialists could draw upon. Their ambivalence toward representative institutions, their hostility toward market society, their attitudes toward militarism and standing armies, drew on republican ideology. The basic Marxist distinction between exchange and use value, which was central in much of radical political economy, drew on republican political economy. Not all of these republican influences were filtered through the French Revolution. However, French democratic republicanism, one of the first manifestations of a truly active communist party according to Marx, packaged together seminal ideas and organizational models. The Decembrists, for example, introduced the political principles of republicanism and a Jacobin model of organization to the intelligentsia of the Russian empire. This emergent dissident stream was joined to Marxism later in the century.

The domestication of republicanism in France

The French revolution left an enduring legacy in French politics: political competition around the principles of the republic. This competition influenced French politics in important ways from the onset of the counter-revolution up to the formation of the Fifth Republic. This competition helps to account for the combination of regime instability and territorial consolidation that was characteristic of political modernization in France. War continued to shape the relationship of nation

and republic. Military defeat in 1870 weakened the Right and opened the door to republican political consolidation to an important degree and this consolidation, following on the Commune, separated republicanism from revolution. Yet it still nurtured, in reaction, an integral nationalism that drove a wedge between the republic and the nation.45

Eugen Weber has provided an influential description of the process of political modernization in France, aptly captured in the phrase ‘peasants into Frenchmen’. Military defeat in 1870, he argued, produced a ‘new nationalism’46 and its domestic success, he argued, could be measured by the mobilization in 1914. His arguments have a specific time frame bounded by military conflict in 1870 and 1914. Weber appears to document another instance of how nationalism trumped all other forms of solidarity in the outbreak of the War. Weber also appears to confirm the central importance of war in shaping domestic politics. This new nationalism was caused by military defeat and contributed to domestic solidarity. Thus Weber appears to fit nicely within the conventional explanation of the centrality of interstate war in European political development.

However, the late nineteen-thirties and the early forties provide evidence that the ‘new nationalism’ was not a complete success. Extending the time line forward from 1914 leads to the divisions over the armistice with Germany, to Vichy, and the ‘fratricide’ of the resistance.47 This new nationalism had not fully settled the issue of republicanism. It was not caused simply by military defeat. It was a response as well to the most important challenge to dynastic principles within France. The domestic enemy of the new nationalists was republicanism, which had sapped France of its military spirit. The new nationalism was related to the enduring importance of the republican question and the regime transition to non-revolutionary, parliamentary republicanism in the Third Republic.

Weber analysed rural modernization as a process structured politically around the nation, as his notable phrase suggested. Yet it is a striking feature of Weber’s argument that the last phase of rural modernization coincided with the beginnings

45 Zeev Sternhell in fact argues that the origins of fascist ideology are French. See, for example, his book La droite révolutionnaire. Les origines françaises du fascisme, 1885–1914 (Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1978), and the discussion in Michel Winock, Nationalism, Anti-Semitism and Fascism in France, trans. Jane Marie Todd (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1998), pp. 195–205. Paxton extends the arguments of Sternhell by proposing that ‘fascisms take their first steps in reaction to claimed failings of democracy’; thus, ‘it is not surprising that they should appear first in the most precocious democracies, the United States and France’. According to Paxton, the functional equivalent of fascism in America was the emergence of the Klu Klux Klan in the South after the Civil War. But he also argues that it is not necessarily the first fascisms that take political root and become ‘parties capable of acting decisively on the political stage’. In his comparative analysis of fascism in Europe, Linz notes the much stronger commitment to royalism in French proto-fascism, while ‘other fascist movements were in principle republican, even when they, like Mussolini, ended in accepting the monarchy’. See Robert O. Paxton, ‘The Five Stages of Fascism’, Journal of Modern History, 70 (1998), pp. 12–13, and Juan J. Linz, ‘Some Notes Toward a Comparative Study of Fascism in Sociological Historical Perspective’, in Walter Laqueur (ed.), Fascism: A Reader’s Guide (Berkeley and Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press, 1978), p. 106.


of republican government in the late 1870s. When peasants became Frenchmen, the mould was republican as well as national. In regions where monarchists and intransigent Catholics could resist republican penetration, it was unlikely that socialists could do better than republicans. There were few conversions from monarchism to socialism. Socialists had to pass through republicanism first. For the same reason, where republicanism had not penetrated, efforts of the left would be directed at consolidating the Republic, rather than at undermining it through political attack. Although the political expression of class was shaped by republicanism, it does not follow that republican political cleavages were a result of political manipulation by economic classes. This would reduce the constitutional question to the class question.

Republicanism no longer carried the threat of civil war or revolution, but parliamentary republicans in the Third Republic built their networks in the provinces through excluding those who were considered their opponents. This practice continued to politicize the issue of political regime. Republicans used regime resources and manipulated state institutions in order to maximize republican support and minimize counter-mobilization by anti-republicans. The consolidation of republicanism during the Third Republic depended on the politics of patronage, in contrast to the ascetic ideals of the republican moment of the revolution. This change illustrates both the routinization of republican charisma, and the domestic divisions that it continued to produce.

This process of moderation had occurred progressively over the course of the nineteenth century. In terms of diplomatic practice in the 1790s, ‘[e]ven as they struggled against it, the revolutionaries found themselves enmeshed in the old system… the new diplomacy increasingly resembled the old as the revolutionaries found themselves making compromises with the demands and practices of the old diplomacy’. In 1848, Lamartine reassured Europe that the proclamation of the Second Republic did not mean war. ‘Reassure yourselves if in error you take the Republic of 1848 for the Republic of 1792! We are not a revolutionary anachronism, we are not going against the stream of civilization’. By 1871, no such reassurance
was necessary, whatever the domestic rhetoric about revanche.\(^{52}\)

In terms of domestic political competition, republicans gradually gave up the instrument of violent revolution. Revolution had led in the 1790s to foreign invasion. Revolution in 1848 yielded a coup in 1851. After the Bonapartist coup in particular, republicans began to abandon the dream of a radically new beginning.\(^{53}\) The final acknowledgement of the reality of republicanism in one country evidently went hand in hand with a new political strategy in domestic partisan politics.

Still, the routinization of republican charisma is not the same as its complete effacement. Cleavages around the republican question distinguished France from the quintessential liberal case—Britain. Changes that could be linked to liberal innovation in France—the expansion of democracy, the separation of church and state, the reform of the military\(^{54}\)—were closely associated with republicanism. Liberals had far greater reservations about democratic expansion in the nineteenth century, particularly universal (male) suffrage, than did republicans.\(^{55}\) The separation of church and state was also republican; it was explicitly linked by Emile Combes, in the government of republican defence, to the substitution of a republican civil religion for Catholicism. Republicans, finally, opposed standing armies, militarism and too powerful military elites\(^{56}\) although their reforms to the military were not very deep.

Republicanism in France was domesticated over the course of the nineteenth century, but it was still exceptional within Europe. ‘[D]emocratic movements’, Nord has argued, ‘had a hard time of it in mid-nineteenth century Europe. There was one exception to this rule, and it was France which became the first of the great powers to adopt a democratic constitution’. ‘Gambetta and Ferry … rubbed shoulders with the like of Garibaldi and Virchow’, yet outside of France, he argues, ‘the democratizing thrusts were blunted or absorbed’.\(^{57}\)

In effect, the French case suggests that there was another way to escape fascism, other than liberal democracy.\(^{58}\) To speculate to some degree by considering the implications of this statement, fascism on the European continent might be accounted for, not by the absence of liberal democratic political institutions or culture, but by the failure of republican consolidation. Where republicanism failed to be consolidated, there was political contestation around the republican question and it contributed to fascist revolution; where republicanism was consolidated, there

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may have been contestation and conflict, but not enough to contribute to fascist revolution. The republican route to modernity was a dangerous political route because if republicanism failed, the door was open for a different form of popular political integration—that is, fascism.

The problem of popular integration within republican institutions took on particular importance within Catholic societies, or societies with substantial Catholic populations. For in these circumstances, the issue was how to integrate Catholics. These were societies that had escaped the Reformation or had rolled back Protestant advances during the Counter-Reformation. In Catholic societies, republicanism became a way of attacking the social and political position of the Catholic Church. It was a substitute for Protestant and liberal challenges to Catholicism. Where the latter challenges were successful, the resulting political regime tended to be monarchical, although with constitutional limitations on the monarch. In Catholic societies, the politics of republicanism was not only anti-monarchical, but also drew on a tradition of hostility to the Church. This made the popular integration of Catholics within republican institutions and culture difficult. Even in France, where republicanism was more consolidated, there were limits to the integration of Catholics. ‘Most Catholics welcomed the end of the Third Republic and the sweeping away of a political class for whom anticlericalism had been an article of faith, and identified with the declared intention of the regime to organize a ‘National Revolution’ which would be based largely on a return to Christian moral values’.59

Varieties of fascism not only crowded out republicanism on the continent, but also the most important political vehicle for the popular integration of Catholics—Christian democracy. However, when republics were constituted in Italy and renewed in France and Germany after the military defeat of fascism, it was with the support of modernizing political coalitions that gave a central place to Christian democrats.60 The importance of Christian democratic parties in post-war settlements,61 an importance encouraged by the occupying powers especially the Americans, helped to reassure Catholics about their prospects under republican constitutions. This contributed to republican consolidation in all of these cases, but this consolidation was possible only after fascism was no longer a viable option in European politics.

One other transition to a republican constitution in this same time period in Europe can be remarked upon. In 1948, a coalition government led by Fine Gael implemented a republican constitution, gave up Ireland’s Dominion status within the imperial constitution, and led Ireland out of the British Commonwealth. This completed a lengthy political transition that, in an earlier phase, had culminated in the formation of the Irish Free State in 1922. Catholic Ireland had never been fully politically integrated into the liberal and Protestant framework of imperial Britain.

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This was a Catholic population that could not find a political home within a constitutional monarchy. The Anglo-Irish Agreement of 1921 demonstrated the hostility of the British imperial government to republicanism, as well as to full-scale Irish independence. A republican constitution was out of the question if Ireland was to remain within the Commonwealth. Republicanism was strictly incompatible with empire. The reaction of the new political elite in the South of Ireland to the terms of the 1921 agreement also demonstrated the symbolic importance of the republic within Ireland. It was the issue of imperial association and the oath of allegiance to the monarch, more than the issue of Irish unity, which provoked the factional infighting that resulted in a brief period of civil war. Britain maintained its imperial identity by denying that a republic could be a part of the empire in 1921; Ireland confirmed its distinctiveness in 1948 by becoming an independent republic. Catholics chose a republic.

Philip Nord notes the exceptionalism of the Third Republic in Europe. Indeed, in his emphasis on French exceptionalism in Europe, Nord provides support for my earlier argument that democratic change in Europe in the long nineteenth century was limited, and unstable. Yet in acknowledging the weaknesses of the French Third Republic, he also notes the existence of another unnamed republic. ‘Sister republics exist that have their own paranoid style, their own marginalized populations, their own elites none too respectful of democratic procedure. And if such republics have survived the hard blows of twentieth century history, it may be—happily for them—that their democratic mettle has not been put to the ultimate test, the heavy bludgeoning of total defeat in war’.62 When recognizing the imperfections of republican France, he notes also that ‘... it is easy to think of at least one democratic culture, riven with globalist, moralizing, and racist impulses, that has survived and even prospered’.63

He is referring, of course, to the United States and, in a backhanded way, to the contributions that the United States made to European political and economic reconstruction. This discussion of the long nineteenth century in Europe is not complete without attention to this ‘sister republic’.64 I turn therefore to my earlier argument that democracy was not self-sustaining in Europe and to the argument that consolidation depended on outside leadership provided by a stable, consolidated republic which had been able to develop in a geopolitical context relatively unfettered by dynastic and aristocratic resistance and by interstate rivalry.

I do not examine the American role in Europe in 1945;65 rather, I look at some features of the republican regime that evolved in America, without which it would be difficult to imagine why and how the United States was in a position to support democratic change in Europe in 1945.66

They key moment in the evolving relationship between Europe and America was the emergence of Wilsonian internationalism. When the Americans entered World War I, Wilson sought to construct a foreign policy that would not be based on the

63 Ibid., p. 246.
65 There is an excellent analysis in Ikenberry, After Victory, pp. 163–214.
tradition of realpolitik, and that would express the exceptionalism of America. ‘The history of the United States’, he wrote, ‘is modern history in broad and open analysis, stripped of a thousand elements which, upon the European stage, confuse the eye and lead the judgement astray’.67 If in 1897, Wilson had commented that the nation was ‘unfinished, unharmonized, waiting still to have its parts adjusted’,68 he wrote four years later that ‘[a] nation hitherto wholly devoted to domestic development now finds its first task roughly finished and turns about to look curiously into the tasks of the great world at large, seeking its special part and place of power’.69

In questioning the balance of power, and its presupposition of interstate anarchy and self-help, Wilson used the principle of self-determination to support the position that interstate war was associated with the distribution of types of domestic political regimes. His liberalism was closely tied to the belief that American power had a special character. As carried forward by Wilson, the principle of national self-determination had its origins in American political culture—through a reworking of the tradition of states-rights, a tradition that had some roots in Wilson’s Virginia background. Wilson had conceded that the commonwealths of 1774 were states, and states they remained after they entered the union of 1789.70 He further allowed that ‘… the right of secession may have existed (theoretically) at the first’ [that is, ‘the first years of the century’]. But, he further argued, the right of secession ‘did not exist at the time the South sought to exercise it’. This right had ‘ceased to exist by reason of the growth of national sentiment’.71 The principle for which the South fought was retrograde, and ‘protected a belated order of society’. The victory of the North freed the American nation from internal contradictions,72 and preserved the territorial integrity of the American Union. The secession of the South could not, in this view, be justified by a principle of national self-determination. The refusal of the national government to accept the withdrawal of the South, and the decision to protect the integrity of the Union, were quite consistent with a principle of national self-determination. Self-determination established internal sovereignty. National self-determination in America thus was associated with the extension and consolidation of liberal republicanism. There was no contradiction in nineteenth century America between national self-determination and territorial integrity. Territorial integrity and self-determination were separated, and potentially in conflict, outside America—particularly in the old world because of the continuing importance of imperial and monarchical rule within it.

Wilson may have failed at Versailles but he stands behind Roosevelt’s Four Freedoms speech of 1941 and the Atlantic Charter of the same year. And behind Wilson stands one hundred-odd years of republican hegemony. America was unusual because its ideology of nationhood was republican. The same could not be said for the states of Europe where anti-republicans could always invoke a national past against republicans. It was not true of Spanish America, where republicanism

was quickly and thoroughly challenged. Even as America made the transition from a federal union to a federal state, liberal republicanism continued to inform America’s sense of its distinctiveness and its place in the world. Some legacies die hard, even in a world of sovereign states.

**Republicanism in America**

This discussion of republicanism in America provides some support for my earlier claims about the strategic structure of republicanism in a monarchical world. There has been republican continuity in America since the Founding and the geopolitical context in America was dramatically different to that in Europe. The differences shaped the strategic structure of republicanism and contributed to its hegemony in America.

No movement challenged the emerging American regime by drawing on a monarchist alternative, unlike post-Revolutionary Europe, where divisions between republicans and monarchists very much influenced political competition. The most aristocratic faction in American politics—the planter elite of South Carolina—in fact attempted to hoist fellow Americans by their republican commitments.73

In this light, the assertion that republicanism was the ideology of American nationhood74 does not seem remarkable. And it would further suggest that the polemical charges of monarchy and aristocracy deployed in political debate in the Founding period carried primarily symbolic weight.75 Jefferson's quarrel with Hamilton was not an opposition between republican virtue and monarchical ambition but, rather, a debate between different virtues76 inflected against a background of shared political convictions. 'Instead of repression and revenge, ideological passions in the US found an outlet in polemics and party organization'.77 This remark points to a useful contrast between Europe and America in the wake of revolution, which might help to place in sharper relief the unusual situation of republicanism in America.

In America, the protracted European war slowly transformed elite attitudes about the source of foreign threats. In the early years of his administration, Jefferson had treated England as the ‘contemporary culprit and historic enemy’.78 He attributed the lingering crisis in Anglo-American affairs to the unfinished business of the


78 Spivak, *Jefferson's English Crisis*, p. 103.
American Revolution. But by late 1807, Jefferson increasingly feared all of Europe. And as the European war ended, American policymakers continued to believe ‘that Europe’s absolutist regimes viewed the United States as a standing challenge to legitimate rule and monarchical government’. The Royalists everywhere detest and despise us as republicans’ wrote John Adams in 1816. ‘Our government’, Monroe wrote in 1815, ‘makes all the govts. of Europe our enemies’.

These were real fears, but at the same time, since the 1780s policymakers had recognized that the two ‘neighborhoods’—Europe and America—were very different. Republican America simply was not in the same strategic situation as republican France. These differences, which tended to be elided in these American reactions after the Congress of Vienna, were the very reasons for optimism in America about the future of republicanism.

From the American point of view, there were no sovereign competitors in America to the project of republicanism. This was a condition, moreover, which had to be maintained in order to ensure the success of the republican experiment. Multiple sovereignty implied competition among technologically comparable societies; this in turn implied standing armies and national debts to support soldiers in the field, and such a society of states implied balance of power politics and a situation of permanent insecurity. The goals of the American Revolution, it was feared, would be difficult to preserve under such conditions. It was essential then, as Lewis argues, to pursue federal union. ‘Unless a single union included all of the states, separate sovereignties would interact in some form of a balance of power system’. This union was imagined by some, particularly Jefferson, as a ‘republican empire, an empire without a powerful metropolis or an aristocratic ruling class’.

The American union was something more than an anarchy, and it was more centralized than the European Concert. A concert offers no permanent solution to the security dilemmas associated with interstate anarchy, and the European Concert was not a stepping-off point for political union. The Concert decayed with time and its decay reinforced the interstate system of European society. Since the American union was already more than a concert, however, its transition path was more likely to be toward deeper political integration. The federal union internalized political conflict, unlike the European Concert. While interstate conflict and war threatened the European concert, it was the possibility of secession that threatened the American union.

The hegemonic power of republicanism was actually confirmed in the Civil War. The South Carolina elite argued that their institutions and practices represented a truer form of republicanism than the institutions and practices of the North. Slavery was essential in a true republic, they argued, thus confirming the power of republicanism as a legitimating ideology in America. They sought to exploit the

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79 Ibid., p. 94.
81 Ibid., p. 75.
82 Ibid., p. 6.
84 Jervis, ‘From Balance to Concert’.
Federalist synthesis of states’ rights and national government by denying another central claim that had been central to the early debate—namely that an extended republic feasibly protected liberty. The planter elite in South Carolina was drawn instead to earlier justifications for the small republic—that the extended republic could not resolve the problem of faction. The run-up to the Civil War thus continued some of the debate of the Founding period.

Relations among the states in the American union in its early years were more peaceful than relations among the newly independent states of Latin America. This held for all types of war, from systemic to civil to small wars. With large armies on hand, the new states readily sought military solutions to internal and external disputes. War broke out first between Buenos Aires and Brazil and later between Colombia and Peru. And in the same year, 1825, military leaders took power in a number of Spanish American states, marking the beginning of the militarization of public life in Spanish America. Internal divisions plagues the new nations, including factional disputes and unresolved constitutional issues. All of the revolutions had been incomplete, and had left in their wake characteristic conflicts among post-independence conservatives, moderates who were liberal, constitutional monarchists and radical republicans. These conflicts were not so different from the divisions between monarchists and republicans that were crystallized in continental Europe after the French Revolution. In Spanish America, however, public life was far more militarized. In the language of one observer, the caudillo-ridden Latin American republics looked like militarized haciendas. Hence conservatives were not always monarchists. They could co-ordinate around a military dictatorship even if the constitution was formally republican. Such an option was not beyond the pale for European conservatives but it was much less likely to be invoked in the first instance. Monarchies in Europe still had considerable support and staying power after the French Revolution. The ‘legitimist’ peace settlement of Vienna demonstrated the continuing presence and importance of monarchial regimes in Europe.

American policymakers, particularly Adams, Clay and Monroe, had hoped to encourage general adherence among the new states of Spanish America to a ‘North

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86 Lewis, *The American Union*, p. 204.
American model of diplomacy, politics and economics— that is, adherence to neutral rights, republican government and liberal principles on trade. But by the nature of events in Spanish America, they also had to confront precisely what the federal union had been designed to eliminate— multiple sovereignty in the Americas. Republicans had always feared that multiple sovereignty would lead to balance of power politics, which was considered inimical to republican politics. The federal union was the political bedrock on which to build a republican America because it solved the problem of multiple sovereignty. Yet there was now more than one sovereign power in the Americas. And American policymakers could do little about it. Could they have refused to recognize republican governments in Spanish America as the Spanish American Empire disintegrated? Once they had recognized these new entities as legitimate international actors, the neighbourhood had changed.

As the neighbourhood changed, so did the internal structure of the United States. There were ambiguities in the Federalist synthesis of state rights and national government that could be exploited in ways that would force a domestic reworking of the internal logic of the federal union. A right to secede could be justifiably invoked in the South, supporters of secession argued, because the United States was a compact of states. If a right to secede existed and the act of seceding occurred, it was precisely because the United States was not a state. The units to which the right to secede was attached were semi-sovereign. They were states in a union. This political use of the concept of secession was designed to establish that the United States was not a state but a compact of states.

The political debate in ante-bellum America was about how secession was to be conventionally understood. More particularly it was about how to describe the United States in constitutional terms and how any description could be made compelling. In describing secession as a process of withdrawal of a state from a compact, the political elite in the South forced the North to deny this description of the United States and to substitute a rival description.

The position of the South could be challenged in several ways. One way would have been to concede the description used in the South, namely that the United States was a compact of states, but then deny that such an arrangement created a right to secede. Another challenge would have been to concede this description and to concede that it entailed a right to secede, but to deny that this right extended automatically to the Southern states. A third way to challenge the constitutional language of the South was to argue that a right to secede that was grounded in a compact theory could not be invoked because the United States was not a compact. The North made real this latter claim that the United States was a state and not merely a compact through the use of force, ‘resolving once and for all where sovereignty lay’. In so acting it took on board the most important trappings of a territorial state. ‘A state proves itself as a sovereign state by demonstrating that it has an overwhelming monopoly on the legitimate use of physical force’. The Civil War not only consolidated republicanism; it also consolidated the territorial foundations

of the American federal state and eliminated any future threat of secession as America continued to expand.

The dreams of a federal union and a republican empire were dead by the middle part of the nineteenth century. Both of these models of political arrangements were particularly sensitive to patterns of authority within and across political boundaries. As authority began to be dispersed amongst multiple sovereign actors in the Americas, political authority within the United States became increasingly concentrated. But the political culture of republicanism did not disappear with these changes. Rather, republicans in America were forced to consider how liberal republicanism could continue to make a distinctive contribution to public life, both within and across political boundaries. Liberal republicanism continued to motivate policymakers when they defined American identity and its role in the world.

Conclusion

The long nineteenth century stretched from 1789 to 1945. It began in revolution and ended in war. This period is treated here as a protracted European-wide democratic transition. My analysis thus treats differently the turning points typically emphasized in international histories of European politics in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. So, for example, 1815 is relevant for my arguments, not because the Congress of Vienna begins a transformation in international politics, but because it is a post-war settlement resulting from the consequences of social and political revolution. And for my purposes, 1945 is relevant because it marks the military defeat of the National Socialist revolution in Germany and the consolidation across much of Europe of a long process of democratic change.

My arguments are explicitly rooted in the unit level. However, I also take into account social interdependencies in European society associated with the distribution of types of political regime and with territorial stratification—that is states. I have emphasized in particular the consequences of democratic republicanism within a social system composed of dynastic states.

These arguments about European society show how difficult it is to sustain an exclusively systemic perspective on war and change in European society. They show why it is important to take seriously the preferences of revolutionary actors, and the structures within which they act. And they illustrate, as well, some of the consequences of broaching in argument the theoretical importance of domestic regimes.

Furthermore, if this period is of one piece as I have proposed, then we should be able to rethink, or frame in some new ways, other events such as the revolutions of 1848 or the Great War. We might also be able to rethink the cleavage structures of European politics in more systematic ways for a number of cases by taking into account the political conflicts associated with republicanism. In any event, these are ways in which the arguments of this article might be taken forward.
The long nineteenth century is a term coined for the 125-year period comprising the years 1789 through 1914 by Russian literary critic and author Ilya Ehrenburg[1] and British Marxist historian and author Eric Hobsbawm. The term refers to the notion that the period between 1789 and 1914 reflect a progression of ideas which are characteristic to an understanding of the 19th century in Europe. Throughout 19th-century Europe, political and economic forces helped to dramatically alter the European continent in a manner that forever changed the countries and people that inhabited them. In less than a century, the absolutist ideals of the Old Regime started to wither away as revolutionary ideals of freedom and democracy attempted to take hold across Europe. Industrialization, with its powerful economic connections, greatly fueled these revolutions through the development of both social strife and inequality. As a result, Europeans experienced uneven and sporadic waves of change across the long nineteenth-century. What accounts for these discrepancies? Histories of European international politics are punctuated by turning points. Typically, these watersheds have been connected to major wars. What do such histories have to tell us about nineteenth century Europe? What, if anything, is left out in the telling? My purposes in posing these questions are, first, to suggest that these histories focus too narrowly on war and, second, to propose an alternative perspective on modern European politics. Export citation Request permission. Copyright. The "long" nineteenth century, extending up to World War I, contained the seeds of developments and crises that continue to haunt the region today. The book begins with an overview of the main historical trends in the sixteenth to the eighteenth centuries, during which time the region lost momentum and became the periphery, no longer in step with the rising West. Author of Decades of Crisis: Central and Eastern Europe before World War II (California, 1998) and of Central and Eastern Europe 1944-1993 (1996), he has now, with his informal "trilogy," performed the remarkable feat of laying the entire modern history of the region before the English-speaking audience.